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Abstract
This thesis investigates somatic movement and puppetry as tandem 
practices. It draws particularly on the somatic education approach of Moshe 
Feldenkrais, originator of the Feldenkrais Method (FM) and its two modalities; 
verbally guided Awareness Through Movement and hands-on Functional 
Integration lessons. I pinpoint self-image in FM, which relates to a person's 
kinaesthetic awareness of herself as she acts, as a key concept for theorizing 
puppetry, reframing it as person-image to avoid some of the theoretical pitfalls
of 'self'. I re-examine the idea of body-image in Paul Schilder, Feldenkrais's 
source, and identify the importance of his work for critical thinking on person-
image and performance. Relating person-image to the trainings and writings of
Jacques Lecoq, Dennis Silk and Heinrich Von Kleist, I analyse the ways in which
it can include objects, puppets and materials and propose a new practice, 
Awareness Through Puppetry, which goes beyond an application of FM in 
puppetry training. I apply the fresh understanding of person-image I have 
developed to specific performances by Pierre Tual, Ilka Schönbein and Xavier 
Le Roy. Throughout the thesis I refer to Tim Ingold's concept of the 
'meshwork', weaving lines in, out and around my practice and thinking, 
connecting them to critical thinking more broadly in performance studies and 
beyond. 
My contributions to knowledge in this thesis are an assessment of 
Schilder and Feldenkrais's work applied to somatic performance practice in 
puppetry, which I understand as an approach as much as an outcome, leading 
to the practice of Awareness Through Puppetry, and a fresh approach to 
performance analysis through the lens of person-image. I situate the thesis in a
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broad ecological context where puppetry has a new subversive role as a 
somatic technology through which it is possible to discover something about 
what it is to be human and nonhuman, and how these interact.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
When I was fifteen, the stillness of my mother in her coffin was 
shocking. The coldness of her brow that I kissed, like stone. The fixity of death.
No longer in time. No future, except that of decay. No self, no person present. 
Movement is life indeed. The warmth of my soft-breathing child asleep. The 
delicate movement of her breath that I sense, even in the dark, as I check on 
her, accompanied by its gentle, intermittent sound.
The puppet has multiple possible futures and only a very slow process of
decay ahead, generally speaking. It is brought to life, and in a sense it really 
has a life of its own; it is an extension of the person who gives it movement 
and breath. It is a way of extending and exploring her self-image. In this thesis
I use examples from puppetry and material performance to explore the notion 
of person-image, a development from Schilder’s ‘body-image’ and Feldenkrais’s
‘self-image’, and its place in a radical performance ecology.
*
Feldenkrais Method (FM) is a somatic education process that uses the 
development of situated movement awareness and environmentally anchored 
movement for neuromuscular retraining. In the method, which is named after 
its founder, Moshe Feldenkrais (1904-1984), self-image broadly refers to 
kinaesthetic awareness of oneself in action.
The terms ‘puppetry’ and ‘material performance’ refer to processes of 
creation and presentation in which responding to nonhuman materialities is key
and which use the dance between human and nonhuman as a creative source.
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I qualified as a FM practitioner in 2007 and have been a theatre-maker 
since 1994.
*
1.1 A chorus of voices
The concrete! What one holds in one’s hand, what one can touch, sniff, 
eat, grip, salivate, sweat. It already smells of the stage, it seems to me.
Jean-Louis Barrault (14)
Tout bouge. Tout évolue, progresse.
Jacques Lecoq (1997:173)
Movement is life. Life is a process. Improve the quality of the process
and you improve the quality of life itself.
Moshe Feldenkrais (Beringer 2001:xi)
I seem to be a verb.
Buckminster Fuller (Wheeler 135)
Movement is Consciousness./ That’s what puppetry is, right?
Kate Brehm (Posner 84)
I heard the words ‘fixed and cannot move’ in a song; that’s how puppets
are – and are not.
Christopher Leith (Masoliver)
The opposite of embodied is dead, not omniscient.
Bruno Latour (2004b:209)
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I cite these fragments by way of a micro-introduction to this thesis and 
my influences. Barrault speaks of materiality as the essence of theatre and I 
agree. Materiality is also the essence of how human beings construct 
themselves as embodied beings, moving in and as part of a material 
environment. For Lecoq, everything moves, and the recognition of the 
dynamics of different materials as people move with and through them will play
an important role in my argument. Equating movement with life and seeing life
as process, Feldenkrais offers a scientist’s tilt on Lecoq’s artistic vision, as well 
as the notion of improvement which will be explored later. Fuller connects the 
‘I’ very clearly with the process: ‘I seem to be a verb’. For Brehm movement is 
consciousness and it is not only for the human that there is no ‘consciousness’ 
without movement, but for the puppet too. I will look at playing with behaving 
‘as if’ something existed or were possible, in relation to performance, 
movement and self-image, and investigate the role of the imagination in 
creating and limiting movement. Leith identifies the dual nature of the puppet 
as both unmoving and not, leading us back to Lecoq’s ‘tout bouge’; he hints at 
the special nature of the puppet and what it allows the puppeteer to sense. 
Latour is the only thinker (as opposed to practitioner) in this crowd, and his 
phrase warns against the metaphysical trap waiting to snap when writing about
puppets; puppets are not degenerate gods (Craig) and their powers stem from 
their materiality, not from another realm (Buschmeyer in Jurkowski 1988), in 
spite of their status between being, appearing and apparition (Jusselle 
2008:9). Which is not to deny the potency of animist thought and play 
experiments; more on that later.
This is not a thesis only about puppetry, but one aim is to debunk the 
idea that puppetry is 'all in the hands', as I have heard one puppeteer describe 
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her practice1. I link puppetry practice with somatic education and consider the 
implications for political ecology and how people live in the world. I ask how 
Feldenkrais’s concept and use of self-image in his method can be a generative 
dramaturgical and critical tool for material performance. Within this are the 
more straightforward, practical questions, What does Feldenkrais Method (FM) 
offer the puppeteer? and, What does puppetry offer the FM practitioner? I do 
not aim to prescribe modes of training or performance preparation (although 
this is a by-product), but rather reflect on how putting puppetry and FM into 
conversation increases the reach of both. I do not address the role of the 
audience or spectator; my focus is on the experiences of making and doing. 
The project is ambitious and idealistic in the sense of aspiring to oil processes 
of change rather than aspiring to an ideal. It is about how living in the world 
creates (and destroys) humans and creates (and destroys) the world. I 
consider moments in training, performance and life. In this introduction, I map 
out my terms and set up a critical framework for the work.
There is an interest in FM in the puppetry world: it is taught in puppetry 
schools in France and Germany2, there are other puppeteer/FM practitioners 
besides myself (Nicolas Gousseff and Claire Vialon in France, for example), 
Basil Jones of Handspring, perhaps the most famous puppet company in the 
world, is aware of it and links the use of breath in puppetry to that in FM 
(Sichel 1663). Although different, Alexander Technique (AT) is a somatic 
1 Rachel Warr at Pulling the Strings in Surgery: Roger Kneebone & Rachel Warr, a public 
event (part 0of Clod Ensemble's 'Performing Medicine' series) exploring parallels between
puppetry and the operating theatre, 9 Nov. 2015.
2 Claire Heggen's pedagogy at France's national puppetry school, École Nationale 
Supérieure des Arts de la Marionnette (ESNAM), is heavily influenced by her encounter 
with Feldenkrais at Peter Brook's theatre in the 1970s (Fredricksson). Nicolas Gousseff, 
FM practitioner, also teaches periodically at ESNAM. FM practitioner, Hermann Klein, 
teaches puppetry students at the State University of Music and the Performing Arts Stut-
tgart (HMDK).
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education method related to FM from which Feldenkrais drew inspiration; AT 
has been practised and advocated by puppeteers Stephen Mottram and the 
now deceased Christopher Leith4. The particular relationship of the body to 
objects in puppetry relates to the importance of skeletal and environmental 
awareness in FM. This connection between the somatic and the puppetic5 exists
in practice but has not been theorized.
In the performing arts generally, interest in FM is growing. The last two 
years alone has produced, for example, Worsley's book, Feldenkrais for Actors 
(2016), a special issue on Moshe Feldenkrais of Theatre, Dance and 
Performance Training (2015) and conferences at the Universities of Bath and 
West London (2015, 2016)6. In the last decade there have been PhD theses 
where FM is a central focus in relation to dance (Garner 2008, Kampe 2013) 
and acting (Edinborough 20097). Two volumes of The Feldenkrais Journal have 
been devoted to the performing arts (2002, 2003) and one to improvisation 
(2014). Many of the practices treated pertain to puppetry, but no one 
specifically addresses the conversation between puppetry and FM (apart from 
myself in the above-mentioned journal). This thesis therefore charts new 
territory. 
3 Jones is quoted saying, 'The lead puppeteer will give an in-breath: we are about to go. It 
is a kind of signalling, a semiotic of movement. Of course it links to Tai Chi, Hindu move-
ment forms, Feldenkreis (sic); it has many links. We understand those links so well'.
4 Both have referenced AT in workshops in my presence.
5 Coined from the French 'marionnettique'.
6 (re)storing performance: The Feldenkrais Method and Creative Practice, 27 June 2015, 
University of Bath; Making the Impossible Possible': The Feldenkrais Method in Music, 
Dance and Creative Practice, 30 Apr. 2016, University of West London.
7 Edinborough refers to the practices of object manipulation and aikido; his work is the 
nearest of those referenced to my own research.
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My argument hinges on an understanding of materialities (including 
puppets and bodies) where these are not environments through which people 
move or in which they live, or things they use, or, in the case of puppets, 
objects through which a performer can project, but lines along which human 
beings sense8. My use of lines and 'along' is influenced by Tim Ingold's thinking
on meshworks, which I expand on below, as well as his terms 'enworlding' and 
‘lifeworld’, and ideas around skilled practice and developmentally embodied 
responsiveness. For now, I ask my reader to imagine the trembling of a 
spider's web; both spider and fly feel the vibrations along the threads. My 
concern is with diffused, multi-directional sensitivity and awareness. In relation
to the meshwork, I also consider Jane Bennett and Bruno Latour’s ideas on 
‘actants’. I argue that self-image, as lived, is a key nexus or knot in the tangle 
of materialities, and a conceptual tool which helps unpick what happens in 
performance where mingling people and things is the point. I contend that this 
collaboration must be a central focus in thinking about performance generally 
and that all performance is material. 
'Self-image’ refers to how much of a person is included in her image of 
herself as she acts. I stake out the territory of 'person-image' which I believe 
avoids the problematics of 'self' and offers a subtly different concept. I look to 
Feldenkrais’s source for the concept of self-image, Paul Schilder (1886-1940), 
whose research on 'body-image' (his term) in the field of psychiatry and 
psychoanalysis emerges as a rich and largely untapped source for critical
8 In this thesis, I expressly do not enter into any debate about 'things' and 'objects' and 
use these terms freely and almost interchangeably. If I align my thinking with any no-
tion, it is Ingold's 'thing' as a gathering of lines, within his concept of the meshwork. I set
to one side object-oriented ontology (Harman) and thing theory (Brown), which might 
have been candidates for consideration here, in order to focus on elaborating my own ar-
gument in terms of the meshwork. These other avenues might be fruitfully pursued in the
future in relation to what I weave here however; Bennett's analysis might provide a good
starting point (2015).
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thinking about material performance. Closely related to self-image is the use of
imagination in FM; the kinaesthetic visualization of oneself in movement. I look
at the difficulties of imagining movement and how these can be harnessed 
creatively in a puppetry approach.
I am not alone in seeing puppets as a special, particularly sensitive, 
form of materiality, and as tools through which it is possible to discover 
something about what it is to be human (Bell, Cohen, Francis, Gross, 
Jurkowski), but theorizing a connection between somatic education and 
puppetry is, I believe, novel. In Chapter 5, I propose the beginnings of a new 
practice I call Awareness Through Puppetry. While object-theatre makers such 
as Molnar, Limbos and Carrignon rely less on the sensitive corporeal connection
I address, and don't necessarily see their work as puppetry (Jmil), I contend 
that my observations about meshworks also apply to their work and to other 
performance genres. I propose that puppetry be seen more as an approach 
than an outcome, and that some performance that does not consider itself to 
be puppetry can be fruitfully viewed from a puppetic point of view. The case 
studies in Chapter 6 refer to artists exploring person-image through 
(sometimes loosely) figurative forms.
Puppetry might be seen as an art-form which explores and exploits the 
‘other’ rather than the self (Gross, Kohler, Piris). In FM, self-image is the other 
in a way; it is the schism in the human between what she is and her self-image
that gives a person her richness and her problems. I see puppetry as a kind of 
living proof that self is in other and other is in self. Bringing somatic practice 
into conversation with material performance provokes questions regarding 
agency and ethics. I aim to offer another perspective on Matthew Isaac 
Cohen’s remark that, 'Puppets in performance can provide powerful lessons in 
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how to deal humanely with other people' (130)9. How do they provide these 
lessons and what is it to ‘deal humanely with other people’? Can a coupling of 
the arts of puppetry and somatic awareness offer a foil to neoliberalism, or at 
least a novel critical apparatus and awareness practice? I contend that FM and 
material theatre have much to offer together as restorative human and 
ecological practices.
Throughout the thesis I draw examples from my own performance work 
and its creation, my teaching and learning experiences, and from performances
I have seen, both of puppetry and work which does not frame itself as 
puppetry where appropriate. My methodology relates the parallel development 
of my own experience in puppetry and FM training and exploration situations, 
as both receiver and leader, to my readings and theoretical understandings of 
somatic education and puppetry practice, technique, training and spectating. 
My research draws on my training and expertise as a Lecoq-trained performer 
and theatre-maker (Ecole Jacques Lecoq), and as a puppeteer and FM 
practitioner. My practice precedes and has continued throughout the research 
for this thesis and there is a constant dialogue between my doing and thinking.
My theatre teachers and mentors over the years who have influenced this work
are Philippe Gaulier (ex-Lecoq teacher), Krikor Belekian (architect and director 
of Lecoq’s L.E.M. - Laboratoire d’Etude du Mouvement), Jean-Louis Heckel (co-
founder of French company Nada Théâtre), Shiro Daimon (ex-Noh actor turned
contemporary performer), Yves Marc (Decroux-trained co-founder of Théâtre 
de Mouvement), Alain Recoing (French puppet master), Christopher Leith, 
Rene Baker, Sue Buckmaster and Stephen Mottram (British puppet masters), 
plus all the other theatre, aikido and FM practitioners with whom I have played.
9 Taylor, in her introduction to Handspring, also asks what puppets teach us about 
ourselves (12).
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There is not the space here to summarize the practices of these various 
practitioners; their presence will be elucidated as relevant in the discussion.
I have packed a lot into my title, so, after some critical framing, let me 
unpack a little. The following sections are first approximations of my terms 
enabling an overview of my terrain. My methodology of accumulated 
'approximations' is drawn from FM where the term is used to refer to a layered 
approach to exploration and learning. The term 'approximation' is used by FM 
practitioners to refer to an exploratory step in a learning process. However the 
more usual meanings of approaching, being near in space or time, or a value 
that is nearly but not correct, do hint at the sense that approximations are 
always near to a point, an ideal or an idea; an approximation relates to 
something, not nothing. A first approximation is an initial exploration of a 
specific movement and how much awareness of it is present. Subsequent 
approximations refine or shift what was learnt or discovered at the start. I 
expand on this methodology at the end of this chapter. In the thesis, each 
successive section and chapter brings new approximations, fresh attempts to 
come at the subject from alternative angles, with different strategies.
1.2 Critical tools: Meshworks
… the meshwork of entangled lines of life, growth and movement. This is
the world we inhabit ... what is commonly known as the ‘web of life’ is 
precisely that: not a network of connected points, but a meshwork of 
interwoven lines. (Ingold, 2011:63)
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Ingold, takes the term 'meshwork' from Henri Lefebvre (Ingold 
2007:80), who writes:
… mental and social activity impose their own meshwork upon nature's 
space, upon the Heraclitean flux of spontaneous phenomena, upon that 
chaos which precedes the advent of the body; they set up an order 
which, as we shall see, coincides, but only up to a point, with the order 
of words. Traversed now by pathways and patterned by networks, 
natural space changes: one might say that practical activity writes upon 
nature, albeit in a scrawling hand, and that this writing implies a 
particular representation of space. (117) (His italics.)
This ‘practical activity written upon nature’ is akin to Feldenkrais's 'self-image' 
which ‘implies a particular representation of space' and which might be seen as
a constraint if a person didn't have sensitivity to feedback. This sensitivity is 
what FM and puppetry develop. Ingold goes beyond Lefebvre in making the 
meshworks of people, environment and things intertwine in an inseparable and
non-hierarchical way, simply because any element is impossible without the 
others: I do not just require ground to walk on but air, water, things, a place to
live in, night and day, and so on. This is Ingold’s so-called ‘lifeworld’. He 
considers and rejects Latour’s actor-network theory (ANT), which is a model for
understanding modern societies as networks with 'fibrous, thread-like, wiry, 
stringy, ropy, capillary character that is never captured by the notions of 
levels, layers, territories, spheres, categories, structure, systems' (1990:3). 
Ingold proposes instead ‘SPIDER’ - ‘skilled practice involves developmentally 
embodied responsiveness’ (2011:65). This idea assumes the primacy of 
movement while Latour's network is still a structure, albeit an organic one. 
Feldenkrais also chooses movement as a route to awareness (his 1972 book is 
called Awareness Through Movement, the name also given to his verbal 
lessons). Movement can occur along lines whereas connected points suggest a 
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conceptual framework where information exchange is possible, but not subtle, 
close or loose-woven textures, which is to say, not variation or different 
qualities of exchange. Ingold therefore rejects Latour’s attribution of agency to 
all elements in the network since it cannot be said that a pebble and a person 
have comparable agency. Rather agency comes about thanks to the 
meshwork; ‘The web, in short, is the very condition of my agency. But it is not,
in itself, an agent’ (2011:93). Thinking in terms of the meshwork avoids 
ontological problems by focusing on living rather than being; it rejoins 
Feldenkrais’s ‘life is a process’ and Lecoq’s ‘tout bouge’. Importantly, Ingold’s 
thinking, influenced by Ortega y Gasset and Karl Marx, acknowledges the 
process of living which, for humans, can be charted by shifting self-image; 
‘what we are, or what we can be, does not come ready made. We have, 
perpetually and never-endingly, to be making ourselves’ (7). This is Ingold, but
could be Feldenkrais. The selves that we are making are our self-images. I 
might be able to lose or gain a bit of weight, strengthen my core or become 
more supple, but in order to change how I act in the world on a more 
fundamental and global level, I need to change my self-image. The self-image 
is the mutable part, it is what my intention and attention does with matter. FM 
practitioner trainer, Jeff Haller, claims, ‘we have the biological capacity to 
observe what we are doing and refine our activities. This does not mean we 
can change ourselves, only our self-image, that is, our thinking, sensing, 
feeling and acting’ (2006).
FM deals in environmentally grounded, or situated, movement. Ingold 
wants to reframe the environment, ‘as a domain of entanglement’; ‘It is within 
such a tangle of interlaced trails, continually ravelling here and unravelling 
there, that beings grow or ‘issue forth’ along the lines of their relationships’ 
(2011:70). My research looks at the specific tangles produced when humans 
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make performance purposely with and through nonhuman materials, as the 
driving force.
According to Feldenkrais, 'we act in accordance with our self-image' 
(1972:3). The meshwork is the condition of agency, according to Ingold. Below
I expand on why I choose to reject the 'self' of self-image and replace it with 
person. My notion of a person reaches far beyond the confines of any body and
any mind but does include one specific and inseparable body and mind in each 
case. There is a lack of hierarchy anywhere in the idea of person-image as a 
knot in the meshwork; a coming together of person, environment, weather, 
things… an entanglement of person and lifeworld which influences the lines 
along which a person travels through life. Body is an aspect of mind, mind an 
aspect of body, both aspects of society and nature, and nature and society 
aspects of body and mind. 'Person-image' involves a collaboration with the 
material flow of the world. I consider how the puppet influences the 
puppeteer’s self-use in this meshwork, how and when person-image includes 
objects or puppets and what scope there is for playing with this.
Although Feldenkrais never speaks in terms of a meshwork, he 
emphasizes global, situated, function in relation to context and environment. 
He was interested in Wiener's 'cybernetics', which referred to the feedback 
mechanisms in 'the entire field of control and communication theory, whether 
in the machine or in the animal' (19) and might be considered a conceptual 
precursor to the meshwork10.
10 Cybernetics is however criticized by Berthoz as not offering an active theory of perception
(151). Feldenkrais makes passing reference to it in The Elusive Obvious in relation to the 
feedback loop of skeleton-muscles-CNS-environment (1981:22).
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Near the beginning of the Amherst FM practitioner training in 198011, 
Feldenkrais demonstrates his vision of a person which might be seen as an 
intermingling of lines:
… (for) important things in your life, the change must be of the entire 
person, not of the body, not of the little place in the back ... If you have 
a bad back ... it is medical practice to heal the back. My practice is to 
heal the feet and the neck and the shoulders until I go to the point 
where the trouble is where it disappears by itself ... If you make one 
detail work properly, it’s nothing. (Amherst 1980, 10)
It is easy to extrapolate to the meshwork of society, and Feldenkrais saw his 
method as reaching far beyond 'bodywork'.
1.2.1 Critical tools: 'Umwelt', 'Lebenswelt', 'Innenwelt'
Ingold uses Uexküll’s theory of the Umwelt, in which the outer world is 
particular to, and endowed with meaning by the creature experiencing it. If the
Umwelt is the lines of the outer world as experienced, then the Lebenswelt, or 
lifeworld, is all the experiences; the Innenwelt, used by Lacan in contrast to 
the Umwelt, might describe self-image or what the person makes of these 
experiences. Ingold concludes that ‘the organism (animal or human) should be 
understood not as a bounded entity surrounded by an environment but as an 
unbounded entanglement of lines in fluid space’ (2011:64). Um-, Leben- and 
Innen-welt are not separate entities, but intertwined in a biosemiotic whole. 
Conceptually, the Umwelt closes creatures in their worlds. A person’s Innenwelt
11 During his lifetime, Feldenkrais trained 13 people to practice his method in Tel Aviv (Is-
rael), 1969-71. In San Francisco (U.S.), 1975-78, he trained another 65 students. 235 
students attended the Amherst (U.S.) training starting in 1980, of which Feldenkrais 
taught the first two summers; his assistants, drawn from the original 13, taught the rest 
(Reese 2012). Recordings of the Amherst training are available on loan to FM practition-
ers from The Feldenkrais Guild UK.
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seen as self-image offers the potential to shift her Umwelt, or how she is in the
world. Ingold writes:
In that very act of standing back and reflecting on the conditions of 
existence, the human Umwelt becomes an Innenwelt – literally a 
‘subjective universe’ – an organization of representations, internal to the
mind, which lend meaning to the raw material of experience. (80)
But it is always ‘the whole creature’ as Wendy Wheeler puts it, involving ‘mind-
body-environment’ as well as ‘the whole system (minds-bodies-cultural-social-
and-natural-environments)’ which needs to be acknowledged for ‘human 
flourishing and creative living’ (33). Looking at self-image and puppetry 
together helps to understand how I extend beyond me, and how environment 
extends into me; our entanglement and my enworlding.
During Feldenkrais’s early formative years, ideas around complexity 
were bubbling up in diverse areas. Feldenkrais read widely and conversed 
ardently; some of these ideas undoubtedly reached him, as well as what might 
be called ‘the complexity turn’ seen as a more general conceptual shift. 
Wheeler identifies some of the key ideas in the first half of the twentieth 
century coming from Bertalanffy in biology, Prigogine in flow dynamics (along 
with Feldenkrais’s friend Aaron Katzir (Reese 2015)), Wiener in cybernetics, 
Cannon on homeostasis and Whitehead on organic mechanisms (Wheeler 52). 
In relation to complex systems, the meshwork image might appear too simple, 
unless perhaps one sees each line as itself composed of a meshwork. What is 
important for my argument is that the self-image is a hub where observation, 
choice and action happen.
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1.2.2 Critical tools: ‘actants’ and agency
Bennett’s use of Latour's term ‘actants’ in Vibrant Matter (2010) has 
been appropriated in the field of material performance. Posner finds Bennett’s 
description of the agency of the inanimate material world ‘similar to how 
puppeteers have long articulated their interplay with puppets’ (6). ‘Actants’ 
dissolves the hierarchy putting people above objects. Bennett summarizes 
Latour's concept thus: ‘an actant is a source of action that can be either human
or nonhuman; it is that which has efficacy, can do things, has sufficient 
coherence to make a difference, produce effects, alter the course of events’ 
(viii). In Latour's essay, "How to Talk About the Body?", he argues that 'the 
more you learn, the more differences exist' (2004b:213), and, in Politics of 
Nature, that 'reality grows to precisely the same extent as the work done to 
become sensitive to differences' (2004a:85). The making a difference of 
actants and differentiating of humans covers the nonhuman-human meshwork 
of interactions. I am interested in Bennett's aim to inspire ‘more attentive 
encounters between people-materialities and thing-materialities’ (x), which 
could be a description of good puppetry, but frustrated by her lack of practical 
suggestions as to how to facilitate these. These encounters involve tuning 
human ability to differentiate and are facilitated when there are also more 
attentive encounters between people-materialities and other people-
materialities, such as in FM.
However, while I might work with the materiality of a puppet and it can 
have a very strong, almost magical power over me as a puppeteer, leading to a
kind of possession (Jurkowski, Schönbein, Taylor), or over the audience for 
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whom it comes alive, it will not exhibit agency without my skilful 
puppeteering12. It might induce a sense of the uncanny by its still presence, but
even this is partly the result of the skill of the puppet-maker (plus the eyes and
brain of the viewer). The distinction between appearing to have agency and 
having it is important for thinking about puppetry. Ingold elaborates:
Since agency calls for skill, and since skill arises through development, it
follows that the process of development is a sine qua non for the 
exercise of agency. To attribute agency to objects that do not grow or 
develop, that consequently embody no skill, and whose movement is not
therefore coupled to their perception, is ludicrous. (2011:94)
Ingold dismisses the idea of fixed objects, claiming that live beings could not 
interact with them; every thing and being is a line and in life, but there is a 
distinction between things that are alive and moving (from their own 
propulsion) and things that aren’t. Along the lifeline of a pebble, the pebble is 
changing very slowly. He suggests that ‘to render the life of things as the 
agency of objects is to effect a double reduction, of things to objects and of life
to agency’ (2010:7). With regard to puppets, Ingold’s thinking helps to shift 
the dialogue away from treating objects as though they had agency, or lending 
them agency by calling them ‘actants’, towards something more complex. 
Rather than separate entities acting as agents, or actants as points in a 
network, Ingold proposes an entangled meshwork of lines of life where 
everything is connected through its intertwining, but the power of action is not 
12 Skill in puppetry depends on the tradition a particular puppeteer is in, going from the 
highly codified such as Japanese Bunraku or Chinese hand puppetry, to the eclecticism of
contemporary European puppetry with its many jostling techniques and styles. Jurkowski 
points out that the skill of the European puppeteer is located in her negotiation of 'what is
happening 'in-between'' (2012:131). Astles also picks up on this, from a slightly different 
angle, recognizing a shift in puppetry practice from a focus on the animation of material 
to an interest in how the puppeteer treats her material (Tables Rondes, from 01:30:00).
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equally distributed. This helps towards a sense of ethical responsibility for one’s
actions which it is possible to argue evaporates in a network of actants; if stuff 
acts, then I can’t help that happening. The puppetry historian's perspective 
that 'the distinction between living and inert matter is basic to how humans 
sort out the world' (Blumenthal 65) may be true, but I am entangled in a 
meshwork with other humans and nonhumans and need to respect the 
vibrations through the meshwork. Puppets are a type of thing made to be 
played by humans, in a meshwork, or entanglement, of lines including the 
person, her self-image, the thing or things and the material life from which 
they come – wood, resin, cloth or whatever. The things give to me, the 
puppeteer, but I take responsibility for what I do with them.
While Latour’s network and points leads to distinct entities, nonhuman 
and human, where agency suggests acting on something, the meshwork 
implies acting with; not directions of action to and fro, but emergent actions. 
Ingold draws a parallel with the ‘haeccities’, or sets of relations, of Deleuze:
These haecceities are not what we perceive, since in the world of fluid 
space there are no objects of perception. They are rather what we 
perceive with. In short, to perceive the environment is not to look back 
on the things to be found in it, or to discern their congealed shapes and 
layouts, but to join with them in the material flows and movements 
contributing to their – and our – ongoing formation. (2011:88) (His 
italics.)
According to Ingold, there is no ‘ready-made world’ but rather ‘a world-in-
formation’; the organism is seen as a knotting of lines in shifting space. This 
aligns with Feldenkrais’s notion that people should not adapt to the world 
around them, but progress into it, along it, with it; this is a sign of health 
(Amherst 1980, 1 00:20:24). There is no linearity but a constantly growing, 
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criss-crossing meshwork. In The Nonhuman Turn (Grusin 2015), Sheldon 
identifies a tendency in critical thinking which allows things a stronger 
existence than Ingold’s meshwork without making them unreachable entities, 
or strong ‘actants’ as in Latour:
From Luciana Parisi’s abstract matter to Jane Bennett’s vibrant matter, 
feminist new materialism sees objects as a concrescence or intensive 
infolding of an extensive continuum. Matter draws together what 
appears separate and makes the totality subject to mutation and 
emergence. (196)
This sounds like a complexity view of ‘meshwork’ to me, where things and 
people are, to different degrees, particular tangles and open to further 
entanglement. It is within this vision of an emergent meshwork that I wish to 
place my argument.
1.3 First approximation: Feldenkrais Method
Feldenkrais developed his method of somatic education throughout his 
life, drawing on his background as an engineer and physicist, self-directed 
research into anatomy and early neuroscience, exhaustive personal 
experimentation after a knee injury, the practice and teaching of judo in which 
he became a black belt, early tutoring jobs and his Hasidic roots13. FM is a 
learning modality which uses movement to address habit and faulty self-use 
and activate neuromuscular reprogramming. All you can do with a puppet is 
move it, or not move it. Even speaking through it involves moving it, or not 
13 Mark Reese’s detailed biography fleshes out our understanding Feldenkrais's life and how 
he developed his method (2015).
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moving it. It has no psychology, no thoughts, no feelings. It exists as 
something more than an object mainly through movement. Perhaps this helps 
understand Feldenkrais's choice of movement as a means to access the 
person; a person moves, or does not, relating parts of herself to each other, or
not. Movement is an observable quantity in the world in the way thought, 
emotion and feeling are not.
Feldenkrais states that, 'The results of faulty habits are what are called 
character or chronic diseases' (2005:11). In his book, Body and Mature 
Behaviour (1949), he sets out physiological and behavioural bases and 
arguments to the effect that the degeneration of the human is not inevitable 
and the endeavour to change is both laudable and necessary. He postulates 
that human consciousness will remain stunted so long as people do not 
collectively address the need to function optimally within our physical, gravity-
bound environment; this is the next transition to be made in global human 
development. He analyses what distinguishes erect human posture from that of
other animals, noting the importance of the tiny amount of energy required to 
initiate movement from standing, and the capacity, in fully realized, erect 
posture (with minimum muscular tonus) to move in any direction easily and 
without prior reorganization. Immobility is less easy than movement, but fully 
realized erect posture is the point of greatest potential energy and therefore 
potency (2005:92, 94). This is when the centre of gravity is at its highest. He 
recognizes an understanding of this in Eastern practices, such as yoga and judo
(2005:105, 1958, 2010b). The state of potency can be strong or delicate; it is 
not about maximum but situation-appropriate power.
If I learnt basic Mandarin, that might be enough to see me through a 
holiday, but if I was going to live in China it would be in my interest to learn 
the local language properly. All humans live in gravity, yet few of us learn to 
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function optimally in it. Feldenkrais writes, 'There being no instinctive mode of 
doing in most acts, we can learn any performance' (2005:131); why just get 
by in gravity when we can become refined and fluent in our self-use, 
particularly if we are going to perform? 
FM is practised via one-on-one 'Functional Integration' (FI) lessons14, 
which are hands-on and mainly non-verbal; movements are gently explored 
with guidance from the practitioner, and 'Awareness Through Movement’ (ATM)
lessons where verbal invitations to explore and bring awareness to different 
movements are given by the practitioner to a group. Feldenkrais claimed his 
method was concerned with learning to learn; it is not about learning to do 
anything in particular but with how to do any activity better, which is to say 
congruently with human anatomy and gravity. Given that it is concerned with 
learning, it has no end goal except the autonomy of the student from the 
teacher when she reaches a point of being able to apply the principles of the 
method herself. The learning is without limits. Serious studies are slowly 
accruing which analyse FM's degree of efficacy in many areas; a broad 
summary drawing on diverse databases and publications in different languages 
was collated in 2015 (Hillier and Worley). While there are problems of bias and 
poor reporting methods for many of the studies, the authors claim, ‘The 
majority of the 20 included studies reported significant positive effects of FM in 
a variety of populations and outcomes of interest’ (10). They include tests with 
healthy people as well as those with specific conditions, but no arts-related 
studies, in which it might be even harder to produce 'objective' results without 
bias. In my experience of teaching FM to a broad range of people I find it does 
14 By 1980, Feldenkrais regretted this name because of the mathematical connotation of ‘in-
tegration’ and the fact that ‘no one knows what is integration' (sic). He would have pre-
ferred ‘Functional Synthesis’ because ‘we try to build up a new function out of the old ele-
ments ... that functions better than before’ (Amherst 1980, 1 00:12:00).
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not work for everyone at all times. It is demanding, like learning a musical 
instrument, and requires an ability to pay close attention to oneself. This can 
be developed, to a degree, but it is impossible to force a reluctant student to 
learn or notice change.
Of particular relevance for the discussion in this thesis is the manner in 
which, in FI, the practitioner moves the student, or connects her own skeleton 
to the student’s skeleton, as a means to connect to or communicate with her 
central nervous system (CNS). There is a clear link between hands-on practice 
and puppeteering, both including the practitioner and a partner in a feedback 
relationship. The skeleton might be seen as the material core of the person, or 
inner puppet. I return to this idea and its problems in Chapter 5.
Feldenkrais developed over a thousand ATMs, some exploring functional 
movement riddles in great detail, others focused more on self-image and some 
concerned additionally with social interaction, such as the many rolling lessons 
that require students to become aware of the action of the group as a whole, to
maintain the same rhythm (without fascist uniformity) and not collide. There 
are also neurological lessons, such as the various versions of ‘Bell Hand’, where
the pulsing of one hand affects the whole nervous system, as well as lessons 
seemingly moving just the eyes or using only attention shifts and the 
imagination. The ATMs are a starting point and, once familiar with the Method, 
a practitioner can invent new lessons around the same principles. What these 
principles are will be elaborated in Chapter 4, but the main one is to have no 
principles! The method works on bringing the student towards an awareness of 
her habits such that she becomes able to identify through sensing (not just 
understanding) compulsive movement patterns and can explore other 
possibilities. At its heart it is engaged with learning how to learn (Feldenkrais 
1980). It is a practice that acknowledges multiple bodies through its 
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engagement with the whole person in her environmental functioning, rather 
than aiming for one better, idealized body. The potency of FM lies in its 
adaptability to any practice and any person. It is not for either the young or 
the old, the disabled or elite performers; it is not for any particular discipline 
but for all, and also for daily life. It is not general however, but highly specific; 
specifically adaptable to make any activity a source of learning.
1.4 First approximation: ‘self-image’
We act in accordance with our self-image. This self-image - which, in 
turn, governs our every act - is conditioned in varying degree by three 
factors: heritage, education, and self-education. (Feldenkrais 1972:3)
Feldenkrais considered ‘we live with an image that we created for 
ourselves’ (Alexander Yanai 303, vol. 7a:2081)15. Change is possible because 
genes and physiology (heritage) do not govern everything; the education one 
receives and the culture one lives in are not chosen before a certain age, so 
that leaves self-education as the most accessible area for improvement. In 
Awareness Through Movement, Feldenkrais states that ‘self-image consists of 
four components that are involved in every action: movement, sensation, 
feeling and thought’ (1972:10). He writes, ‘A complete self-image would 
involve full awareness of all the joints in the skeletal structure as well as of the 
entire surface of the body’ (21). This is the kind of mastery possibly only found
in supreme martial artists and was, in fact, Moshe’s ideal, but it is important to
remember that he saw self-image as an ongoing process; he writes, 
15 I explain in greater detail what the Alexander Yanai (AY) transcripts are in Chapter 4. I 
cite them hereafter as AY Lesson Number, vol.:page number (where relevant).
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‘our self-image is never static. It changes from action to action, but these 
changes gradually become habits; that is, the actions take on a fixed, 
unchanging character’ (11).
Feldenkraisian self-image relates to the discrepancy between how 
someone actually acts and how they think they act, or to put it another way, 
the lacunae in a person’s self-in-action awareness. Ideally self-image does not 
become too fixed, but retains the potential for change throughout life and it is 
only self-image that can be changed. Its tendency to become fixed is what 
Feldenkrais uses as the basis for his method; if habits didn't etch themselves 
deep in a person's self-image, the method would have no foundation or 
touchstone from which to work.
Feldenkrais actually used several terms to refer to what has become 
more commonly known as ‘self-image’ in FM circles; he also uses ‘body-image’ 
and ‘body schema’ after Schilder, whose work I treat in detail in Chapter 3. It 
is worth mentioning that an extensive essay collection, published little over a 
decade ago, Body-image and Body Schema (Preester and Knockaert 2005), 
makes no mention of Feldenkrais and his method. The volume includes 
chapters from diverse disciplines; philosophy, neuroscience, phenomenology, 
psychoanalysis and dance scholarship, since, it is argued, the subject of ‘the 
body’ needs an interdisciplinary approach. Sheets-Johnstone is the only author 
included who writes from movement, and the editors highlight that 
‘neuroscientific studies tend not to investigate the fundamental ways in which 
self-movement anchors our cognitive and affective lives’ (13). Sheets-
Johnstone provides some useful background for the primacy of movement 
(here and 2009, 2011). But, in spite of having experience of Feldenkrais’s 
work, applying the word 'magical' to its effects (1979:24), she does not appear
to continue to see it as a source for new knowledge and understanding in her 
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more recent writing, referring to it only casually. Perhaps her appreciation of it 
as 'magical' actually shows that she misunderstands it and hence rejects it for 
further investigation.
The practical (and pragmatic) nature of FM, and its outsider status in 
terms of science and medicine16, means that its findings and implications are 
widely ignored in the many academic fields that consider body-image and 
schema from medical, theoretical and philosophical points of view. I use 
‘ignored’ more in the French sense, ‘to be unaware of something’, than in the 
active Anglo-Saxon sense. Doidge’s inclusion of a case-study where FM is used 
for rehabilitation in The Brain's Way of Healing (2015) is a rare exception, but 
this book is destined for the general public rather than being a serious 
academic study. It has been criticized for presenting recoveries as near 
miraculous, rather than offering substantial evidence for the efficacy of the 
'alternative' approaches it documents. Some of the cases described seem 
related to the tenacity and capacities of the afflicted to make a leap of faith 
regarding neuroplasticity (Adams). It is however a fascinating question, 
although not to be answered here, why years of empirical research by many, 
many FM and other somatic practitioners are not seen as a viable source of 
data for theoreticians thinking about body-image17.
Since self-image is the term which prevails in the FM community and 
one of the challenges facing FM practitioners involves communicating what the 
method offers, I want briefly to consider its everyday connotations which relate
to how people perceive themselves. People have a positive or negative self-
16 It tends to be lumped in with 'alternative' therapies and 'well-being' practices.
17 While Feldenkrais explicitly cites body-image as a concept and Schilder as a source in his 
work, many somatic practices draw on it explicitly or implicitly, although the language 
used varies. See F.M. Alexander, G. Alexander, Hanna, Rolf, Todd, Sweigard, and, for an 
overview of these and others practices, Hanlon-Johnson. 
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image; they perceive themselves to be fat or thin, attractive or unattractive, 
strong or weak and so on18. These impact on self-image as intended by 
Feldenkrais but are not of its essence. I think it is important to bear in mind 
the potential for misunderstanding or partial understanding when using the 
term ‘self-image’, and to remain aware of the implied nuances when using the 
term.
The word ‘self’ is a potential diversion from the relationality at the heart 
of Feldenkrais’s ‘self-image’. Without considering all the conceptual histories of 
‘self’, the self of Feldenkrais’s self-image is certainly broader than the everyday
self of ‘selfish’, ‘self-centred’, ‘self-indulgent’, ’self-interest’ and also what 
might appear to be more positive hyphenations like ‘self-confident’ or ‘self-
possessed’. All these point to a rupture with that which is not self, rather than 
giving a sense of continuity between self and not-self. These are selves which 
you can do things for and against rather than selves deeply enmeshed with 
world and other selves; in them there is little sense of exchange between self 
and not-self. The attention to ‘self’ FM asks for becomes meaningful only when 
this is an enworlded, intersubjective self. Through attention to movement 
leading to a greater sense of one’s self-image, Feldenkrais claims that the 
person ‘grasps that his small world and the great world around are but one and
that in this unity he is no longer alone’ (1972:54). He clearly states that 
‘regard for the self will have to be relegated to second place’, continuing, 
‘Unless a stage is reached at which self-regard ceases to be the main 
motivating force, any improvement achieved will never be sufficient to satisfy 
the individual’. He is not talking about serving society or altruism however, but 
action; ‘as a man grows and improves, his entire existence centers increasingly
on what he does and how, while who does it becomes of ever decreasing 
18 As explored in the national press by, for example, Wiseman.
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importance’ (19) (his italics). If an ethics can be said to stem from 
Feldenkrais’s concept of self-image, it arises first out of awareness which 
requires practice in self-observation, leading to potent action, rather than an 
outward assessment of circumstances in the world. Feldenkraisian awareness is
multi-directional, directed at least both outwards and inwards, and ideally 
diffused. Given this, I find the term 'person-image' more accurate, although for
the sake of clarity I use 'self-image' when referring to Feldenkrais's work and 
writing. 
The ‘image’ of ‘self-image’ is also misleading and a testimony to the 
dominance of visual models in Western culture and latterly more broadly in 
human society. Berger’s seminal Ways of Seeing (1972) confronts this 
dominance head-on, illuminating the ubiquity of images since the dawn of their
easy reproduction. An example from philosophy might be Merleau-Ponty’s 
emphasis on vision in his phenomenology of perception, which Irigaray 
critiques as ‘overpowering and acting as a model for all other perceptual 
relations, [which] submits them to a phallic economy in which the feminine 
figures as a lack or a blind spot’ (Grosz 1994:104)19. Irigaray hints at the need 
for a multi-modal view of perception, less focused on the pointed, phallic gaze, 
and more on an emergent mixed palette of experience. Sheets-Johnstone also 
criticizes the use of image in the term ‘body-image’ for its visual connotation as
well as referring to an absence and to ‘some thing’ (2005:216). Several FM 
practitioners contrast mirror image with self-image, where self-image is 
something sensed from within rather than seen from without (Galeota-Wozny, 
Scott). Scott cites the Narcissus myth that seems to be about self-image but is 
only about the visual aspect of it. Self-image in FM refers to the inner sense.
19 I have engaged with Irigaray only through Grosz, an important source for me relating to 
Schilder.
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Johnson argues for what he calls ‘image schemata’; the patterns of 
movement, object manipulation and perceptual interaction which organize 
human experience such that there are no abstract meanings; all meaning is 
derived from the concrete, lived experience of being in the world (xix-xx). Put 
simply, what seem to be images or concepts are always deeply connected to 
movement20. This meets up with Sheet-Johnstone’s argument for the ‘primacy 
of movement’ which makes the case from an evolutionary point of view for 
movement being the basis of consciousness and hence of images and concepts 
(2007, 2011). Johnson’s image schemata are a useful adjunct to Feldenkrais’s 
self-image in that he underlines the notion that ‘images’ emerge from felt 
experience; how humans are in their bodies is central to the meanings they 
produce. Feldenkrais draws special attention to the fact that my image of 
‘verticality’, for example, is not the same as yours since each is based on our 
individual experiences of becoming vertical and perceiving vertical things in the
world. Thanks to this, a critical space opens up where movement can be used 
to explore the variations in shared images and concepts. Image schemata and 
self-image are specific to the individual, whilst including enough shared 
elements such that communication and understanding are possible, but not 
enough to preclude miscommunication and misunderstanding.
Since, in Feldenkraisian terms, improving self-image involves developing
a sense of how my musculoskeletal system can best perform in gravity, if lots 
of people improve their self-images it should lead to people sharing a more 
consistent self-image (i.e. one that is more founded in the physical reality of 
moving in gravity in human form on specific, shared surfaces), thus it should 
improve social communication and understanding. This is not to say, however, 
20 FM trainer, Mara Della Pergola also expresses this idea (37).
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that this would lead to an homogenization of people in society; on the contrary 
according to Feldenkrais, when individuals do not go on developing their self-
image throughout life ‘society comes to be made up of persons increasingly 
alike in their ways, behaviour and aims’ (1972:18). This is due to the individual
identifying self-image with value to society and thus overriding his or her 
organic needs. If organic needs are met (and self-image is therefore relatively 
full and accurate, remaining open to growth), the person will be able to 
function creatively and exploit her full human potential.
But there is a twist in the Feldenkraisian aim to clarify self-image since, 
while an ideal self-image exists according to the laws of physics and 
biomechanics, this is recognized as unattainable by definition. Perfection might 
be momentarily experienced but the moment stasis is reached and dynamic 
change lost, the perfection has gone. Perfection is fleeting and fragile, or, 
perfection is to be found in constant evolution. The novelty of Feldenkrais’s 
approach to this Heraclitean outlook is to offer a precise method for 
improvement with no end or goal in mind; the possibilities are always shifting. 
He likened his method to tuning a piano saying, ‘it is much easier to play 
correctly on an instrument that is in tune than on one that is not’ (1972:24). A 
piano periodically needs tuning and notes themselves have a certain breadth, 
they are not one-dimensional points, they are only ever more or less right and 
begin shifting again immediately after tuning. As do human beings. Even on a 
tuned instrument, there is no limit to how much one can improve one’s playing,
and tuning is not a one-time affair.
As was typical of a man who was constantly questioning his own 
thinking and assumptions, according to his biographer, Feldenkrais no longer 
used the term self-image in the 1980s (he died in 1984) (Reese 2015:294). 
Perhaps he had considered the limitations and baggage of the words ‘self’ and 
36
‘image’; he frequently alludes to the problematic nature of language as a 
vehicle for communication and his development of the hands-on modality, FI, 
was a way to circumvent words and communicate through touch, connecting as
directly as possible to the CNS of his students. Maybe the slippery elusiveness 
of self-image made it seem more useful to talk simply about skeletal 
awareness, leaving less scope to wonder about self, image and self-image. In 
the Amherst practitioner training, Feldenkrais said, 'Your skeleton will survive 
your soul' and announced that his next book would be 'about the skeleton and 
the future of consciousness' and that 'in the long run, people will have to 
become skeleton conscious, otherwise their consciousness will not evolve, but 
will remain muscle conscious or foot conscious. They will not evolve' 
(Workman)21. Unfortunately he didn't get to write that book and his statements
are left for us to unpack. He goes on to say; 'The future of the evolvement of 
consciousness will be to reduce it from the muscle stiffness to the skeleton 
appreciation'. FM trainer, Yvan Joly, recalls Feldenkrais saying that muscle 
awareness is emotional and historical whilst skeleton awareness relates more 
to permanence, stability and harmony with the environment (Workman 
00:01:50). There are problems here that I address in Chapter 4.
Self-image remains a central concept in the FM lexicon and it emerges 
as a useful lens to sharpen a view of how the method speaks to puppetry. 
Understanding self-image as an ongoing process, not a thing, is fundamental to
shifting towards modes of thinking about humans and ‘reality’ that are non-
essentialist, non-objectivist and accommodate ongoing change at all levels.
21 This is an edited video online. Whole resource, Amherst, 1981, 11, accessible to FM prac-
titioners from www.feldenkrais.co.uk. Feldenkrais was not a religious man although he 
was brought up in the Hasidic tradition. He spoke these words in English, which was not 
his first language.
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1.5 First approximation: ‘puppetry’ and ‘material performance’
I use the word puppetry in its broadest sense and see it as an approach 
to theatre-making rather than a practice strictly involving puppets. Defining 
puppets or puppetry is not the aim of this thesis, but I need a framework 
within which to work and to transgress with awareness when appropriate22. 
Penny Francis describes puppetry as denoting 'the act of bringing to imagined 
life inert figures and forms (representational or abstract) for a ritual theatrical 
purpose - for a performance’ (5) (her italics). Blumenthal writes, 'Whenever 
someone endows an inanimate object with life force and casts it in a scenario, 
a puppet is born' (11). They, and others such as Rene Baker (2009:53) 
suggest that puppetry needs an audience; it does not have an informal social 
form in the way dance does, or even acting, in the case of storytelling or 
recounting anecdotes and taking on different people’s voices. I would argue 
however that it does take place informally, in child's play and play with 
children23, and in other non-performance contexts in very subtle ways; in the 
way people handle things. This might not seem to be enough to count as 
‘proto-puppetry’, but if puppetry is handling things with heightened awareness 
and for specific ends, then simply handling things is where it begins. The 
puppetry training moments that have most resonated with me have begun with
simply handling things and bringing awareness to the emergent dialogue 
between matter and myself (Performance workshops: Baker, Buckmaster, 
Leith, Soehnle). Writing about the principles of puppetry discerned from a 
lifetime of work, Basil Jones states, 'One of your most important tasks as a
22 For an overview of the history of writing on puppetry, with excellent bibliographies, see 
Jurkowski (1988) and Bell (2001). For a more recent medley of voices from the field, see 
Posner et al.
23 See Winnicott on children and transitional objects (Candlin & Guins 65-79). I refer to 
something broader than his notion however: touch and handling.
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puppeteer is to allow the audience to feel how the world touches the puppet 
and how the puppet touches those in the world around it' (265), putting touch 
at the heart of puppetry and how meaning is created for an audience.
Perhaps one of the reasons puppetry has difficulty in being appreciated 
as a specific art form, or is seen at best as a minor art form, is related to the 
hidden seed of puppetry in daily life. Handling things is so basic and 
fundamental to human life; humans become, grow and learn through handling 
things and moving in the world. The seed of puppetry then is embedded deep 
in daily and developmental life. It is what children do to know the world, it is 
what draws them into movement as they go towards and recoil from things, 
the word ‘recoil’ suggesting a return to a fetal shape; a developmental 
movement of the whole self. I would like to add a first step in the art of 
puppetry to Francis’ definition; that of bringing awareness to handling things. 
The second step then can be ‘bringing to imagined life inert figures and forms’;
this is done by millions of children daily. Puppetry denotes, then, the act of 
bringing awareness to handling things in order to bring to imagined life inert 
figures and forms. Ultimately this might become a performance, but in the 
context of training, education or therapy, the practice itself brings its own 
rewards (Salvage, Shön).
Tillis distinguishes virtual from tangible puppets whilst also inferring 
from Kaplin a definition of the puppet as the site of signified life created by 
people (178). The creation of computer graphics figures described by Tillis 
involves creating joints and surfaces to form a figure moved by feeding in 
information about centres of gravity, arcs of movement for limbs and so on, 
known as 'inverse-kinematics'. This is similar to the process of designing and 
making a tangible puppet. However, the process of manipulation, as Tillis 
notes, is different. It is possible to class the process of virtual puppet 
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manipulation as leaning more towards the analytic and tangible puppet 
manipulation as leaning more towards the somatic. The virtual puppet might be
seen as demanding a primarily mental process, using visual feedback, while 
the tangible puppet seems to entail a whole person process, using multi-
sensory feedback. However, the tangible and the virtual do not sit in complete 
opposition to each other and it is possible to envisage virtual puppetry that 
requires refined somatic sensing, such as that produced using motion capture, 
and tangible puppetry that is controlled or experienced virtually. The Muppets, 
for example! One of my concerns in this thesis is with the role somatic sensing 
plays in puppetry; this is easier to grasp in relation to tangible puppetry and I 
therefore refer primarily to the tangible. 
Jurkowski finds that the puppet has progressively moved away from 
functioning as a fictional theatrical subject to privilege what he calls its real 
function: that of an object (2000:10). Building on this, puppetry can be seen 
as moving into its own realm where objects are part of the meshwork, creating
and receiving vibrations rather than trying to ape actor theatre or have 
puppets do the same work as actors. A quirky and amusing ‘interview’ between
‘Noam DePloom' (who ‘may or may not represent either Bee Pallomina and/or 
Lee Henderson’) and a puppet (of his/her/their own creation) points up the 
differences between human and puppet labour in performance work 
(DePloom). The puppet baldly says, ‘the role of the human performer is to 
embody an idea so that it can be felt, while the role of the puppet performer is 
to embody an idea in felt’ (25). The puppet questions Marina Abramovic’s use 
(stay with me here) of the ‘white, European, heterosexual, human body’, 
provoking the question in relation to performance art, ‘which body is given 
agency?’ (24). This puppet’s own ‘body’ is non-existent; there is nothing under 
its smock, which suggests the art of puppetry might be thought of as giving 
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body to the disembodied, or simply embodying ideas (in felt, or another 
material, which is expressive in itself)24.
Jurkowski quotes Slonimska saying that, ‘The puppet proposes a form of
theatre without corporeal elements’ (2000:23), but this idea seems to me to 
come from an era when puppeteers were invisible whereas, in contemporary 
theatres, they are often visible in some way and what is staged is as much the 
relationship between all the material elements, or how the puppeteer treats her
material, as the puppet itself (see n. 11, this chapter). Piris develops Annie 
Gilles' concept of ‘manipulacting’, to refer to situations where not only is the 
puppeteer visible, but also playing something (not necessarily a character) for 
the audience (Piris 2012). Jurkowski notes a need to shift from looking at the 
puppet as a virtual character to looking at the relations between the signs of 
character and the forces which animate them (2000:113). He uses the term 
‘opalisation' to describe the double vision of seeing a part of the puppeteer’s 
body both as his and as his puppet’s body. He credits Obraztsov with its 
invention, with his small puppet, Tiapa, cradled to his chest, showing his 
forearm which the audience also sees as the puppet’s bare back (40). There is 
an area of slippage for puppeteer and audience, where parts of his body are 
puppet but also himself. In contemporary puppetry there is often no attempt to
fool the audience into believing the puppeteer is not present. Part of the 
pleasure in witnessing this kind of puppetry is derived from seeing the 
puppeteer navigate the slippage. The human and nonhuman intermingle and 
change places. The puppeteer learns how to move attention within herself 
(which is practised in FM) and how to direct movement outwards. I expand on 
this in chapters 5 and 6.
24 Baixas refers to puppets as 'the imaginary incarnate, in bodily form, switched on' (Blu-
menthal 101).
41
Trimingham proposes seeing puppets as affordances to the puppeteer; 
‘Affordances describe material substance with the extra dimension of use and 
potential use’ (126). If the puppet is an ‘affordance’ to the puppeteer, a kind of
tool as Trimingham suggests, I propose it is a tool of discovery that enables 
the puppeteer (and her audience) to find out more about what it is to be 
human. Voicing a more mainstream view, Proschan calls puppets ‘objects 
through which we can project intensified, artistic and often holy speech and 
action’ (Francis 6) but, without losing this meaning, I think puppets are also 
objects along which we can sense. I project into objects, but they also project 
information from the material world into me. Puppets are the gatekeepers of 
the inanimate world (Blumenthal 65). Through them I can listen to it, but only 
as filaments in a broader meshwork; it is not only through my hands that I 
listen to the inanimate in the puppet, but through my feet that I listen to the 
inanimate in the floor and in the puppet. It is not only the puppet that ‘speaks’ 
to me but also the floor, the chair, the table and so on. But only the 
puppeteered thing, through being a puppet and through my puppeteering, 
allows me to sense the world and to project out through it.
The puppet, unlike a hammer or a needle, says ‘I am like you’, no 
matter its form. It can be anthropomorphic or zoomorphic, it can be a man-
made object (a cup, a chair…), it can be, or represent, an element from nature 
(a rock, a tree…), it can even be immaterial or gaseous - a digital image, a 
shadow, smoke; but from the moment it is puppeteered it becomes part of a 
shared animate world, whilst also retaining its material status and testifying to 
a human presence - there is someone behind the animation. This is why 
puppetry offers a means for listening to nonhumans. Puppeteer, Nenagh 
Watson, has researched what she calls ‘ephemeral animation’, where, for 
example, the wind ‘animates’ a plastic bag (2015). There is still someone 
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present seeing this without which we could not speak of animation: Watson’s 
imagination is the animator and in a sense this mere posing of a puppetic gaze 
on objects in the world might be the purest form of puppetry in that it attempts
to listen to the material without intervention, although not without what might 
be termed capture or framing25. There is a similarity in approach to FM, where I
listen to movement as it occurs without trying to change it, and puppetry, 
whether hands-on or off, where I do the same for movement occurring in the 
object, and for the imaginative associations it provokes.
A useful term which includes puppetry is ‘material performance’, 
understood as including performance made with materials, objects and masks 
as well as puppets (Posner et al.)26. However, it would be more elegant if the 
term puppetry could hold all of this. In Jos Houben’s performance-
demonstration, The Art of Laughter27, he ridicules the notion of ‘physical 
theatre’ saying he has never seen an actor come on stage without his body. A 
similar comment might be made about material performance; when is 
performance immaterial, or when does it not have a specific materiality or 
happen in a particular (material) context? Even with a virtual puppet, or 
internet project, the experience is always material. Theatre and performance 
are material in the sense that experiencing is material. However, a conceptual 
emphasis on the material aspects in terms of process and product is usefully
25 In a similar vein, Peter Schumann recalls seeing ‘angels in the drafty streets of NYC who 
were actually tossed-away wrapping papers, but obviously joyful and superhuman in 
their ability to brighten up masses of dark stinky air stuck between high-rises’ (50).
26 Jurkowksi uses the term 'material theatre' to refer specifically to theatres of materials, as
opposed to objects or multimedia (2000:130).
27 Live performance at the Shaw Theatre, London, 2016.
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suggested in the term ‘material performance’28.
Gross identifies the puppet as ‘an object in performance, an ally and 
challenger of the living body of the actor’. FM might also be described as 
challenging the living body. Gross claims the puppet ‘as idea, as a piece of our 
mental furniture, a tool of thought, a spur to reimagine parts of our ordinary 
life, our play and work’ (Posner xxiii), acknowledging a puppet is not only an 
object, but an idea, a tool, and, I would add, a practice. FM too is partly a tool 
and practice of thought to reimagine parts of our ordinary life. In this, puppetry
can be seen as an approach which may or may not give rise to something that 
looks like puppetry. Gerard Marx muses on the puppet as a functional tool; 'the
body outside of the body, an exosomatic organ, to quote Karl Popper’s 
beautiful description of the instrument' (229). The functionality of the puppet 
as tool asks for a functionality of the somatic organ in relation to it as an 
exosomatic one. The term 'exosomatic organ' itself hints at the way in which 
the tool infiltrates and is combined into the person-image; it is only exosomatic
in that it can become a separate body again, but, in use, it becomes included in
some way in the person-image of the puppeteer. In the following chapter I 
recount how my interest in person-image and somatic practice in conjunction 
with puppetry emerged.
28 Its Western roots lie with Edward Gordon Craig who called for ‘artists’ of the theatre 
whose work included all aspects of it, from acting to stage management to design and 
directing (2008). In the few productions he was able to mount according to his strict re-
quirements, and in his writings and designs, he had a huge impact on twentieth century 
theatre. His emphasis on all sides of theatre-making sees the material aspects as equally 
important as the text; Craig promotes a shift from putting on plays to theatre-making as 
it is conceived today by those making material performance, who add only the specificity 
of human-nonhuman dialogue as generative principle.
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1.6 Methodology, structure and case studies
Feldenkrais considered that there are four components of human action 
always present - thinking, feeling, moving and sensing. The simultaneity of 
these connects us deeply into the meshworks of people, environments, things, 
elements, animals and systems - humans and nonhumans, animate and 
inanimate, ‘real’, ‘abstract’ and discursive, in which we live. Having danced 
around the problem of how to talk about FM and puppetry together (both 
enormous and rich areas themselves), I have come to the conclusion that the 
key is in person-image. The base note in this thesis is my practice and 
understanding of FM which becomes almost a methodology. It is hard to write 
about directly, so my approaches are indirect as befits the ‘method’: they are 
approximations.
Rather than a linear approach, progress by approximations allows me to 
involve and draw on a wide breadth of material. Since I assume a complexity 
view of an emergent meshwork, no territory is out-of-bounds. I cross practical 
experience and theory, aiming to illuminate the utility of the concept of person-
image. I write about training (of myself and others), experiencing and making 
performance, performing, puppeteering, practising FM, mothering, thinking, 
writing, the past, now and the future. In FM, a methodology of approximations 
means you can start anywhere but move forwards by making meaningful 
connexions for yourself or your student in relation to that starting point. 
Approximations are small steps that each function to clarify an idea or 
movement. Approximations can complement and counter each other. Nothing 
is treated as completely irrelevant; anything might illuminate the movement or
argument. Which is not to say that everything does. There is still a need for a 
coherent meshwork of approximations, like the spinning of a tale. Meaning 
however is both found and made; this is the dialogue of approximations. 
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An example: In FI, I roll a supine man's head and it moves more easily 
to the the right than to the left. He has right knee and neck pain. Over the 
course of 30 minutes, I show him that he is stopping his head from moving 
left, and he can choose to do this or not do it. Some of the approximations I 
explore to clarify this are: moving a shoulder forward and rolling his head or 
stopping it from rolling; showing him what happens to his ability to roll his 
head when he fixes his pelvis or allows it to move; showing him how allowing 
his sternum and ribs to move affects his ability to turn his head; with him 
sitting up and standing, I show him he can turn more easily to look over his left
shoulder when his shoulder, spine, ribs, sternum, pelvis and legs are involved; 
while he walks, I ask him to sense how his walk is affected when he allows or 
does not allow his head to turn to the left, and how this affects his knee pain. 
Each movement I propose or thing I ask him to notice is an approximation.
In ATM, a first approximation might be observing how you can take hold
of your right foot with your right hand while lying on your back. A second 
might be rolling to the right holding your foot with your hand. And then you 
may make many more approximations of rolling to the side like this, looking at 
your foot or bringing your face towards your knee or straightening your leg. 
Each of these variations is an approximation where your focus is on a different 
aspect of the movement or part of yourself. Auxiliary movements not directly 
related to the main theme might be used at any point. For example, in the 
rolling lesson, an auxiliary movement might be lifting your head with your left 
hand while you bring your right hand and foot together in front of and away 
from you. When you come back to rolling to the side, you may find yourself 
suddenly sitting up, because your back got more involved and if you roll 
holding your foot like that, bringing your head towards your knee without 
impeding the movement, you will sit up (because you have a skeleton).
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My approximations in Chapters 1 and 2 provide reasons for connecting 
areas of thought and practice that do not normally sit together. These are 
theoretical, practical and personal. From here I move to the history of the 
notion of 'body-image': Chapter 3 engages with the work of Paul Schilder, from
which Feldenkrais develops 'self-image'. This serves to ground my exploration 
of Feldenkrais’s work, but also reveals avenues from Schilder that Feldenkrais 
did not explore and these prove interesting in relation to puppetry and 
performance. My choice to start an approximation with Schilder yields more 
than expected then. An FI or ATM lesson might also have an unexpected 
outcome. I start with student's head and his knee pain is gone. Or I learn how 
to roll to sit holding my foot and when I stand up my balance has also 
improved. Since a methodology of approximations is not goal-based or end-
gained, it happily encourages and accommodates the emergence of fresh 
discoveries.
Chapter 4 takes a close look at Feldenkrais’s use of the concept of self-
image and begins to open out towards puppetry. This approximation brings to 
light the need to problematize and maintain a critical distance from FM. At this 
point in the thesis I choose two further facets to explore in order to shed light 
on how the concept of person-image clarifies the conversation between FM and
material performance. Chapter 5 considers person-image in puppetry training 
and in relation to a broader emancipated education. In this chapter more than 
any other, I use 'auxiliary movements'. I look to Lecoq, Silk and Kleist as 
indirect conduits towards thinking about the practice I call Awareness Through 
Puppetry. Chapter 6 uses a selection of performance case studies to explore 
aspects of person-image in performance from a puppetic point of view. This 
takes the argument into the realm of performance analysis in order to 
demonstrate the potency of thinking in terms of person-image. Chapter 7 
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concludes the thesis in a final drawing together of lines and an indication of 
directions that might be pursued out of this particular knot.
A methodology of approximations means that there is no final point or 
destination but a synthesis of many facets which gives a richer, more mobile 
and agile place from which to think, move, feel and sense. This is the case for 
a FM lesson and, I hope, for this thesis.
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Chapter 2
Personal grounding
  
Figs. 1 & 2 A puppet of Moshe Feldenkrais made by Janusz Dembinski for practitioner, 
Hermann Klein, who teaches FM to puppeteers at HDMK. Image © Hermann Klein.
Fig. 3 Moshe Feldenkrais. Image © Feldenkrais Guild UK.
2.1 Why connect Feldenkrais Method and puppetry? An anecdote
I have asked myself this question many times, some days with despair 
as Jurkowski whispers over my shoulder, 'The puppet opposes the human' 
(1988:52). Why on earth connect a practice about moving the embodied self 
with a practice about moving inanimate objects? Aren’t they very unlike each 
other1? The growing presence of FM practitioners in puppetry trainings 
suggests however that there is a fruitful connection to be made. And surely it is
not just the obvious; move better, move puppets better, and avoid job-related 
strains, pains and injuries.
1 I take heart from Anne Bogart's call for theatre artists to do what takes time and 'what is 
absolutely the hardest. Every day.' (Margolies 2009:18). FM and puppetry both take time
and are demanding. Self-image is a hard concept. Why not bring it all together?
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In hindsight, this thesis owes a debt to a puppeteer named Athena2. We 
were two of five participants in a week-long masterclass with Christopher Leith 
in 2007. She was largely self-taught, although she had also trained on the 
Puppet Barge; she made marionettes and performed with them on the streets. 
In that intense week of hanging around with our puppets with Zen-like 
tenacity3, sensitive to whatever emerged, Athena expressed a view that 
puppetry could change the world; if only everyone did a bit of puppetry the 
world would be a better place4. At the time I was in the fourth year of my FM 
practitioner training and was just coming to appreciate that Feldenkrais 
thought his method could change the world; if only everyone did a bit of FM 
the world would be a better place. At lunch time, Leith asked us to pay 
attention to how our shoes wanted to be put on and how our feet met the 
pavement outside. To paraphrase him quoting an AT teacher, he said, 'Any 
gesture towards a thing or a person which does not allow for feedback from 
that thing or person is an aggressive act’. He was teaching us to wait for 
movement to emerge in our string puppets, an idea echoed by puppeteer, 
Schönbein, whose work I examine in Chapter 6; 'the life emerges in the 
stillness' (Gross ch. 11). This chimed with the FM training I was about to finish,
where we were encouraged to wait for patterns of movement to emerge in our 
partners and let our hands 'know' what to do5.
2 Athena Maschi (née Gilbert), currently of Bus King Theatre.
3 One of Leith’s main references was Herrigel’s Zen and the Art of Archery.
4 Puppetry as an unobtrusive, seemingly unthreatening art-form also has a history in con-
texts where the fact that it is easily hidden has allowed it a subversive life; another mode
of world-changing. Ronnie Burkett's 1999 show, for example, Tinka's New Dress centres 
around ghetto puppeteers in Nazi-occupied Czechoslovakia; the anti-Hitler content pup-
pets got away with is mentioned by Malíková (41).
5 François Combeau's expression (FM practitioner trainer).
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The more I practised both things, the more I saw them as connected. 
Both were about paying attention to sensation and to tiny emergent 
movements. In FM, these movements were my own and those of my students. 
At its most ambitious, FM is about human potential but for me the humanism 
of FM is both its strength and its weakness; although implying a broader 
ecological connection, I felt it needed reframing in the light of contemporary 
politico-ecological thought in order to have the potential to be powerful beyond
individuals or small networks of individuals. Its wider implications can be lost 
when it is seen as part of the outwardly apolitical 'well-being' and 'self-help' 
movements, which it often is, and this is a positioning I strongly contend. While
FM might make you feel better, it is a rigorous awareness practice in which it is
necessary to confront your experience, whatever that may be. The puppeteer 
listens to the movement of her puppet, and then follows. She proposes and 
accepts. As in the Keith Johnstone exercise and basic improvisation tenet, she 
says ‘yes and…’ to her puppet (1999:36). But, for me, the animism latent in a 
certain way of looking at puppetry which assigns agency to objects needs 
grounding in and through the human being, literally through hands and feet, so
that an awareness of the flow between thing and human situated in a specific 
context can emerge, rather than a mystical focus on the 'soul' of things. This is
not to say that there are no FM practitioners who conceive of their work within 
a broader framework (see, for example, Kampe and Yeatman), nor that all 
puppeteers have some kind of devotional relationship with their puppets, or 
with puppeteering (as Athena seemed to have)6. What interests me is how 
6 Basil Jones of Handspring writes specifically of the 'devotional state', making it number 1 
of 11 puppetry principles. For him, it is a trance state one may need to enter in order to 
endure the physical pain of puppeteering. In it 'you will always treat your puppet as a 
verb' and find that you follow the other principles he outlines (264). In a somatic pup-
petry practice, however, one might hope that pain was limited and the demands on the 
puppeteer more akin to the endurance demanded of an ultra-marathon runner, for ex-
ample. Using shifts of attention in relation to person-image can assist this; this is ad-
dressed further in Chapter 5.
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theorizing these two areas might reveal how they can feed each other and 
how, together, they offer a unique and rich practice. I propose that 
investigating the Feldenkraisian notions of self-image, imagination and 
awareness in relation to puppetry and material performance opens up wider 
questions of agency and impact in the world at large.
In spite of my hunch and sense that FM and puppetry can and should 
speak to each other, how was not immediately obvious and indeed I have 
sensed a resistance from each to meet the other. FM is about human 
‘Awareness Through Movement’ and ‘Functional Integration’; the names of its 
two modes of practice. It is concerned with human thought, feeling, sensing 
and movement, with human action, behaviour and functioning, with live, 
animate beings. Puppetry can be many things, particularly in contemporary 
performance, but usually involves things that are inanimate, not alive, and 
often involves ‘bringing them to life’, animating them or endowing them with 
some kind of life. In live beings the movement is generated from the inside (or 
is it?) and in things that are not alive it is generated from the outside (or is 
it?). The bracketed questions are the reason for this thesis. In FM, it can feel as
though one is creating the context for a person to come back to life, through 
one's voice or hands from the outside. In considering how movement happens 
in both the animate and inanimate, it becomes clear that it is more useful (and 
accurate) to smudge the distinction between the two and accept that aspects of
both can be found in the other. 
2.2 Second approximation: Feldenkrais Method
I first heard about FM in 1994 from a clown friend. From her, I 
understood it involved animal movement! Now I understand why it was difficult
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to describe. (And I wasn’t completely wrong about the animal movement; FM 
explores developmental movement, some of which connects back to human 
evolutionary predecessors, for example, crawling patterns and undulations.) 
Soon after, I did some dance classes with Gill Clarke who used bits of FM. I 
recall becoming increasingly aware of my skeleton, until it felt as if it was 
walking itself down the street; I was free, tagging along for the ride. It was 
effortless. I didn't dwell on it, although I often rocked from my heels, pelvis 
and shoulder girdle as it felt good and seemed to 'realign' me. The name 
‘Feldenkrais’ tucked itself away in my brain and waited. As the tapestry of my 
life grew the effects of these classes seemed more remarkable.
My next encounter with FM was in a workshop with Yves Marc of Théâtre
de Mouvement in 2002. He and his collaborator, Claire Heggen, had worked 
with Feldenkrais in one of his long summer workshops at Peter Brook’s Bouffes 
du Nord in Paris in the 1970s. Themes from ATM lessons were woven into in 
their teaching process (see Fredricksson). I began to understand this intelligent
movement method and as a performer I felt I began to access expressive 
potential and freedom I had not been aware of previously.
Just after this I found myself horizontal for a few weeks with a leg injury
after a big jump in a cold rehearsal room. At the ripe old age of 30, after a 
decade of gung-ho physical risk-taking, I was flat on my back with time to 
think about how I was using myself. I thought I needed to work more 
intelligently since youth was no longer on my side. I remembered Feldenkrais –
I had bought a book of his after the workshop with Marc. Written in 1949, 
Body and Mature Behaviour is Moshe's first book explicitly laying out his 
method and its philosophical and scientific underpinnings. It is not an easy 
read and the French translation is particularly dense. Once I was up and about,
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I searched for classes and was lucky to arrive at Myriam Pfeffer's door; she 
was one of Feldenkrais's original thirteen assistants.
Her classes were slow and peppered with her deceptively simple and 
often humorous questions and remarks ('What is the expression on your face 
now? Make sure you keep your jaw clenched...'). It was a huge change (and 
challenge) for me to lie on a soft carpet in a warm space and focus on my 
experience of small movements with no obvious purpose in mind. I had been 
used to jumping, springing, hanging off ropes, somersaulting; often working 
for imminent performances in ad hoc rehearsals spaces with cold, hard floors 
and no heating. I found it hard to do less, take rest, have a break, do less, 
rest, pause, do less... and I often fell asleep at first, but little by little I sensed 
my movement afresh. The dynamic and attention to detail were very different 
to the way theatre-practitioner Marc used the method, which now seemed 
more pragmatic. He had cherry-picked a few ideas and related them to his 
subject, but his teaching rhythm retained the dynamism of a theatre workshop.
This is not to say FM lessons are never dynamic, but the focus in the lesson is 
the movement itself; afterwards the student can, and is likely to, contextualize 
in her own life and according to her needs. I am not criticizing Marc; he was 
not claiming to teach ATM. I have now used FM myself in the context of giving 
theatre workshops, and I use and teach it differently to when I teach it on its 
own. I would argue that theatre students benefit from ‘pure’ as well as tailored 
ATMs since the tailoring removes some of the openness which is part of the 
method’s strength7. This might seem to reduce the relevance of my thesis! But I
7 The subject of pure versus tailored ATMs in performer training comes up often; it was 
discussed for instance in the Bath conference in 2015 and at a practitioners' Guild day led
by Victoria Worsley, on FM for actors in Apr. 2017. A recent group of Rose Bruford acting 
students to whom I gave movement classes including 'pure' ATMs and Lecoq-inspired 
work, expressed their frustration sometimes at not knowing where something was going 
or why we were doing it, and at there being no demonstration. Interestingly however, 
most said that this way of working had grown on them (over the course of a term) and, 
in the end, they saw the benefits and changes in themselves.
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hope to show that parallel activities within a somatic-inflected puppetry 
practice make it more than the sum of its parts and that it is not only puppetry 
that benefits from FM, but FM which benefits from puppetry. 
After a few classes with Myriam, I enrolled to train as a practitioner. At 
the start of the four-year training I felt I was finally learning about movement 
properly, after all the physical disciplines I had practised. I didn't realize at the 
time that the method wasn't restricted to learning about the physical 
movement of my body; it was more far-reaching than that. It was only once in 
the training that I began to hear the term self-image, and it seemed so elusive 
a concept, I didn’t dwell on it. I kept a loose sense of it as that to which I was 
able to bring my awareness as I moved, which was often very limited given my
riotous mind.
What was I learning that was new? Or how was I learning so that it felt 
new? It was the phenomenological precision that astounded me. A precision 
felt from the inside, known from experience, which makes it very powerful. It is
in stark contrast to all the methods and classes I have met before or since. 
There is no external form to copy, no artificial dynamism, no vague concept of 
energy; in fact there are no concepts, at least none that are not sensed from 
within. Only questioning. I enjoyed acrobatics, contact improvisation and aikido
because there was a functionality to them; I appreciated the mechanics of 
movement and the fact you had to do things a certain way for them to work. 
FM was movement as dynamic physics taken a step further by looking at how 
each person integrates function. There was novelty in diving into the 
experience of a functional movement like getting up from the floor and fleshing
out my image of myself doing it so it became clearer, more efficient and 
pleasurable. Efficiency is a slightly strange concept to apply to movement. It 
conjures up robots, or ergonomic production lines, but efficiency in FM is 
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movement that feels effortless and spontaneous in the moment it happens, 
permitting an aesthetic appreciation of it. I understand this to be what 
Feldenkrais meant by awareness.
FM asks students to explore many developmental movements so that, 
as conscious adults, they have the chance to rediscover movements they first 
experienced as babies on the way to learning to roll, crawl, walk, talk, run and 
so on. The growing human learns approximatively and moves on; this is the 
price for individual rather than species learning. These ways of moving are 
learnt, from a survival point of view, in order to go towards and away from 
things in the environment (Sheets-Johnstone 2007); this idea is present in FM 
lessons, which are as much about orientation as about coordination and timing.
People also move for pleasure, for the joy of moving, and this is as important 
to our survival as more strictly functional movement; the two are inseparable. 
Feldenkrais notes that people are not born knowing up from down, or right 
from left. These abstract concepts are learnt through an embodied process, 
sometimes not very effectively, particularly in the case of left and right. 
Feldenkrais introduces many variations in his lessons to reproduce the trial and
error process of the baby. He uses the concept of self-image, or how one is 
aware of oneself in movement, as a tool for clarifying one’s actions. Through 
sensing how one's skeleton functions in gravity, through forming a sensorial-
mental image of it, and through sensing, observing and pushing and pulling 
through the bones of colleagues, skeletal awareness is developed throughout 
the training. 
FM emphasizes a person's entanglement with the lifeworld; it is about 
situated movement and function (in which I include pleasure), and not about 
the body or movement for its own sake. FM does not deal with bodies, but 
people, including all the lines in the meshwork along which each person moves.
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2.3 Second approximation: self-image
When I began to explore FM in depth in 2003, I found self-image a 
tricky concept, both to understand intellectually and to sense. I was asked in 
lessons to sense what was included in my self-image, or how complete it was. 
How three-dimensional is my self-image? Are my arms connected to my 
centre, or are they like separate appendages? Where do they start? How much 
of my back is included in my self-image? Into which parts do I breathe? How 
many of my vertebrae are included? My fifth thoracic vertebra? My left fourth 
toe? Do I have an accurate sense of the thickness of my chest, the width of my
hips, the width of my lips? How much of myself is involved in the movement? 
These kinds of questions danced around, circling in on the elusive self-image. 
Whilst they are unanswerable in absolute terms, it is possible to get a sense of 
how much of myself is involved in my movement, and it is possible for a 
practitioner to see how much of a person is involved in her movement (another
way of saying included in her self-image).
There seemed to be two modes for knowing something about one’s self-
image, one through feeling or sensing what was going on, which applied more 
when doing movement, and one through the imagination, which applied both 
when not moving and simply observing oneself, and when imagining 
movement. (There is always some movement present in a living person, from 
her breathing.) For me it was easier to sense how much of myself or which 
parts of myself were involved in an actual movement than it was to sense my 
vertebrae, or where my arms and legs were in relation to my mid-line, or 
whatever I was asked to pay attention to, whilst lying, sitting or standing 
relatively still, or to have a sense of my whole self-image in movement in my 
imagination. It still is, to a lesser degree. Imagining movement, which involves
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imagining one’s self-image in movement, is a strategy used in FM but felt 
difficult for me.
'Scanning' in a FM lesson involves bringing awareness to yourself whilst 
relatively motionless, in any resting position (lying, sitting or even standing). 
Sensing yourself in movement, you are paying attention to where the 
movement is flowing kinematically and where it is getting stuck, or how far you
are doing what you think you're doing, or how accurate your sense of your self-
image is. Puppeteer, Jones, refers to all 'unintended movement' as 'the 
equivalent of noise' (264) in the performance. The concept of noise disturbing 
or hindering a movement is familiar in FM; Della Pergola refers to the process 
where 'bones come to light while muscles become silent' (36). But how do you 
stop the unintended? By imagining without doing, the motor schema for doing 
the movement is engaged. The decoupling proposed by Feldenkrais taps into 
an understanding of the adult brain primarily as an organ of inhibition, not of 
excitation8. So that in order to perform a kinematically pure and precise action,
be it running, throwing a ball or playing the piano, all the extraneous actions 
must be inhibited rather than actively doing the action itself in an efficient and 
precise way. It is a matching of intention and action. This process of identifying
and inhibiting the extraneous movement in action is also explored in Alexander
Technique (AT), on which Feldenkrais drew (Reese 2015:195-7, 420-4). AT 
teacher, Lucia Walker, recently shared this distinction with me; FM is 
Awareness Through Movement while AT is Movement Through Awareness. 
While this is perhaps too simplistic (there is a lot of ‘awareing’ going on in FM 
in scans, in relation to self-image and using the imagination), it highlights FM’s 
use of movement. I would argue that FM goes in both directions (from 
8 An understanding shared, and arguably pioneered by F. M. Alexander, founder of AT.
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movement to awareness to movement), while AT is more mono-directional 
(from awareness to movement).
Feldenkrais’s approach was to propose hundreds of movement variations
offering insight into different and unexplored facets of self-image; options. The 
breadth of propositions offsets the intrinsic difficulties involved in sensing one’s
self-image and imagining movement mentioned above; through exploring 
variations in movement and moving one’s attention to different parts of oneself
as one moves or imagines movement, the process of fleshing out self-image is 
oiled and its elusiveness demystified. Understanding that there are only ever 
approximations in a never-ending process serves to make the task seem less 
impossible and any gain in one’s sense of self-image valuable; one’s curiosity 
need never be dampened since there is always more detail to discover.
Of a tree, Ingold claims, ‘the tree is not an object at all, but a certain 
gathering together of the threads of life’ (2010:4). Self-image is also a 
gathering together of the threads of life, including the perceptions and 
materialities of the living person. Self-image is growing and ageing, changing 
as the person changes. Self-image is like an image of a moment in the 
meshwork, capturing the intermingling at one point in time. A way to check in 
with the emerging moment. A useful thing, but one to hold lightly, a fragile, 
mutable thing. It (and therefore people) share incompleteness with puppets, 
conceived as partial, imperfect, reduced, fragmented (Gross) sometimes a 
scrap, a discontinuity (Barthes). Self-image is as much about self-in-world-
image as self-in-self-image; the meshwork comes into play.
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Thing interlude #1: Teddy
A tiny tale of person-image between matter and movement.
 
Fig. 4 Teddy and me around 1975. Still from cinefilm shot by Karl Fredricksson. Image ©
Kristin Fredricksson.
 
Fig. 5 Teddy in 2013. Image © Kristin Fredricksson.
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This teddy is my unconscious self-portrait. But I am only aware of this
because I have acquired an intimate proprioceptive knowledge of my self-
image and organization through FM. My left leg is my support leg; I tend to
carry more weight on it when standing, even when I think I am standing
neutrally. This tendency has been offset since doing FM, but my pattern is still
there. I have a slight C curve in my spine towards my right. I have had
problems with my right hip and right shoulder; if I lie on my back I can feel my
right shoulder blade doesn't tuck under me comfortably in the way my left one
does and my right leg and foot lie in a completely different way to my left.
Teddy's right side is also withered and would be less useful to him than his left
if he had a skeleton; forces would not pass through it in a simple and direct
way and the movement would get stuck. The funny thing is that carrying teddy
under my right arm for all those years is possibly partly why my right side is
stiffer and less available for movement now, and as a result teddy has become
my self-portrait. Who made who? Did I make teddy that way, or did he make
me? Both. Teddy has acted on me, and I on him. It's a dance. I am also
teddy's self-portrait!
 I ask the acting students in a movement class at drama school to make
Plasticene models of themselves near the start of term. One individual makes a
model of himself sitting slumped, complete with X-box device in hand and
tablet on the floor beside him. The other students and he agree that the
imprint of these objects is still clearly visible in the way he stands, chest caved
in, on its way back to his slumped position. He includes them in his vision of
himself; they are intimately bound up with his self-image. Things carve spaces
out of us that we might otherwise also have available to move into, in
performance and in life.
*
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2.4 Second approximation: puppetry and material performance
Puppets and objects affect self-images, self-images affect puppets and 
objects. Use and manipulation are at least two-way activities, there is no 
simple doing to, no more with things than with people. There is no action-
reaction, but a multi-directional intermingling. A deep ongoing process. The 
understanding of self-image that Feldenkrais develops is precise and subtle, at 
once abstract and concretely experienced; it corresponds to the combination of
abstraction, or essence, and material reality found in puppets (Barthes, 
Jurkowski).
While I have not constructed practice to carry out my research, it is 
rooted in, and constantly refers to, my practice and experience in both theatre 
and FM. Material stuff is what incites me to make (a show or a puppet); a 
vibration along the lines of the meshwork. The following story illustrates my 
understanding of the two-way traffic in practising puppetry and the specificity 
of a puppetic approach.
In 1998, at the Lecoq School, I made a costume out of dead cat skins 
that I found in a hold-all in an alleyway near Passage Brady, the place to get a 
cheap curry in Paris. The skins were revolting and musty, with gaping eye-
holes and empty paws. I hot-glued them to tights worn on my legs and torso; 
it hurt and I felt slightly mad and queasy as I did it, alone, late at night, in my 
chambre de bonne. The scene we performed the next day as part of the weekly
presentation of 'autocours' work was largely improvised and lasted a few 
minutes. The theme was what Lecoq called ‘mystère’, where we explored 
worlds of fantasy and fairy, myth and magic. I entered a trance; the 
performance was wild but controlled, I could not remember exactly what had 
happened afterwards and now, 19 years later, I have a hazy recollection of 
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writhing movement from a kind of downward dog yoga position and half-
chanted, half-mewed and screeched vocalizations. The piece was well-received 
(rare for Lecoq) and immediately after listening to his critique, which was 
always given while we were still on stage, I ran out, stripped off the sweaty cat
skins, and stood under a hot shower for a long, purgative washing away of 
what felt like the cat revenge that had come through me.
All this might sound like the over-the-top imaginings of an impulsive 
young student, but shamanistic possessions involving masks or magical totems
in non-Western cultures have frequently been described in anthropological 
accounts and addressed in writing on theatre and puppetry (e.g. Artaud, 
Darkowska-Nidzgorska, Johnstone, Blumenthal). Francis acknowledges the 
ongoing importance of the spiritual and ritualistic aspects of puppetry (1). In 
the West the ecstatic cult of Dionysis evolved into masked drama which is 
widely seen as the birth of Western theatre. Puppeteers and mask performers 
from contemporary Western culture frequently talk about being possessed by 
their puppets and masks and about not fully controlling the making or 
performing of them (e.g. Schönbein9); the puppet or mask demands to be let 
out of the material and performed in a certain way. These things seem to have 
strange powers. Ventriloquist, Nina Conti, says the puppet speaks her 
unconscious mind, voicing the things she normally censors in herself (Nina 
Conti). I’ve also heard the story (I think from John Wright, but I may 
misremember) of a student clown who went to the toilet with her nose on and 
couldn't figure out how to get out of the cubicle. I would argue that this is 
down to a full and attentive awareness of, and sensitivity to, the subtleties of 
the dance between materiality and movement. Placing materiality at the core 
of possession does not diminish its power or disconnect it from imagination.
9 And many in conversation.
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 I lost myself in the cats, but I found something else in listening to 
them, or through them. Their power came from their materiality and my 
reaction to it; physical material led to a moment of theatre. I did not reflect on 
what to do with the skins. I had the urge to glue them on and just did what 
came from being in them. I had recently seen François Truffaut’s L’Enfant 
Sauvage (1970) for the first time, about the attempt to tame a child who has 
grown up in the wilderness. Perhaps it led me to want to embody the wild child
and the cat-suit was a body mask that enabled this. An interaction with raw 
materials produces puppets and masks and they call many of the shots along 
the way to theatrical performance; the material suggests the form (which 
might be its raw state) and the form suggests modes of play and expression. 
Meeting the materials is like meeting the wild child in the woods and trying to 
tame her. The taming works more or less, the puppeteer or mask-wearer is 
wilded more or less, and the theatrical event is the telling of the story of this 
meeting.
Working in a puppetic way gives me access to things I would not be able
to sense or hear otherwise. Sometimes, but not always, the balance of power 
tips and a state of trance occurs. There is always an element of possession; 
you cannot do whatever you want with a puppet or thing. It affects you. Not a 
metaphysical possession but a very physical one which emerges from the 
puppet’s materiality. In Posner et al., puppets are described as realities which 
‘dance the manipulator’ (Foley), do-ers rather than objects (Parker-Starbuck), 
shapers and makers, not mimics and mirrors (Posner) and ‘the human infusion 
of independent life into lifeless, but not agentless, objects in performance’ (5). 
The fact that objects are not agentless is important; they are part of the 
meshwork which enables agency while not actually agents in themselves. Bell 
reminds us that Lehmann argues puppetry has always been postdramatic in 
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that it ‘has always thrived independently of a dependence on dramatic text’ 
(12). Puppetry is a theatre of the material world, an art form which expresses 
unmouthable things about the intermingling of humans and nonhumans, about 
what people do in and to the world and what it does in and to us. Puppetry is 
of the meshwork.
To define ‘material performance’ or puppetry as that which springs from 
an encounter with physical material however would be both too restrictive and 
too vague; theatre where puppets, masks and materials play an important role
might just as well start from a story, a play, a place, an idea, an improvisation 
and so on, depending on the artist-maker, and much visual art might also be 
said to arise from a meeting with some material or other. However, the 
sensitive encounter with material, or the nonhuman, is central to the processes
both of making and performing material theatre so that it stages, to quote 
Margolies, ‘the process of humans noticing and responding to fundamental 
material properties, as well as the variety of possible interactions between 
humans and the material world’ (2014:322). It is about the relationships, 
about witnessing and listening. I suggest these relationships can be enriched 
through somatic awareness, so that the puppeteer is not only operating 
through sensitivity to her materials but also to herself. What might somatic 
education have to do and say about material performance and vice versa, and 
about the variations in the hard and soft realities we experience?
Trimingham, we saw, suggests puppets are ‘affordances’ to the 
puppeteer. Ingold criticizes Gibsonian affordances as a ‘sclerotisation of the 
environment,’ saying,
We need a different understanding of movement: not a casting about 
the hard surfaces of a world in which everything is already laid out, but 
an issuing along with things in the very processes of their generation; 
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not the trans-port (carrying across) of completed being, but the pro-
duction (bringing forth) of perpetual becoming’ (2011:12) (his italics).
FM could also be criticized for over-emphasizing the ‘hard surfaces of the world’
with its constant reference to finding support from the ground through the 
skeleton. However, in FM it is recognized that the ground is used or not used to
produce kinematically pure movement. For humans, it does not afford the 
same potential for every user; its potential is completely open, as with the 
puppet. Exploring the non-obvious ways of becoming of the puppet (and not 
just its affordances) can be a rich creative seam which expands its 
vocabulary10.
Kaplin sets out a classification system focusing on the puppet/performer 
dynamic using distance and ratio as quantities. Distance refers to ‘the level of 
separation and contact between the performer and the object being 
manipulated’, going from performer and object being one to ‘psychic, body, 
remote, and temporal degrees of contact’. His order reads: performer/object - 
actor - character role - masks - body puppets - hand puppets - rod puppets - 
marionettes - remote-controlled figures - shadow figures - animated figures - 
computer generated figures - virtual performer/object. As the space between 
what is performing and the performer grows, direct agency diminishes, to the 
point at which it is no longer possible for the performer to receive somatic 
feedback from the thing itself but only visual feedback (from the remote-
controlled figure). After this point time and space separate the manipulated 
from the manipulator, hence the feedback loop is further loosened and
10 In 2003, I was Assistant Director on Drames Brefs 2 by Philippe Minyana with Cie. Chès 
Panses Vertes. We worked with puppeteer and puppet coach, Philippe Rodriguez-Jorda, 
who asked the puppeteers to explore the puppets simply as objects, without paying at-
tention to their figurative qualities. This opened up many new avenues of expression with
them.
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potentially becomes more intellectual. While somatic awareness may be useful 
further up this scale, my focus is mainly on the part from mask up to and 
including marionettes; that is, with puppetry while there is still a direct physical
relationship with the thing so that a somatic feedback loop is possible. Kaplin 
suggests the point ‘where the center of gravity of the performing object and 
the performer are distinct from each other, that the term “puppet" can be 
used', but notes, ‘like all the different zones of contact I outline here, the 
divisions are not sharp’ (23). My range of reference includes mask and body 
mask since masks can be worn elsewhere than on the face and at this point I 
would argue they become puppets. Indeed, this was my route into puppetry, 
via masks at Lecoq, which we displaced onto other parts of our bodies. Body 
masks equally need not correspond to the anatomy of the wearer; I might 
have a head on my back or might be wearing a body mask with another actor 
as in the good old pantomime horse.
Bringing awareness to handling things as the baseline activity for 
puppetry might also be seen as the starting point for other art forms dealing 
with matter - sculpture, painting, ceramics and so on. Puppetry is a 
transdisciplinary or pluri-disciplinary (to use Jurkowski’s term) art form by its 
very nature. Other elements to which performer training attunes awareness - 
rhythm, breath, articulation (movement and voice), space, le jeu and so on - 
are also the business of the puppeteer. But these are addressed, or expressed, 
through the manner of handling things. The material qualities can be accessed 
through vision too, it might be argued; what does it look like? Indeed, I have 
usually been directed in this way for performances involving puppets and 
objects where an outside eye is invaluable, although sometimes this might only
be a mirror11. The puppeteer’s point of view and the viewer’s are so different 
11 Schönbein's use of both mirror and inner sensing is described in Chapter 6.
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that it can be hard for the puppeteer alone to know what ‘works’. Placing the 
emphasis on the visual to the exclusion of the felt precludes sensory feedback 
that is important for the puppeteer in her work, and will also impact on the 
show if one is being made. Person-image and how it is altered by or extended 
into objects becomes a focus for attending to sensitivity and qualities of 
movement in puppetry to compliment or counterpoint a more purely visual 
aesthetic approach. The same score or scene performed by one puppeteer and 
another might be very different depending on how the person is attending to 
herself.
The puppeteer needs (at least) a dual focus; what does it look and feel 
like? An inwards and an outwards focus. On a basic level, this might be about 
the practical needs of the puppeteer; ‘user-friendly’ puppets in terms of weight 
and controls help. The balance and play between inwards and outwards focus, 
or the relationship between person-image and puppet, is the main work of the 
puppeteer. By shifting and directing my focus, I shift and guide the viewer’s.
Claudel, drawing on his experience of Japanese Bunraku in the 1920s, 
writes of the puppet as an extrapolation of the mask, calling it a 'centre à 
gestes', noting that it lives from its centre (Plassard 78). For Claudel, these 
puppets cannot walk as they have no rapport with the ground; their limbs and 
heads are only expressive, not functional, and sometimes the puppet seems as
though it will escape from its heart-close animators whom he describes as 
having neither bodies nor faces (79). Human movement is always related to 
the ground; the human organizes her movement up and away from the 
ground, whilst also being a body acted on by gravity. The puppet is acted on by
gravity, countered by human force. Claudel's comments about the centre of the
puppet relate to the desire in FM to free the centre so that the limbs and head 
are free to move and express. Intriguingly, the centre of the Bunraku puppet is
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empty; it has no solid body but only a shoulder board and a bamboo hoop at 
hip level attached by strings ("Bunraku Dolls..."). Movement is created around 
a space. The Bunraku form is an example of a performance meshwork; the 
puppets each have three puppeteers and the music and text are performed to 
the side of the stage. The elements are co-present and recreated together in 
the performance. The form requires the audience to shift its focus and create 
its own integration.
Moving from East to West, Barthes writes on Mr Punch's European 
relative, Polichinelle; 'it lives not as a total body, totally trembling, but as a 
rigid part of the actor from whom it is derived … it is still a piece of movement, 
a jerk, a shove, the essence of discontinuity, a decomposed projection of the 
body's gestures … fallen from the body to become a fetish' (Francis 135; 
Plassard 87). In terms of person-image, this figure of the puppet is both more 
connected with the person-image of the puppeteer than the Bunraku, and less 
involved in a wider meshwork of lines; it is seen as a break rather than a 
continuity. Barthes calls Bunraku, by contrast, 'the body's tangible abstraction'.
By emptying the centre of restrictive matter, expression can flow freely.
Since working with Christopher Leith, I have described my own work as 
puppetic, inspired by the French term ‘marionnettique’, although it does not 
always include puppets and when it does they are always part of a bigger mix. 
For me, this means I work with and in response to materials and things, 
listening to the stuff to find out what to do or what to make, assuming that we 
are collaborating. Just as each individual human moves in an idiosyncratic way,
according to her person-image constructed from birth, with her particular 
structure, growing and moving in the world, each puppet is unique, a new 
language to be learnt by the puppeteer; it will have its own particular grammar
and vocabulary, dictated, as Buschmeyer observes, 'by its centre of gravity and
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by the materials of which it is made’ (Jurksowski 1988:19). Craig Leo, the 
original puppeteer of the head of Joey in War Horse (2007), voices the 
Handspring company view of the puppet as a verb12, not a thing, saying, 'The 
puppet is our text, it has full-stops, commas,' but these are space, movement 
and breath rather than words and punctuation (War Horse Conference). There 
might be a base grammar for particular kinds of puppet such as hand puppets -
because there are limits to what the hand can do, attached as it is to the body 
- but each hand puppet will speak its own dialect, just as all violins are not the 
same to play. Blumenthal puts understanding movement and what is 
communicated through movement at the centre of the puppeteer’s art (71). 
The same might be said of the FM practitioner. Pfeffer said we were ‘movement
detectives’, tracking down the parasitic in movement (noise) that prevents 
intention from being translated into action. An interest in movement joins FM 
and puppetry.
12 Echoing Buckminster Fuller on the human.
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Chapter 3
Schilder's mercurial body-image
Paul Schilder replaced the singular notion of the body, the body as 
stable unit bound by the surface of its skin, the body as spatially and 
temporally belonging only to the place-instant of its appearing, with the 
centrifugal notion of a body-image as unfolding multiplicity spreading in 
time and space. (Lepecki 129)
3.1 Introduction: tracing a path back to Schilder
The concept of person-image I use in this thesis is broad, related but 
not identical to Feldenkrais’s self-image, which itself cannot be pinned down to 
a single or clear definition, but is more like an area of intuitions and 
observations. Beyond everyday understandings, self-image is the process of 
how I perceive myself as I act, my inner kinaesthetic sense of self and physical
integrity, or lack of it. It is related to proprioception but not identical; it covers 
more conceptual ground. It reaches backwards in time, and constitutes, in the 
words of FM trainer, Combeau, a ‘bag of memory’1 which produces the present 
moment in which it is also ‘an anticipatory plan for the detailed movements the
body must undertake in order to act’ (Grosz 1994:69). Feldenkrais came 
across the concept of body-image in the work of Paul Schilder (1886-1940).
Schilder was a Viennese-born psychoanalyst, student of Freud and best 
known for his work on body-image, which he writes about most comprehens-
ively in The Image and Appearance of the Human Body, first published in 1935
1 'Un sac de mémoire’; reported in conversation with Claire Vialon, FM practitioner. This 
idea finds an echo in Schilder who writes, ‘Memory is … always in the service of the 
present’ (1942b:383).
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by Kegan Paul. The same publisher produced Feldenkrais’s Body and Mature 
Behaviour in 1949. Aside from his influence on Feldenkrais, Schilder writes 
much on the relations between people and things and the interdependence of 
the animate and inanimate which is of relevance for thinking about puppetry 
and person-image. I use person-, self- and body-image according to whether I 
am referring to my point of view, Feldenkrais’s or Schilder’s, although this is 
not always clear cut.
Schilder foreshadows writers such as Latour (2004a), on the community 
of humans and nonhumans, and Bennett (2010), on vibrant materialism, al-
though neither cite him. His ideas complement the notion of meshwork and 
lend themselves to an Ingoldian-Deleuzian understanding of open-ended emer-
gence and becomings. His work has not been extensively studied for its applic-
ation in performance theory although Lepecki, quoted above, refers to him in 
relation to Xavier Le Roy’s performance, Self Unfinished (1998), which I exam-
ine in Chapter 6. It has not been applied to puppetry as far as I am aware.
Schilder was interested in performance; he refers to masked carnival (in
Nice) and vaudeville, and it is perhaps of note that he developed his ideas 
during the 1910s and 1920s in Vienna, when Gertrud Bodenwieser was active 
in dance, making work such as Demon Machine, 1924, in which female dancers
embody machine parts (Demon Machine..., Sassenberg). Body-image is shown 
as absorbing or reflecting the changing modern environment (fig. 6, 
Bodenwieser). There was also a variety of expressionistic influences in 
Viennese theatre from Wedekind to the Yiddish theatre. In the 1930s Schilder 
was living in New York when Martha Graham and Doris Humphreys were 
reconfiguring dance and there was a puppetry renaissance including the Yiddish
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Modicut puppet theatre (Portnoy)2. While it is outside the scope of this thesis to
explore the possibilities of influence further, an awareness of the cultural 
context helps situate Schilder’s far-ranging thought.
2 Although Schilder was part of the Viennese Jewish elite who shunned Yiddish and there is
no evidence as far as I am aware that he saw productions by any of these artists.
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Fig. 6 Newspaper clipping on The Machine Age, part of Bodenwieser's Demon Machine, from
The Sketch, 26 June 1929. Image © Illustrated London News Group. ALL RIGHTS 
RESERVED. Image reproduced with kind permission of The British Newspaper Archive 
(www.britishnewspaperarchive.co.uk).
3.2 Movement, action, function: the enmeshed body-image
Every action is based upon the body-image. (Schilder 1942b:233)
Every single movement has its specific melody. (Schilder 2000:57)
Our relation to the earth, to gravity, is an outstanding factor for the 
mechanics of movement and for the perception of the body-image. 
(174)
Schilder's concept of body-image chimed with Feldenkrais's polyvalent 
research very clearly. His background in psychology and psychoanalysis 
contrasts Feldenkrais’s in physics, martial arts and education, however the 
neurophysiological aspect of Schilder’s work was a boon to Feldenkrais, offering
solid foundations for some of his more intuitive leaps3. In the ATM lesson, AY 
24 "The Body-image" (vol. 1a:145-8), Feldenkrais refers to Schilder as the 
person who introduced the concept of body-image and identifies ‘the image 
that you see, the emotional image, and the image externally developed from 
the feelings of the body’ (147). He continues, ‘The more these three (images) 
are closely related and interwoven the more control a person has of his body, 
with better accuracy in his movements’. Schilder outlines what he calls the tri-
dimensional ‘body-image’ as involving parts of the body we can see, tactile, 
thermal and pain impressions, sensations from the muscles and viscera and a 
3 Intuitive at the time; many of his intuitions are born out by recent findings around neuro-
plasticity and learning. For example, Doidge claims that Feldenkrais anticipated the motor
theory of thought, proposed by Llinàs who observed that nervous systems are not essen-
tial for life but are for complex movement (2015). Doidge acknowledges confirmation of 
Feldenkrais’s thinking in the work of Merzenich who showed ‘long-term neuroplastic 
change occurs most readily when a person or an animal pays close attention while learn-
ing’ (170).
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sense of position, as well as engaging with a ‘storeroom of past impressions’4 
(2000:11). He quotes Head and Holmes, the source of his ideas about postural 
schema:
By means of perpetual alterations in position we are always building up 
a postural model of ourselves which constantly changes. Every new 
posture or movement is recorded on this plastic schema, and the 
activity of the cortex brings every fresh group of sensations evoked by 
altered posture into relation with it. (1911:187).
Everything a person does contributes to her body schema as it constantly 
evolves and influences everything she does.
Schilder characterizes body-image as something humans play with 
constantly, linking it to imaginative and creative life:
It is one of the inherent characteristics of our psychic life that we 
continually change our images; we multiply them and make them 
appear differently. This general rule is true also for the postural model 
of the body. We let it shrink playfully and come to the idea of 
Lilliputians, or we transform it into giants. We have, therefore, an 
almost unlimited number of body-images. (2000:67)
This plasticity interested Feldenkrais as the basis for transformation; playing 
with body-image is something human beings do anyway, so he was not asking 
his students to do something completely foreign, merely to bring awareness to 
a prenoetic process that was already happening in order to steer it more 
consciously.
Grosz claims Head provided the first ‘rigorous notion' of body-image in 
1911 in her chapter, “Body-images”, in Volatile Bodies (1994). Feldenkrais was
4 Combeau’s ‘bag of memories’.
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possibly nearer to Head’s more strictly neurophysiological approach than to 
Schilder’s more psychological outlook (influenced by Freud), and also to Head’s
self-experimental methodology, although he may have been bemused by Head 
severing the radial nerve in his arm to observe the return of sensitivity in it 
over several years in a series of painful sensation experiments5! Head was 
attempting to cultivate states of reverie and inattention, or a ‘negative attitude 
of attention’ as well as make discoveries about the physiology of sensation 
(Watt-Smith), which resonates with Feldenkrais's use of diffuse attention and 
concentration and echoes Feldenkrais’s own patient research into movement 
via self-observation. Ironically, Head recognized the need for minimal 
stimulation to see results in his subjects as he explored tactile and sensory 
thresholds (1911), a central idea in FM, where the student is asked to reduce 
effort in order to detect small differences6. But while Head remained in the 
nineteenth century model of scientific introspection and expected objective 
results from his self-experimentation, Feldenkrais devised an open-ended 
method which others can follow, each on her own path of discovery, with no 
fixed outcome in mind. The beginnings of the ideas of both men in self-
observation is of interest in and of itself. Close attention to self was required to
create Feldenkrais's method, which others can now use; this pushes it outside 
the realm of allopathic medicine. Schilder came from and stayed within a more 
conventional medical model, but drew heavily on case studies from patients 
who were often very articulate about their experience, and sometimes also 
5 Feldenkrais does not appear to reference Head directly however, and he is not mentioned
in Reese’s comprehensive biography.
6 This idea is based on the Weber-Fechner law which relates human sensitivity to relative 
differences in stimulus. Adding an apple to a bag of shopping might go unnoticed, but 
placing the same apple in the empty bag will not. The fire of a lit match in broad daylight 
is barely visible but a single match flame can light up a dark room. In FM ‘reduced mus-
cular effort’ lowers the ‘threshold of sensitivity’ (Reese 2015:192).
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medical experts themselves, such as a medical student who observed his 
attacks of dizziness over the course of eighteen months (1942b:92-3).
A note on the distinction between ‘postural schema’ (Head’s term which 
Schilder uses) and ‘body-image’ (Schilder’s term). Gallagher analyses the 
difference between body-image and body schema (akin to ‘postural schema’):
A body-image consists of a system of perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs 
pertaining to one's own body. In contrast, a body schema is a system of 
sensory-motor capacities that function without awareness or the 
necessity of perceptual monitoring. This conceptual distinction between 
body-image and body schema is related respectively to the difference 
between having a perception of (or belief about) something and having 
a capacity to move (or an ability to do something). (25)
According to Gallagher’s definitions, a person's body-image is both productive 
of, and dependent on, her body schema. Body schema involves what I do and 
body-image involves what I think I do. Body (postural) schema is learned 
movement habits and body-image is a shifting process of thought-perception in
relation to these habits. These are actually quite limited views of body-image 
and schema, but help to clarify the foundations upon which Schilder and 
Feldenkrais build flexible, pliable and open ideas. Body-image and postural 
schema are not identical in Schilder.
While Schilder looked at body-image from the perspective of psychology 
and psychiatry, Feldenkrais was interested in general human functioning, both 
for the fit and healthy (in society’s terms, not his) and those with medical 
conditions or injuries. Schilder links psychiatric cases with changes in postural 
schema and body-image; Feldenkrais shows how working on the self-image 
(which he also calls ‘body-image’ and ‘primary image’) can work on a problem 
(which might be motor or psychological), not necessarily curing (and not 
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looking to cure, which he sees as a regression to a prior and not necessarily 
good state), but improving function7.
Schilder debated whether the postural model was ‘built up by sensations 
and memories’ or whether there was ‘something beyond the sensations,’ 
asking if a sensation has ‘any inner meaning without being brought in 
connection with the postural model of the body?’ (2000:13), meaning a gestalt 
of being and body-image. He recognizes the discrepancy between what a 
person does and what she thinks she does; ‘many of the tonic changes in the 
posture of the limbs change the actual body only and not the body-image’ 
(80). He also sees the ongoing plasticity of the body-image (as had Head); ‘we 
never cease gathering experiences and exploring our own body’ (172), 
emphasizing the active and collaborative nature of it:
We acquire it [the postural model of the body] in the directed and 
intentional action concerning the world … The postural model of the 
body has to be built up. It is a creation and a construction and not a gift.
It is not a shape … but the production of a shape. There is no doubt that
this process of structuralization is only possible in close contact with 
experiences concerning the world. (113)
For both Schilder and Feldenkrais, body-image is enworlded, embodied and 
social, or to use an Ingoldian term, enmeshed; it only makes sense to talk 
about an intelligent person, not an intelligent body. A person is, by their 
nature, in and of a broader meshwork.
Besides the importance Feldenkrais gives to self-image, there are many 
related concepts present in Schilder that are traceable in Feldenkrais’s work. 
Both see perception and action as a functional unity and perception as
7 I look at the notion of function in FM below and in the following chapter.
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synaesthetic; sensations, posture, emotions, action and personality are one 
(Schilder 2000:15, 114). This relates to Feldenkrais’s summary of human 
action as always involving four elements; moving, thinking, sensing and 
feeling. Schilder’s emphasis on intentional action is important in relation to the 
concept of function in FM which focuses on action as the fulfilment of intention,
or functional movement, which is movement towards, in relation and repsonse 
to, and on the world.
Partly due to his personal history, Feldenkrais was concerned with 
survival and interested in movement likely to support it. However, he was also 
concerned to move beyond questions of survival and explore human potential 
to its full. He developed his notion of function in relation to many sources, but 
it is useful to look to Schilder to clarify Feldenkrais’s ideas. Schilder thought 
that ‘function cannot be defined from the point of view of anatomy alone, but 
only from the point of view of environment and situation in relation to 
anatomy’ (1942b:235-6). FM does not use expressive or non-functional 
movement as a source for exploration, which is not to say it has nothing to 
offer what might be seen as the expressive arts. Indeed, if expressive 
movement, voice or playing (instruments or puppets) can be rooted in 
functional movement, the connection between intention and expression can be 
liberated8. This is what the dancer in Kleist’s essay, "On the Marionette 
Theatre" (1810)9 is referring to when he complains of dancers having their 
souls in an elbow or the lower back rather than performing movement which 
follows ‘the simple law of gravity’; their movement is affected (2012:123). 
Schilder expresses a similar idea; ‘Every striving and desire changes the 
8 On functional movement, with particular reference to FM, and choice in the actor's art, 
see Worsley.
9 To which I return in Chapter 5.
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substance of the body, its gravity, and its mass’ (2000:201). He is interested in
the history of figurative painting as a history of how people have seen (and 
perhaps lived?) the human body (271-272). The history of puppets and 
puppetry might provide similar insights with the added element of showing 
something about the understanding of (expressive) movement. Both histories 
reveal traces of the shifting experience of self-image over time and in different 
locations10. I explore this further in Chapter 6.
Schilder relates external space and body-image; that is to say he 
recognizes the role of the environment in the co-construction of body-image. In
observing the anticipatory plan of human action and the active nature of the 
beginning of the movement he provides Feldenkrais with a key substantiation 
of his own personal observations; being about to move or imagining movement
are active processes and therefore useful for learning. On function, Schilder 
writes, ‘we must give up rigid ideas about anatomy in its relation to function 
when the general situation changes’ (2000:26) suggesting the (not uniquely) 
Feldenkraisian emphasis on function in which actual anatomy is irrelevant, but 
how it is used is everything. He notes that making movements helps 
orientation; movement is a source of knowledge. Doing can be, or can lead to, 
understanding. Feldenkrais exploits this to the full in his method. Schilder 
identifies the importance of the mid-line of the body for organizing movement 
and notes that symmetrical parts of the body are ‘physiologically and 
psychologically connected with each other’ (20). The mid-line is a conceptual 
tool in FM both in terms of perceived symmetry and asymmetry and its use to 
10 Trinity (2016), a recent show by Brave New Worlds, explores this in its design-led per-
formance including worn structures. On their tumblr they say they are ‘investigating the 
processes of transformation, iconification and transcendence, by looking at the ways in 
which the body has been masked, morphed, muted, ritualised, armoured, adorned, 
transformed, elevated, made “other”, through the centuries from medieval and renais-
sance art, fairy-tales and folklore, to science fiction and fashion. We are playing with the 
archetypes of the female form, from the fictional to the personal' (Brave-New-Worlds).
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increase global movement awareness (develop self-image), as are the more 
neurological aspects flagged up in Schilder where crossing the mid-line with a 
hand or foot, for example, reveals aspects of the neurophysiological 
organization of the person in certain cases11. In FM this translates as looking 
for what works and finding out how to expand it to other areas; observing 
functionality around the mid-line is one strategy for doing this.
3.3 Schilder and the community of body-images
Schilder considers the importance of the sociology of body-images for 
ethics and aesthetics as well as its physiological foundation. He makes the case
for the need to ‘consider the interrelations of the body-images of various 
persons, or, in other words, the sociology of body-images’ writing that:
The body-image in the sphere of perception is dependent on the 
inanimate world or rather on the world under the aspect of the inanimate.
The body-image in the libidinous sphere is to a great extent dependent 
upon our attitudes towards the love-object, or, in a broader sense, the 
animate world, or still better, the world under the aspect of animation and
life. (2000:175)
He thinks ‘that the development of genital sexuality is necessary for a full 
appreciation of other persons and our appreciation of their somatic integrity’ 
(173), echoing Feldenkrais’s concerns in Body and Mature Behaviour where the
ability to achieve full orgasm is a gauge of maturity. Grosz identifies the 
problematic nature of seeing a full self-image as dependent on a stable, genital
sexuality which does not take into account female sexuality which she calls 
‘genitally multilocational, plural, ambiguous, polymorphous’ (1994:83). I would
11 See Worth on asymmetry in FM and dance training.
81
add that it is also reductive of male sexuality to make its unique focus the 
phallus and limiting in its view of human sexuality which can also include 
asexuality as a positive choice or state. Schilder refers to male experience as 
human experience, and Feldenkrais could be accused of the same; both are of 
their era. However, the practice of FM allows for and listens to difference. The 
demasculinization of the work is in the hands of current practitioners, many of 
whom are female (not that this necessarily means better listening to and 
allowing for female experiences)12. The emphasis on structure and skeleton in 
FM might be seen as helping to make a touchstone of masculine experience 
given that the skeleton is relatively genderless13, compared say with the 
broader (‘multilocational, plural, ambiguous, polymorphous’) palette in Body 
Mind Centering, where bones, organs, nervous system, cells and so on are 
each focused on in turn14. I don’t think however that FM is necessarily a 
practice which makes male experience the norm, but it could be. I return to 
this discussion in the following chapter.
Whilst many of Schilder’s terms, such as references to ‘primitive man’, 
and opinions, for example, about what he sees as aberrant homosexuality, are
12 Among Feldenkrais's early students and assistants, many were women who have gone on
to develop the method, including Mia Segal, Ruthy Alon, Myriam Pfeffer, Chava Shelhav, 
Bruria Milo, Gaby Yaron and Anat Baniel. In 1982 Feldenkrais chose these women, along 
with only two men (Jerry Karzen and Yochanon Rywerant) to be trainers in his method 
("Jerry Karzen"). He died in 1984, so his teaching was largely in the hands of these wo-
men. From my own experience, men are in the minority in FM trainings, but this might 
only be the case in the UK, France and the US; I have no experience of trainings else-
where.
13 The main differences are that males tend to have larger bones and females a wider, cir-
cular pelvic inlet ("Male or Female?").
14 'Body-Mind Centering® is an integrated and embodied approach to movement, the body 
and consciousness. Developed by Bonnie Bainbridge Cohen, it is an experiential study 
based on the embodiment and application of anatomical, physiological, psychophysical 
and developmental principles, utilizing movement, touch, voice and mind. Its uniqueness 
lies in the specificity with which each of the body systems can be personally embodied 
and integrated, the fundamental groundwork of developmental repatterning, and the util-
ization of a body-based language to describe movement and body-mind relationships' 
("Body-Mind Centering®").
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of his time and deeply problematic, this should not obscure other useful 
aspects of his work. (In Feldenkrais’s writings too some terminology and 
postulation is out of date; he also displays at least an ambivalence towards 
homosexuality, for example.15) More than just a source and confirmation for 
Feldenkrais, Schilder explores body-image from aspects that are of interest in a
discussion of both puppetry and political ecology. The study of self and body-
image is ultimately about societal transformation in the work of both. Giving a 
palpable sense of ethical responsibility, Schilder asks:
Is there not a stage in which we see body-images everywhere? Is there 
not a stage where the soul and the body-image are practically all over 
the world? Is there not an animistic phase in human development? 
Identification exists between ourselves and our fellow beings … all these 
persons outside ourselves are necessary to build up the picture of our 
own body. When we have built up our own body we spread it again all 
over the world and melt it into others. It would be wrong to conclude 
that collective processes go on. There is no collective body-image; but 
everybody builds his own body-image in contact with others. 
(2000:273)
As I hope is coming into view, he can be seen as pointing towards ideas 
discussed in Chapter 1: Deleuze’s haeccities (1980), Ingold’s meshworks 
(2007, 2011), Latour’s actor network theory (1990) and community of humans
and nonhumans (2004a) and Bennett’s vibrant materialism (2010). Schilder 
identifies the continuum from animate to inanimate whilst also recognizing that
humans sense their difference from the world and act in and on it. He writes:
It is fascinating to follow the remote possibilities of identification. They 
descend from the animal of the mammalian type to everything which is 
animated, thence to plants, and beyond that to the inanimate world,
15 Although he also says 'women are far superior to men...as far as pain goes' (Amherst 
1980, 1, 00:03:10)!
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especially in so far as it moves. And the world is primarily a moving 
world. Rest is only a special type of movement. When we are connected 
with the world by identification, we derive from it the feeling of unity 
with the world. But at the same time the world remains different. It is 
an object towards which we are acting. (2000:253)
Human beings are primarily acting in the world. This means that we are 
acting in relation to nonhumans, as well as to each other, either taking them 
towards and even into ourselves or pushing them away or out of ourselves. 
The escape route from holism and monism is intentional action. But there is 
also the tendency to calibrate one’s body-image with the body-images of those 
with whom one comes into contact. In Chapter 6 I look at specific examples 
from performance to consider this mesh of intentionality and action. According 
to both Schilder and Feldenkrais, people act according to their body-images 
and this is connected, says Schilder, to ‘the deep community between the 
postural models of (other) human beings’ (44). He makes this into an ethics; 
‘There are deep connections between our actions and interests towards 
ourselves and our actions and interests towards others. The preservation of the
body-image of another person is an ethical value in itself’ (282)16. This relates 
to Feldenkrais’s idea that (detrimentally to the progress of society and the 
person) social expectations often outweigh organic needs in influencing the 
way a person acts17.
Schilder hints at a sense of the potential radical nature of FM when he 
says, ‘what persons around us do with their own bodies is also of enormous 
importance. Here is the first hint that the body-image is built up by social
16 Schilder takes this idea very far, discussing the physiological basis for animism.
17 I examine the notion of ‘organic need’ in the following chapter which focuses more dir-
ectly on Feldenkrais’s work with self-image.
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contacts. The child takes parts of the bodies of others into its own body-image’ 
(137). Schilder supposes that, ‘every action of the ego in the analytic sense, 
every grasping, groping, and sucking, will again have an enormous influence 
on the structure of the body-image’ (123). In FM practitioner training, self-
image is explored by retracing its development from the sucking and bringing 
of hands and feet to the mouth of earliest infancy to motor coordination for 
rolling, crawling, walking, hopping and so on; fundamental human movement. 
Schilder connects the transformations of others and ourselves; ‘the 
community of body-images is at the basis of every social function’ (205). If this
is so, working on self-image has great transformative potential at the level of 
society; what people embody will be passed to their children and entourages. 
Schilder cites dance and shape-changing performance as examples of ongoing 
(beyond childhood) human experimentation with body-image. For him, the 
history of self-image is also the history of humankind; ‘The building-up of the 
body-image is based not only upon the individual history of an individual, but 
also on his relations to others. The inner history is also the history of our 
relations to other human beings’ (138). Self-image has something to say about
puppet-human relations as well as about human-human relations. The ‘inner 
history’ also has an outer history in the human production of puppets, puppetry
techniques and ways of telling through nonhumans.
3.4 Schilder on ‘outside space’
An object always has a definite relation to the body-image. An object is 
the crossing point of many worlds. It is in the world of physics and in 
the world of practical and moral values. (Schilder 1942b:233)
85
On a very basic level, Schilder shows that ‘the stabilization of the object 
parallels the stabilization of the impression of the body,’ hence the ‘elimination 
of perceptual motion’ is necessary for ‘efficient action directed towards the 
stabilized object’ (137). Unless I can stabilize my perceptions I will not be able 
to stabilize my body-image which I need to do to act in and on the world with 
intention. I need a world to ‘cling to and lean on’, in Schilder’s words: 
Every action is based upon a background of posture, in which the 
individual is oriented to the outside world… posture is in direct relation 
to the spatial framework. A posture must necessarily be a reaction to 
the force of gravitation. Action can only be understood as emerging from
the continuous tonic adaptations to one’s environment or pulls. (374)
The puppeteer’s art is to refine the everyday capacity to act in and on 
things in the world, choosing specific qualities and rhythms of interaction. For 
Schilder, ‘philosophers and psychologists have not given sufficient attention to 
the fact that there is not only a space outside of the body but also a space 
which is filled by the body’ (188), and neither have puppeteers. He goes on, 
‘The image of the body extends in space and implies space perception. Without
an outward space, body space is strictly senseless’. He thus claims a co-
dependency for outside and inside space; one’s body is also part of the outside 
world. His remarks on the difference between the space of the body and the 
space outside it are of particular relevance for puppetry: 
The aims of a movement can be very varied. The aim can be an aim in 
the outside world, in the outside space. It can be an aim in the region of
one's own body. It can be the reaching of a particular point, or the 
acting on a particular object. Experience in pathology … leads me to the 
conclusion that the psychological space concerning one's own body is 
different from other space. Space therefore, psychologically shows a 
lack of homogeneity. The outside space and the body space differ in 
their structure. (57-8)
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The puppeteer has at least three spaces, if not four or five; the space she 
occupies herself, the space she occupies with the puppet, the space of the 
spectacle, the space shared with the audience, and beyond this the social 
space. The puppeteer communicates with the audience through the 
intermediary of the puppet, at least partially. The spaces occupied by and with 
the puppet are transitional; they are neither purely beyond her nor her own 
space. If you touch my puppet, either yourself or through another puppet, you 
are also touching me. Depending on the style of puppet and on your touch, I 
may or may not feel the touch as something which impacts on me. It may be 
that I need to sense it in order to react and create meaning for the audience 
both when we are moving the same puppet, and when we are not. The space 
of the puppet is invested with presence and intention and endowed with 
person-image, although it is absent of bodily human presence. The melody of 
the puppet is influenced but not governed by its physics, just as my personal 
movement melody is influenced but not governed by my physical anatomy. 
Puppetry plays with the ‘lack of homogeneity’ of space; the difference of 
structure in inner and outer space. It can conjure inner space where there is 
none by creating a sense of a living being where there is just inanimate 
material and it can allow outer space to impact on inner space, the puppet on 
the puppeteer, as if more than one person with a person-image were present. 
The work of the puppeteer is to play with ‘aiming her movement’ in particular 
ways to encourage this bleeding between outside space and the space of the 
body.
Schilder makes what might seem like an obvious point:
the human body proves insufficient for many of the tasks which the 
animate and inanimate surroundings offer. This is partially a problem of 
strength, but it is also a problem of the space relation between the 
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individual and the objects. We can reach further with a stick or thrown 
stone than with our arms and hands. (1942a:45)
Perhaps this idea can be extrapolated to the function of puppets as tools of the 
human psyche. The human body alone, used in an everyday way, does not 
reach far enough into the world nor allow a sure enough grasp on reality; 
puppets extend the power of the human imagination. The body used in extra-
daily ways in dance and theatre also extends the human’s reach, but the 
specificity of puppets is that they are also physically present and manipulated 
as tools, extending both agency and imagination.
Following the case study of a schizophrenic, Schilder states, ‘When the 
dimensions of the outer space are changed, there is also a change in the 
dimensions of the body-image’ (1942b:208). Lecoq used exercises such as 
‘miming’ one’s room, the spaces of his school, or an entire city, to increase 
sensitivity to the effects of outer space on person-image by exaggerating these
and expressing them in movement. A cathedral must have a high roof to 
accommodate a person's sense of soul, which it also helps to create. Implicit in
these exercises is a recognition that perception of spaces happens through 
time; outer spaces have a dynamic and a rhythm which is in dialogue with an 
individual's person-image. It is perhaps easier to conceive of the impact a 
space has on me than the impact of a puppet or object. There is a tendency to 
think of things, and especially tools, as manipulable. Puppetry is sometimes 
thought of as manipulation, although the term is used more in French and 
other Latin languages than in English where we usefully avoid it, using 
'puppeteering'. Thinking in terms of manipulation reduces the ways in which 
one might perceive the interactions between puppet and puppeteer. Before 
doing anything to or with a puppet, how might I mime my response to it, or 
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mime the thing itself? How does it affect my person-image? How does it 
change me?
 3.4.1 Objects and touch
On the absorption, construction and destruction of objects, Schilder 
notes that through the earliest developmental acts of grasping and sucking, 
infants seem to want to absorb or destroy things (1942b:240). It is not only 
perception and imagination that build up objects and destroy them, but 
motility; the amount of broken stuff in a house lived in by a free-range baby or
toddler testifies to this! Schilder writes:
Motility is not merely directed towards the object, but it is concerned in 
the creation of the object. The resistance of objects to push and pull 
makes them objects. Push, pull, and momentum of objects are object 
qualities closely related to the motility of an individual. Human action 
progresses by creating more complicated objects, which give 
opportunity for further development of action. (241)
His emphasis on creation chimes with the notion of becoming, picked up
from Deleuze by Ingold, and although he uses the word ‘object’, his sense is 
more akin to Ingold’s ‘things’ which are not fixed entities. Schilder’s objects are
very much becomings or things in a meshwork of actions, intimately related to 
person-image in development and flux.
In the following passage, Schilder quotes Head and Holmes (1911:188), 
pointing exactly to my field of reference; when the body schema is extended 
beyond the person:
lt is to the existence of these 'schemata' that we owe the power of 
projecting our recognition of posture, movement, and locality beyond 
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the limits of our own bodies to the end of some instrument held in the 
hand. Without them we could not probe with a stick, nor use a spoon 
unless our eyes were fixed upon the plate. Anything which participates 
in the conscious movement of our bodies is added to the model of 
ourselves and becomes part of these schemata: a woman's power of 
localization may extend to the feather in her hat. (2000:13)18
And a puppeteer’s may extend to her puppet. But whereas the feather 
becomes part of the person, the puppet maintains an otherness; it is both me 
and not me, my body is both present in it and absent, and it also has its own 
body and way of being - it seems to have a person-image. I can feel through 
its hand, but I endow it with its own body-image too, seen and felt by both me 
and by the audience. The puppet has a certain autonomy, of both action and, 
where applicable, voice; it can say and do things which I do not intentionally 
control. It has an alternative person-image which acts differently to me. This 
might be true, to a degree, of the feather in the hat, but is less true of the 
hammer or blind person’s stick, for example. Aside from accidents, rigid tools 
mostly do what we ask of them, more or less effectively, once we are trained in
their use. In this small discrepancy lies much of the power and mystery of the 
puppet; it is both a tool of the person and of the here and now, and a channel 
for the not-this-person, the other and elsewhere. It is both a continuity of the 
person, and a rupture, fracture, or significant blip in reality which allows a 
fresh perspective or voice to be seen or heard (Barthes, Gross, Kohler).
Schilder cites Köhler saying, ‘primitive adornment does not depend upon
its possible effect on others but upon a curious heightening of the animal's 
body feeling, self-consciousness, and pride’ (2000:203, n.1). The puppet too 
functions to heighten the puppeteer’s capacity to feel and allows her to feel 
18 Grosz also quotes this passage (1994:66).
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through a different body and body-image. Schilder refers to masks and their 
somatic effect on the wearer:
When people wear enormous masks at the carnival in Nice, they are not 
merely changing the physiological basis of their body-image but are 
actually becoming giants themselves. One of the pleasures to be derived
from this pageant is the possibility of playing with the enlargement of 
our body-image and thus increasing our own importance. Our body-
image is in a continuous process of enlargement and shrinking and we 
enjoy these changes in it. The body-image changes continually and we 
triumph over the limitations of the body by adding masks and clothes to 
the body-image! (204)
This body-image play is not confined to mask but also explored by artists such 
as Rebecca Horn in her worn sculptures, and, in different ways, Orlan in her 
plastic surgeries and Stelarc in his prosthetics and cyborgisation19. Of these, I 
see Horn’s work as having the most affinity with puppetry and also, in my 
view, with Lecoq and his colleagues' and students’ research in the L.E.M.20 
where worn or carried structures are built as expressions of the dynamics of 
movement. There is an affiliation between the L.E.M. and the research around 
costume and colour in the Bauhaus, of which it is both derivative and a 
development. Horn’s work is puppetic in that she manipulates structures worn 
on her body. The work of Orlan and Stelarc might seem more radical, using the
artists’ own bodies as sites of transformation to ask questions about human 
form and identity. Head’s severing of his own radial nerve might be 
retrospectively reframed as performance art in this vein. Although he was 
investigating sensation as a scientist, his process was not dissimilar to 
19 See Rebecca Horn, Orlan and Stelarc.
20 Laboratoire d'Etude du Mouvement (L.E.M.). The aforementioned show ‘Trinity’ by Brave 
New Worlds is clearly of Lecoq/L.E.M. lineage, where worn abstract structures are per-
formed as mask; the performance guided by the dynamic of the structure.
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contemporary body-artists. However, it is not necessary to go this far in order 
to play with and challenge notions of person-image; puppetry can do this in 
beguiling and disturbing ways. In much of Schönbein’s work, that I consider in 
Chapter 6, it is often hard to tell where the performer ends and the puppet 
begins; Moussoux-Bonte play with self-similarity and identity in a related but 
different way ("Twin Houses"). An expertly puppeteered puppet or material 
comes alive and seems to think and move for itself. Orlan and Stelarc are 
questioning the human body as a limited or fixed entity by altering their body-
images through additions, like masks. They are playing with their person-
images and how other people react to their manipulations, but so is the 
puppeteer; the puppet doesn’t have to be sewn into my skin or operated by 
electrodes planted in my brain. It is already operated by my brain, via my hand
or another part of my body.
The puppet can go beyond the mask in that, in certain cases, it not only 
shifts the body-image such that one can become a giant, or a dragon, or 
something else, but one can become that thing at a distance from oneself 
whilst also retaining one’s own person-image. Like throwing one’s voice, a new 
person-image is thrown outside the space occupied by one’s own body. The 
puppet sometimes functions like the mask, allowing a transformation of the 
whole person, and sometimes functions as if there was a separation between 
the person and an other, which is endowed itself with its own person-image. 
This opens up the possibility to feel through another and points towards the 
empathetic qualities the puppet can encourage.
In Chapter 6 I look at examples where mask blurs into puppet, and 
include a close analysis of one work where the actor and his puppets are very 
clearly physically separate entities (Fastoche, by Pierre Tual) and person-image
is the theme. My choice here is governed by an interest specifically in the zone 
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where the limits of person-image are explored in a fluid exchange between 
person and thing. Thus my interest lies in a puppetry approach to performance 
and in the zone between mask and puppetry, neither of which I speak to in 
their purer forms.
Schilder describes the way in which a person’s skin almost reaches 
towards objects, an observation that is pertinent to puppeteering and helps to 
develop the idea of different qualities of agency. He writes, ‘There are no sharp
borderlines between the outside world and the body’ (2000:85), in the sense 
that we feel our boundary through the material that it touches; clothes, shoes, 
furniture and so on. On the other hand, ‘object and body are psychologically 
separated by a space in between’; I tend not to think of things as part of 
myself, even when they become integrated in my body-image. Schilder 
recommends this experiment: 
Diminish the pressure of the fingers against the object. We feel the 
object less and less and the fingers more and more. When the fingers 
are finally only just touching the object, the object is scarcely perceived 
any longer, but we have a distinct feeling in the tips of our fingers. We 
can now observe a paradoxical sensation. It is as if the skin were 
protruding over the surface and forming a slight cone, which almost 
reaches for the object! (86)
The sense in which a human being is reaching out involuntarily towards the 
world in order to touch and know it is an interesting phenomenon for 
puppeteers. I would argue that puppeteering develops a sensibility which 
allows me to sense the outside world reaching out to me21.
21 In a masterclass with Christopher Leith at Little Angel in 2007, he asked us to look at a 
selection of wood blocks and try to sense which one drew us towards it, or one to which 
we were drawn. These were to become heads for simple string puppets. His request was 
not as simple as choose a piece of wood, or even choose a piece you like.
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Touch in FM is usually ‘bony’; I am looking for a sense of bony 
connection between myself and my student. In the practitioner training, I was 
taught to arrive, to make contact with the person through my hands, to sink 
through the different layers - skin, fat, muscle – to reach the bone; not 
literally, but in imagination, or in terms of my focus or intention. Touch can be 
very light and still reach bone – in fact this is the aim. I want my contact to 
create a learning environment for the student, or the conditions for learning. 
Schilder raises the question of how closely human beings can approach each 
other. Feldenkrais’s work shows that there can be a rich intertwining of 
persons, that is not erotic or sexual, but which can affect both people on a 
profound level in a deep, kinaesthetic conversation. Although puppets are 
things, I suggest that one of the reasons they affect people is because they 
stage something like this level of conversation but between human and other, 
and they often stage it as a human–human, or human–creature conversation 
(Jones, Kohler). It is often moving to watch a one-on-one FI lesson, where, in 
a sense, the student becomes more herself by giving up something of her habit
and accepting to be more skeletal, more thing-like. This object-quality seems 
to bring something human and tender to the relationship. The wonderful 
French acrobatic duo, Justine et Frédéri, explore this, transitioning between 
active and passive partnering moments where Justine becomes doll-like, giving
herself, her weight, to Frédéri; watching them is like watching extreme FI 
(Barbier)! 
On sensitivity, Schilder comments that, ‘Our tendency to live in the 
world of reality leads us to neglect what is going on in the field of sensations’ 
(2000:87), presumably meaning that, in our eagerness to seize and use things 
and go places, we neglect to attend to how we touch what enables our motility 
and sensitivity. Feldenkrais can be said to have made it his work to put 
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sensation back at the centre of the experience of living. And while both 
Feldenkrais and Schilder recognize the movement in rest, they also emphasize 
movement as a mode of discovery. Schilder suggests we do not feel our bodies
when at rest:
Movement leads to a better orientation in relation to our own body. We 
do not know very much about our body unless we move it. Movement is 
a great uniting factor between the different parts of our body. By 
movement we come into a definite relation to the outside world and to 
objects, and only in contact with this outside world are we able to 
correlate the diverse impressions concerning our own body. (112)
FM asks us to dive into the micro-movement in rest and in preparing for 
movement. These ideas speak to the puppeteer; by moving in and with it, 
puppetry becomes an art of knowing the world and oneself. Grosz refers to a 
‘counter-tradition’ of the thing in philosophy ‘not as other, but as . . . that 
which prompts us to act, to invent, to practice, to extend ourselves beyond 
ourselves' (2002:78). FM and puppetry feed each other to offer a practice that 
encourages an attentiveness towards the world, towards oneself and one's 
action in and on it. Using FM to help focus on the points of rest, the puppeteer 
can tune into the emergent quality of the puppet's movement.
3.4.2 Agency
The following passage from Schilder is key to understanding the 
relationship between body-image and agency and how playing with self-image,
through FM or puppetry, might open up new aspects and understandings of 
agency:
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The body-image can shrink or expand; it can give parts to the outside 
world and can take other parts into itself. When we take a stick in our 
hands and touch an object with the end of it, we feel a sensation at the 
end of the stick. The stick, has, in fact, become a part of the body-
image. In order to get the full sensation at the end of the stick, the stick
has to be in a more or less rigid connection with the body. It then 
becomes a part of the bony system of the body, and we may suppose 
that the rigidity of the bony system is an important part in every body-
image. (202)
His emphasis on the skeleton relates directly to Feldenkrais’s use of skeletal 
awareness as key to clarifying self-image22. Self-image then is really not just 
about one’s image of one’s own body, but about how one is in the world, how 
one is enmeshed in the world, and how the world is present in oneself. The 
bony connection with the tool gives agency; puppets both play with and 
complicate this. With some puppets there is a clear bony connection; a hand 
puppet is animated from within by the movement of the hand (which becomes 
the puppet's body/skeleton), in a rod or hands-on puppet there is a rigid 
connection with the body which gives agency and sensation through the 
puppet. With string puppets there is no rigid connection to the actual puppet, 
only to the cross or control. The puppeteer controls the control, not the puppet.
The action at the end of the strings is a dialogue between human input and 
gravity acting on the object. The puppeteer is playing with rest, what Schilder 
called (qtd. above), ‘a special type of movement’. Schilder points out that, ‘The
more rigid the connection of the body with the object is, the more easily it 
becomes part of the body-image … The body-image incorporates objects or 
22 Feldenkrais might be seen as falling into the same trap as Schilder and other prede-
cessors by mistaking man’s experience for human experience, helped by the notion of 
skeletal awareness since skeletons are relatively gender-neutral, the sexes displaying 
only minor differences. The picture is, however, happily more nuanced. In the following 
chapter I discuss further the problematic of the role of ‘skeletal awareness’ in FM and in 
completing the self-image.
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spreads itself into space’ (213). However, this rule is troubled by the practice 
of puppetry. 
No hard and fast statement can be made about person-image and the 
puppet. The more proximal the puppet (worn puppets including hand puppets 
being the most proximal), the greater the sense of physical agency since these 
puppets are still very much connected to the puppeteer’s person-image. 
However, it is also possible to create an intentional schism and to be in conflict 
with the puppet on my hand, so that my hand is not an integrated part of my 
person-image; I can play with disidentifying myself from it. This rupture, or 
fragmentation, is perhaps easier to accomplish with a puppet over which I have
more direct control than with a string puppet where I cannot control all the 
movement and must listen to its material and structure. A string puppet is in 
some ways more itself, and less amenable to comply with my desires, including
those to work against it. I am less able to extend my person-image into its 
extremities hence less able to play with associating or disassociating myself 
from it. Philippe Genty famously created a puppet number where a string 
puppet leads an antagonistic life of its own. Genty’s Pierrot marionette 
becomes aware of his puppeteer and one by one severs his strings until he lies 
heaped on the ground, motionless ("Marionnettes TV"). The existential 
symbiosis of puppet and puppeteer is laid bare. It is a suicide; the puppet 
seems to have an independent person-image, yet is nothing without its 
handler.
3.4.3 Structure
The marionette has a structure to which the puppeteer must listen; if I 
want to influence it I need to build my desires into its structure. For this I need
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to be capable of imagining the person-image the puppet might have if it were 
alive. In UNIMA’s obituary for Albrecht Roser, the puppet construction 
technique of his master, Bross, is described thus; ‘motion is released through 
the center of gravity of the figures themselves’ ("On the Death"). Master 
puppet builder, Stephen Mottram, analyses the movement he wants in his 
puppets and builds it into them as far as possible, be it human or animal23. He 
also concentrates on shifts of weight in the puppet when puppeteering, so, for 
example, he brings the head of the puppet over the supporting leg before 
transferring to the other leg in a walk. In a puppet made for Wunderkammer 
by Tübingen Figurentheater, Raphael Mürle plays with structure in his 
transforming puppet, allowing movement and form to arise from different kinds
of joints and hinge, unconstrained by any idea of an accurate anatomical 
model24. He creates a puppet whose movement does not only reference human
movement but, since the form still bears some resemblance to human biped 
form, I read the movement in relation to my person-image. In this way his 
creature becomes a fantastic, contortionist, fabulous surhuman, perhaps a 
contender for Craig’s Über-Marionette (1908). The figure’s outlandish 
movement only retains a reference to the human by being a jointed, upright, 
moving thing. Where a human contortionist’s movement is perhaps 
unimaginable in my own body, I still just about see a single and ongoing 
person with a person-image. In Mürle’s puppet, there are moments when my 
perception flips; I can no longer accept the creature as having one ongoing 
person-image - it transforms into another kind of thing. Back becomes front, 
up becomes down; it disrupts the space around it by its reorientations in ways
23 He talks about this in his workshops. See "Stephen Mottram" for examples. Also, Jones of
Handspring describes their process of puppet design; I address this further in Chapter 5.
24 A brief glimpse of the puppet can be seen here, "Wunderkammer trailer" 00:1.27).
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which Orlan and Stelarc could only dream on.
The more distal the relation to the person, as with string puppets, the 
less sense of direct agency perhaps, although it might also be said alternatively
that it is a different quality of agency. The contact is less direct and the process
more like coercing a little animal to come out and play, playing with the 
movement in rest. Marionettes can produce a more schizophrenic sense of 
having both one’s own person-image and a projected one in the puppet. The 
question of presence here becomes interesting. In order for the puppet to be 
present, do I focus on giving a sense of integrity of person-image to the 
puppet, or can I also be said to be feeling through the puppet, even though 
there is no rigid, bony connection? This raises the question of touch and 
agency; with a delicate and flexible connection (strings) there can still be 
agency, but of a different degree and quality. The delicacy of the connection 
affords less opportunity for forcing. The string puppet becomes, then, a 
wonderful tool for exploring qualities of touch and extension of self into the 
world, and of exploring the emergent movement from rest. This returns to 
Athena’s idea that practising puppetry can change the world.
Collaborating with others to produce one coherent person-image for a 
puppet also becomes a potentially rich and radical process, involving a close 
‘listening’ both to the material and to the other puppeteers. Leo Craig of 
Handspring alludes to moments of immanence that occur when puppeteering 
(The Great War Horse); the collective of humans and nonhumans becomes 
something more than the sum of its parts through play. The puppet is a way of
exploring other person-images, in the playful way that Schilder claims is 
natural throughout life. FI involves a similarly intimate and intense act of 
communication between nervous systems and materiality.
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Schilder writes at length about the way in which objects give meaning to
actions and how this relates to body-image. He claims that ‘movements which 
have their goal on our own body are psychologically and therefore also 
physiologically different from movements that concern objects’ and that there 
is a ‘greater biological importance to actions directed towards objects. It is in 
some ways the more vital function’ (2000:59). I understand this to mean that 
survival requires this outwards focus since it is in the world outside that 
potential dangers lie, and our sources of nourishment. However, the ‘outside 
world’ is not a clear-cut thing when the person-image is a process which can 
include parts of it. It perhaps makes more sense to go back to the thought of 
the inseparability of inside and outside, whilst accepting a person also has a 
person-image giving her a sense of integrity and a sense of that which is her 
and not her. Leder describes the phenomenon whereby much activity that goes
on in people is beneath our level of perception in The Absent Body (1990); this
would include Schilder’s postural schema and aspects of Feldenkrais’s self-
image. Leder makes no mention of self- or body-image however, nor skeletal 
awareness or lack of it, focusing instead on the organs and processes like 
digestion where part of the ‘outside’ is absorbed, transformed and excreted. 
Grosz too talks about the outside as skin, and the inside as organs, about 
processes but not about bone and structure (1994:84). 
The puppet puts structure centre-stage and, as can be seen from the 
examples above, there is a deep connection between structure and its 
perception and person-image and its perception, both internally and with 
reference to others. In a sense Feldenkrais asks for attention to structure in 
motion and he equates this with self-image. In terms of theatre training, 
perhaps attention to person-image and one’s skeleton could be seen as an 
extra-daily act as in Barba and Savarese's theatre-anthropology; specific 
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choices made in order to train for activity which is not commonplace (32-5). 
This begs the question however, at what point does one generation’s, or a 
particular group of people’s, extra-daily become another’s commonplace? 
Feldenkrais was certainly interested in the transformation of humans and 
thereby human society. Shared and individual movement habits shift with time,
influenced by clothing, architecture, transport systems, common activities (in 
our times, sitting at a computer, looking at a smartphone and so on), other 
people, in short by all environmental and social factors. Bringing awareness of 
movement into the everyday repertoire (and not just that of the specialist 
actor, sportsperson, dancer, musician, puppeteer and so on) had, for 
Feldenkrais, the potential to change the world.
3.4.4 Focus
Schilder comments that ‘the postural model of the body is especially 
developed by contact with the outside world’ and that ‘those parts of our body 
which come in a close and varied contact with reality are the most important 
ones. The foot gives us the most intimate touch with the earth’ (2000:64). He 
does not, therefore, oppose periphery and centre. This helps understand why 
the hands of the puppeteer need to be rooted or grounded through the feet - 
an exaggerated focus on the hands will not give the best or most comfortable 
result. For many puppeteers and musicians, the hands might be seen and 
sensed as the centre, with the rest of the body as the periphery; the work of 
the somatically aware puppeteer involves finding support from the ground and 
the conversation between the centre and the periphery, rather than necessarily
finding support from the centre for the periphery. In FI, it is possible to work 
either from the proximal or from the distal; the latter might be preferable if 
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there is pain in the centre or if the person seems particularly shy or vulnerable 
about having her centre touched.
Moving the centre of focus or movement is a generative game both in 
FM and puppetry work. Lecoq worked with the idea of leading from different 
centres - the nose, knees, chest and so on - particularly in mask work. John 
Wright takes this into his closely related archetype work. Claire Heggen also 
plays with this idea, bringing it closer to puppetry by putting masks directly 
onto the new centre (shoulder, buttocks etc.) (Fredricksson). I have also 
worked with the idea of having eyes in different places in butoh workshops, 
which similarly shifts the centre of movement and focus25. My four-year old 
daughter said this evening, 'Imagine if our bodies were made of eyes. Our skin 
was eyes. Eyes in our bones'; the desire to play with different ways of being is 
strong! Baker works on the placing of attention to shift the audience's focus, so
they see the puppeteer, the puppet, both or neither ("The Puppet", "Who do 
you see?"). This is different to shifting my movement centre or leading with a 
different part of myself; I can include the puppet in my person-image or not, 
and choose to place my focus in it or a part of it, i.e. outside myself. The work 
in FM, in both FI and ATM, brings into focus all the different parts of the person
systematically and refines their integration with the whole; as such it extends 
the possibility (useful for the puppeteer) that any part, or extension of it in the 
world, can be the centre of focus whilst remaining deeply anchored into the 
whole person (in the broadest sense of the term).
25 With Akiko Motofuji, Hijikata’s widow, in Tokyo, 1999-2000.
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 3.4.5 Gravity
Schilder finds that:
Tone has something to do with the outer world and the adaptation to 
qualities in which physics is interested. The ‘tonic’ individual considers 
the world chiefly from the point of view of physics, inertia, mass, 
gravitation, and also from the point of view of preparedness of the 
organism. In order to do something, one must first adapt to the general 
situation of mass attraction. (1942b:236)
However, for more complex action involving things in the world, tonic 
adaptation is not sufficient. For this, body-image is needed as well, although 
the background is governed by the same physical laws.
Schilder succinctly foreshadows Sheets-Johnstone (2007, 2009, 2011) 
and Noë (2004)26 regarding respectively the primacy of movement and action 
as perception; ‘Every sensation has its motility … Sensation has in itself a 
motor answer. Continued activity is therefore at the basis of our bodily self. We
choose and reject by action’ (2000:105). In the later, posthumously published, 
Mind: perception and thought in their constructive aspects (1942b), he makes 
the point even more clearly; ‘even for the experience of one’s own body, 
motility is ultimately indispensable,' claiming, from observation, that there is 
‘an urge to move’ (74). This later work was particularly important for 
Feldenkrais for its observations on the vestibular apparatus; he cites it in the 
AY lesson-cum-lecture on the body-image cited above (AY 24, vol. 1a:145-8). 
Schilder posits the intimate co-dependence of the inside of the body and what 
is outside, linked by intention and action. The fluidity of his conception of body-
image is anti-objectivist and materialist in the same sense that Feldenkrais’s 
26 Neither of whom appear to cite him.
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idea of self-image is; materiality is the foundation for action.
The materiality which provides this foundation is gravity-bound. Schilder
makes several points on gravity and objects that are pertinent both to FM and 
puppetry and serve to highlight why the two practices have an affinity with 
each other:
Our will seems to be in some way directed towards the centre of gravity 
of a limb. The will is not directed to the moving of the muscle, and the 
actual location of the tendon and of the muscle tissue has nothing to do 
with our intention concerning the place at which we want to move the 
limb. (2000:90)
This connects directly to Feldenkrais’s emphasis on the skeleton and awareness
of it as the key to performing ballistically27 pure movement. It also connects to 
the art of puppetry where the sense of weight, particularly in string and other 
puppets whose material and construction enable them to hang to some degree 
(such as some rod, table-top, hands-on, and multiple-operator puppets), 
guides the movement. Schilder notes that when holding an object it feels 
heavier towards the bottom, even if we know it is an homogeneous object 
(91). He is describing the feeling of gravity acting on things, which produces 
pendular motion in objects, puppets and ourselves. Sensing the pendular 
activity and what it offers without wilful intervention is central to string 
puppeteering and taught by puppet masters, Stephen Mottram, Christopher 
27 My use of the term 'ballistic' applied to movement derives from FM trainer, Jeff Haller. He
uses it according to its less common meaning which I quote here from OED: 'Of motion, a
trajectory, etc.: able to be described in terms of the laws of ballistics, involving gravity, 
inertia, and the resistance of a medium. Of a projectile, device, etc.: displaying such mo-
tion. Also (in wider sense): designating motion or change, or its course, etc., initiated by 
a brief input of energy and continuing as a result of momentum' ("ballistic."). Thus Haller
is indicating situations where energy input is translated directly and purely into move-
ment which is always produced in relation to the surface I am on.
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Leith (now deceased) and Frank Soehnle of Tübingen Figurentheater. (This also
relates to sensing the movement present in the resting state.) The string 
puppet is a series of pendulums which the puppeteer senses and follows whilst 
gently finding out how the physics of the thing can be guided to serve the 
dramaturgy of the piece. But Tommy Luther, a puppeteer from Handspring's 
War Horse, also encourages future horse puppeteers to reduce effort and 
tension by following 'gravity and the weight of the puppet, its natural swing 
and gait' and warns about getting used to the timing of the pendulum in 
relation to the leg controls (Kohler 145).
Although human beings are top heavy, this is not borne out 
experientially, in a similar way to the sense of the object. Schilder identifies the
different masses one is able to sense in oneself; the feet, the abdomen and the
head. He also calls these centres of gravity (2000:91). In spite of these 
volumes, as Stephen Levin’s biotensegrity model substantiates, the feeling of 
oneself in space is not necessarily governed by the real weights involved 
(2016). The biotensegrity model ousts the biomechanical model that can be 
traced back to Aristotle. The skeleton is not seen as a stacking system with 
limbs which function as levers and pendulums: ’Biologic structures exist 
independent of gravity. They are omni-directional structures that can exist and 
adapt to water, land, air and space' (Levin). Biotensegrity was inspired by 
Buckminster Fuller's tensegrity (tension-integrity) model for physical structures
in architecture, although Levin cites the sculptor, Kenneth Snelson, as his main
inspiration. Snelson emphasizes the fact that the rigid components do not 
touch each other and float in an elastic tension matrix. Applied in Levin's 
biotensegrity model, this means that the bones do not touch each other and 
float in a tension matrix of ligaments, tendons and fascia. Pressure on any solid
part of a tensegrity structure affects the whole. Biotensegrity speaks to 
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Feldenkrais's ideal of equally distributed tonus throughout the system 
according to the movement taking place; a different tonus is suited to standing
and lifting, walking and running.
Feldenkrais uses the idea of transmission of forces through bones but I 
do not think there is fundamentally a contradiction between biotensegrity and 
his understanding of dynamic anatomy. Forces clearly do travel through bones 
since they travel through the system as a whole. Touching a person in one 
place affects the whole. FM is precisely concerned with moving in such a way 
that weight travels through the skeleton as directly as possible without 
sheering forces such that a sense of weightlessness is experienced. However, 
the sense of weight is interesting from a movement point of view; how much 
weight do you feel in your feet? On which part of your feet (toes, heels, 
insides, outsides)? How can you use the weight of your pelvis or head to power
or guide a movement? These questions transfer to puppetry where the puppet 
can be a projection of an independent person-image into a space outside one’s 
own body, or like a limb or peripheral part of the puppeteer.
3.4.6 Expanding body-image
Of the hands, Schilder writes that they ‘are an outside world for the 
parts of the body which they touch’ (2000:125), suggesting that the separation
of self and world is not clear-cut, and not necessarily at the boundary of my 
body. Puppeteers know this; the other is both within and without, whilst also 
having a more or less separate bodily form. The hand puppet perhaps most 
clearly demonstrates this, but even in a string puppet, through which it is 
difficult to have precise and directed agency in the world, I can project a 
person-image into the puppet and, in some way, I end where the puppet ends 
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whilst puppeteering. Hands are very much of the body and need a body in 
order to be hands; my two year old showed she understood this when, on 
seeing some puppet hands I had made which were drying, she said, ‘They are 
like hands but not hands. Thank you for showing me that, Mummy’. I 
understood her to mean they are not hands because they are not attached to a
body.
Salvage's study on the puppet as 'spatial structurant' in the context of 
psychomotor reeducation outlines six levels of spatial engagement mirroring 
Schilder (albeit with less finesse); the body limited by the skin, gestures, the 
visual sphere, society, meeting with others and co-existing with anonymous 
others. Salvage, hinting at a kind of awareness through puppetry, considers 
the influence of the puppet on the puppeteer's tonus important in relation to 
how that person organizes herself in relation to the world (50).
Schilder writes about how one’s own body can become tool-like; 
‘generally the trunk and head are less like tools than are the extremities, 
especially the hands…parts of the body with a motility which is particularly 
flexible are nearer to the connotation of a tool’ (1942a:45). While this might be
true for everyday behaviour, all parts of oneself can be used in more tool-like 
ways – teeth can cut a thread, a puppet can be held in the mouth, a mask 
worn on the back or backside. Schilder makes clear that ‘behind every tool 
there is the same constructive effort which we found in the building up of the 
body-image and any other perception’ (46), which contributes to an argument 
for the meshwork. Tools are lines out of and into person-image allowing action 
to flow out. They help make apparent the porous boundary between us and 
not-us.
Schilder considers this ‘spreading of the body-image into the world’:
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What has once been part of the body does not lose this quality 
completely. The bowel movement also separates the faeces only 
physically from the body, psychologically they remain a part of 
ourselves… More complicated is the problem of voice and language. The 
sound produced by me is not completely independent of me. (…) Finger-
nails, everything which comes out of the mouth and nose, hair which 
has been cut off, always remain in some psychological relation to the 
body. The organization of the body-image is a very flexible one. 
(2000:188)
If the boundaries are porous and moving, is Feldenkrais right in looking for the 
integrity of the person? Perhaps in the sense that messing with the boundaries 
is potent when it is a choice, but destructive when it is not, as in the cases of 
psychosis and mimesis to which Grosz and Schilder refer. Becoming like or 
undifferentiated from one’s surroundings is not always useful for everyday 
living. This is the logical conclusion of simple holistic and monist viewpoints and
it is the reason Grosz rejects them. Flexibility of the person-image means there
can be movement between integration and differentiation from one’s ‘outside’. 
This is key for the puppeteer for whom the art of becoming invisible is as 
important as that of having presence, or being able to project it into a more or 
less distal thing or part of herself.
In a note to the section regarding the flexible body-image, Schilder 
adds, ‘Magic practices with faeces, urine, blood, nails, etc., are based on the 
fact that they still belong to the body-image’ (2000:213, n.1), a point Grosz 
picks up and identifies as corresponding to Lacan’s objet a and Kristeva’s 
notion of the abject (1994:81). As well as interrogating the notion of the 
body’s boundary, Schilder approaches territory concerning puppetry in its 
history and connection with magic and voodoo practices. A puppet might be 
endowed with magical properties because it includes the teeth, hair, or even 
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the whole corpse of a person28 (Darkowska-Nidzgorska 184), but also when it 
embodies or provides the physical manifestation of someone’s thought. This is 
no less a case of ‘spreading of the body-image into the world’, since the body-
image is also the product of a person's imagination. But Schilder notes:
parts of our body can become loose in their connection with the body. 
Single parts of the body are personified. Children and nurses of children 
personify fingers. It seems that all protruding parts can gain this relative
independence in the postural model of the body. (2000:188-9)
This relates to puppetry where a part of myself is treated as other and 
endowed with a separate person-image of its own. Schilder identifies the way 
children treat parts of their own body as strange objects before incorporating 
them into their body-image (194-5). This process of gradual differentiation 
between self and world is one which the art of puppetry returns to, again 
rendering strange one’s own body parts and incorporating parts of the world as
if they were part of oneself.
The FM practitioner training revisits infancy, exploring the movements of
legs, arms and trunk afresh and reintegrating them to the whole. If FM is an 
integrative practice, puppetry is perhaps more often a process of fragmentation
and dissociation. The question then becomes, how can FM be relevant to 
puppetry? Maybe through the process of differentiation that leads to 
reintegration; this is explored in later chapters.
3.5.1 Body-image since Schilder
As introduced in Chapter 1, much of the recent literature on body-image
28 Practces found in a belt across central Africa; Cameroun, Gabon, Congo and Ethiopia.
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and schema is covered and discussed in Preester and Knockaert (2005) who 
acknowledge both have ‘no fixed status, but are conceptualized in different 
ways and give rise to a multiplicity of possible applications’ (3). Mishara 
usefully summarizes:
The human self is not its representations, but a process. In existentialist
terms … the human self is a dialectical process condemned to self-
transcendence, i.e., condemned to prospectively transcend each of its 
current representations of itself as possessing a body-image. Being 
(rather than having) a self is the ongoing vulnerability of being oriented 
towards what is not yet. (145)
Sheets-Johnstone proposes ‘corporeal-kinetic patterning’ and ‘corporeal-kinetic
intentionality’ to replace the static thingness of ‘body schema’ and ‘body-
image’ (2005:225). I prefer to use the simpler, more accessible term, 'person 
image', as it retains the possibility of fixity, giving a place to work from; what 
in French might be termed 'un point d'appui'.
Gallagher shows how embodiment characterizes human experience from
the prenoetic to the emergence of language, the noetic and intersubjective 
relations. He literally shows how the body shapes the mind, drawing on 
cognitive neuroscience, case studies and philosophy from phenomenology 
(primarily Husserl and Merleau-Ponty) to more recent writings on the 
philosophy of mind and perception (Searle and Dennett). In his distinction 
between body-image and schema, what is important for my argument is that 
body-image is perceived as separate from the environment, and body schema 
more integrated, 'to the extent that it frequently incorporates into itself pieces 
of the environment that would not be considered part of one's body-image' 
(39). FM might be described, using Gallagher's terms, as the bringing to light 
of elements of the body schema which will result in the transformation of both 
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schema and image. Body schema is always in flux which can be used in a 
process towards greater awareness in action, or, as is more common and often
seen as inevitable, a process of losing awareness and movement possibilities 
as one ages. Body-image has more of a tendency to get fixed, although it can 
change. The body of body-image is more like a separate entity while the body 
of body schema is more like an integral part of the environment, of the 
cybernetic field, or of the meshwork.
Gallagher marshals philosophical and scientific evidence and arguments 
that complement Feldenkrais' work and provide a more up-to-date vindication 
of its principles, and of Schilder's ideas. He understands that awareness 
functions at the level of intentional project rather than bodily action, but 
performance can be improved in relation to intention through focus on body 
schema, freeing up attention. The expansion of movement possibility (within 
structural limits) expands perception of the world.
Merleau-Ponty's concept of ‘schéma corporel’ in Phénoménologie de la 
Perception (1945) is described in The Cambridge Companion to Merleau-Ponty 
as, ‘not an image of the body, and so not an object of our awareness, but 
rather the bodily skills and capacities that shape our awareness of objects' 
(Carman 69-70). Merleau-Ponty references Head, Schilder and Lhermitte, thus 
his analysis is firmly rooted in early neurobiology and outside pure philosophy. 
Gatens summarizes that Merleau-Ponty, along with Lacan and Schilder, 
consider 'a body is not properly a human, that is, a human subject or 
individual, unless it has an image of itself as a discrete entity, or as a gestalt’ 
(229). It is beyond the scope of this thesis to pursue Merleau-Ponty’s argument
in greater depth, or relate it to Feldenkrais’s work, aside from noting that both 
find their conceptual roots in Head and Schilder.
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Neurophysiologist, Alain Berthoz, highlights that body schema is not 
conceived as a representation of the body (in the brain), but rather as a 
scheme of possible actions (247). Elements of body schema can cross over into
body-image – one can become aware of one's habits - and thus the scheme of 
possible actions can change. Echoing Schilder, Berthoz refers to the ability to 
integrate tools or objects into the body schema, also pointing out that the 
ability to 'feel' at the object's extremity, rather than at the interface with the 
object, relies on the object's rigidity, that is to say, on its bony connection to 
the person (109). It is for this reason that pushing through the bones in FM 
enables the practitioner to engage with the student's CNS, because passing 
forces through my skeleton is the only way I can create movement. The 
skeletal awareness which arises brings a sense of the skeleton as an object 
through its connection with the objective world and this can help improve the 
range of body schematic possibilities. 
Body-image, then, is neither conscious nor unconscious, but prenoetic 
(Gallagher 33) or preconscious, that is to say, ‘capable of being made 
conscious’ (Grosz 1994:69). This characteristic is vitally important in FM. Self-
image is a slippery eel of a thing since it is enmeshed in the being of an 
individual but it is not a mental picture or image, in spite of the terms used to 
describe it. It produces the way my body acts but by changing what I do, I can 
change my self-image. As a concept it teeters dangerously close to implying a 
separation between body and mind and one of my aims is to clarify person-
image as part of a conceptual framework where these are a functional unity.
Thinking of person-image in terms of the meshwork can teeter the other
way. The interweaving of elements is so deep and complex that the whole of 
reality might be thought of as one substance; this is Spinoza's monism, a kind 
of unsophisticated proto-approximation of the meshwork. In Grosz's search for 
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ways to reconfigure notions of the body to serve feminism, she finds monism 
problematic, criticizing it and related contemporary holistic thinking where 
everything is part of one ecosystem; a totality comprising systems and 
subsystems. Her reservation is that this does not admit the possibility of the 
unknown, nor of ‘fragmentations, fracturings, dislocations that orient bodies 
and body parts toward other bodies and body parts’ (1994:13). For her, ‘There 
is no body as such: there are only bodies’ (19) (her italics). By looking at the 
concept of body-image in Schilder, and with the added practical approach of 
FM, explored in Chapter 4, it becomes the clear locus of fragment, fracture and
dislocation, a place where observation of the gap between a comforting idea of 
totality and oneness and the individual person who is continually swinging in 
and out of step with that mythic reality becomes evident. This place can 
become a place of power and intervention through the practice of FM, and 
these emergent aspects rely on the elusiveness of each person's image of 
herself.
Person-image has the capacity to warp reality and make certain actions 
possible and others impossible at any given time. I am unqualified to speak 
about nonhuman experience and action, but perhaps Caillois' analysis, 
scrutinized by Grosz, can offer some help here and shed some more light on 
'imaging' in relation to action. She cites Caillois' work on the similarity between
insects’ mimicry (of other insects or of their environment) to what happens in 
certain forms of psychosis. Mimicry, Caillois argues, is not to ensure survival 
since predators do not rely primarily on vision, but is rather the result of ‘the 
representation of and captivation by space’ (Grosz 1994:46). Thus, through 
what Caillois calls ‘depersonalization by assimilation to space’ the psychotic and
the insect lack the basis for a coherent identity with a personal perspective 
‘abandoning themselves to being spatially located by/as others’ (47). Grosz 
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quotes Caillois with his own emphasis, ‘I know where I am, but I do not feel as
though I'm at the spot where I find myself,’ describing the experience of the 
psychosis called ‘legendary psychasthenia'. In Chapter 6 I consider an example
of how this kind of explosion of person-image is explored in the puppet 
performance Fastoche, by Pierre Tual.
Noë argues that perception 'is something we do'. In Action in Perception 
(2006) he reorients the philosophy of perception by arguing that vision 
functions like touch in that we must pass our eyes over things in the outside 
world in order to gain an understanding of them. I mention Noë's work for his 
analysis of perception as active, hence movement-based; 'For mere sensory 
stimulation to constitute perceptual experience – that is for it to have genuine 
world-presenting content – the perceiver must possess and make use of 
sensorimotor knowledge' (10) (his italics). I contend that this constitutes 
person-image.
Noë critiques discourses from the philosophy of perception which has 
tended to treat vision as static and simultaneous, and perception as a brain 
phenomenon; he says perception is 'not a process in the brain, but a kind of 
skilful activity on the part of the animal as a whole' (2). He argues that the 
visual field 'is made available by looking around' (57) and that, 'Vision is 
active; it is an active exploration of the world ... seeing is much more like 
touching than it is like depicting' (72) (echoing Merleau-Ponty in Le Visible et 
l'Invisible (1968), where he remarks that vision is touching through the eyes, 
with 'le regard'). Noë points out that the eyes work in saccades and can only 
see one point at a time; vision is composed of information from a series of 
points with the eye moving from one to another and inferring the rest of the
114
visual field29. Vision might then be termed an analytical sense since it needs to 
gather information from lots of different moments of focus in order to create 
meaning. Interestingly, Feldenkrais created many lessons around making the 
movement of the eyes smoother, which contributes to a fuller self-image, 
perhaps because it makes vision less analytical and fragmented. Fluid 
movement, including of the eyes, is the sign of action fulfilling intention. This 
might also be linked to the concept of presence in performance.
Noë's work chimes with Gallagher's and Leder's, who also argue for the 
intermodality of the senses (2006, 1990). Leder writes, 'Our consciousness  
frequently does not extend to what is going on in our bodies; our conscious-
ness is enacted by what we do with our bodies' (31). This implies that we move
to have a brain, rather than that we have a brain to move. However, Leder 
clings to vision as the primary sense. Puppeteering involves the senses of 
touch and vision, but perhaps even more, the proprioceptive system which    
involves the whole body; the sensors in the muscles and the joints of the   
skeleton provide simultaneous feedback to my CNS. The proprioceptive system
is not reliant on shifting focus in saccades in the way the eyes partially are30; it 
is not a time-based cumulative sense in the way vision is. Therefore the 
proprioceptive system, closely related to person-image, is an appropriate basis 
for a phenomenological investigation since it gives us a body, both as an object
in space, and as the site of becoming.
29 It is not possible, by definition, to focus on one's peripheral field, but it is possible to de-
tect movement and pay close attention to it. Peripheral vision has been necessary for hu-
man survival, sometimes still is, and is a skill that is trained in theatre, where 'seeing' 
what is happening on other parts of the stage without looking at them is important.
30 There is much to be said from a FM perspective about the role of the eyes beyond vision, 
for example for organizing movement and in residual tonicity in the resting body, how-
ever this is beyond the scope of this thesis.
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The capacity to have a perspective, to create space (one’s personal 
space) as well as exist in it or as part of it, are the result of lived experience; 
the result of having a person-image. The self-image can be more or less ‘com-
plete’ or detailed, in the Feldenkraisian sense, but its lack, loss or severe 
impairment is the sign of serious illness, as in psychosis. Its 'improvement’ 
however results in a greater capacity to create and develop one’s specific per-
spective in and on the world. A greater capacity to differentiate and be more 
oneself in whatever sphere one chooses. ‘Improvement’ here simply means in-
cluding more parts of oneself in one’s self-image as one acts31. Feldenkrais 
supposed that those who deny their own organic needs become more homo-
genized in society, partaking of a self-image imposed by their understanding of
society’s demands and thereby limited in their ability to create their own 
unique space.
Each person’s differentiation in the meshwork is bigger or smaller; some
are very differentiated on a global scale (world leaders, renowned terrorists, 
well-known artists); most are very differentiated in their close spheres (the 
mother for the child, the sister for the brother and so on). The actions of the 
person differentiate him/her to a greater or lesser degree, depending on what 
‘stage’ the action is taken (the world stage, a regional stage, the domestic 
stage, a theatre stage…). The loss of social connections, or falling into the 
dense background of meshworked lines, can easily lead to a loss of the sense 
of personhood. Homelessness and refugee status are perhaps two of the most 
common contemporary circumstances which provide examples of this. And 
they are examples which demonstrate that the person does not stop at the 
limits of her body. Even dead bodies are still enmeshed in the social 
31 I examine the concept of improvement in Feldenkrais’s work further in the following 
chapter.
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connections of the person who lies dead. Perhaps with this concept of person in
mind the choice of person-image over self-image as a term begins to make 
more sense, suggesting the inherent connection to others rather than 
emphasizing, as ‘self’ might, the separation. ‘Person’ seems to point outwards 
more than ‘self’ which points inwards. 
3.5.2 Towards somatic ethics32
Grosz's project in Volatile Bodies is to wrest elements that might be of 
use to feminist reconceptions of bodies from thinkers on body-image. Her focus
is on questioning binarized modes of thinking to allow for a multiplicity of 
bodies and interactions. She uses both body-image and body schema as terms 
without distinguishing between them; I find Gallagher's distinction useful since 
he aligns awareness with image and not with schema. Grosz introduces body-
image as ‘a third term intervening between and requiring the operations of 
both mind and body’ (1994:62). I hope it has become clearer through this 
chapter that more than a third term, the concept of body-image actually 
requires mind and body to be seen as a functional unity, and one that is also 
inseparable from environment and society.
Grosz gives a brief historical account of possible precursors to the 
modern concept of body-image, including Artistotle’s pneuma, which she also 
identifies as foundational for the Christian notion of the soul. Ambroise Paré 
(c.1510-1590) first described the phenomenon of phantom limb, working with 
war-wounded amputees. His experience gave him a sense that a person’s 
perception of himself was not wholly governed by what was actually present. 
32 The work of Richard Shusterman on 'somaesthetics' is a glaring omission here (Shuster-
man 2003, 2006, 2007, 2012). Since my focus is on Schilder and Feldenkrais, I consider 
that there is not the scope within this thesis to consider his very interesting ideas.
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Feldenkrais takes this a step further, into the realm of movement; a person 
does not necessarily move in the way they think they do, or do what they think
they do. Through sensory-motor input it is possible to shift patterns in action 
and, thereby, self-image. Paré compared the phantom limb effect to ‘being 
pulled by the shirt, where the body is being acted upon, and acts, with 
reference to an absent or intangible force’ (Grosz 1994:63). Responding to the 
puppet as an outside force might begin as a game but quickly there is a sense 
that it really is an external force acting on me, the puppeteer. Paré used 
ligature to separate conjoined twins. A worn puppet is somewhat like a 
conjoined twin; an independent agent which is also reliant on me, into which 
my person-image extends but over which I do not have complete control.
Noting Schilder's idea that body schema does not correspond with 
anatomy and that objects, even very large ones, can be incorporated into the 
schema, Grosz writes 'the rigidity of the bone system is an important part in 
every body-image' (80) and this points to an intermediate category of objects 
between inanimate and bodily. For my project this is clearly of interest; 
puppets are of this category to a greater or lesser degree. They are capable of 
shifting between inanimate and bodily, and of retaining traces of the body even
when they are not animated.
Echoing both Schilder and Feldenkrais, Grosz summarizes that voluntary
action requires a body-image for intention to be translated into the beginning 
of movement, 'the point of transition in activating bones and muscles' (83). 
While the rigid connection between skeleton and object might be seen as the 
source of human agency normally, from a puppetry point of view, although 
direct agency on the material world might be wanting in puppets which lack 
this rigid connection (strings, shadows, virtual forms), the act of throwing a 
separate person-image into something outside oneself, or endowing something
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with its own self-image can be seen as activating a kind of semiotic agency of a
different order. The power to affect, the power to move, albeit not physically. 
Puppetry forms which are more reliant on the aleatory emergent qualities of 
materials than on direct forms of manipulation also throw light on the nature of
agency and how a softer connection, for example through a puppet’s strings, 
also enables agency, but of a kind that has to allow for greater feedback from 
the thing.
Lacan’s ‘imaginary anatomy’ is a development of the ideas of body-
image and schema from Schilder and other precursors in the field such as Head
(Grosz 1994:39-44). On reaching Lacan’s mirror phase the child shifts from a 
serial notion of body parts to a totalized image of self, whilst simultaneously 
experiencing a fragmented self, and continuing to do so. This relationship 
between whole and part is thoroughly explored in the FM. Although related to 
my subject, I will not delve further into Lacan’s ‘imaginary anatomy’ in this 
thesis since he asks his concept to do a lot more work regarding the 
problematics of psyche than Feldenkrais’s Schilder-derived self-image. 
Feldenkrais was interested in the fact that motor sensory stimulation alone in 
his view could help a person change her self-image. Hence his rejection of, 
despite his interest in, Freud. For this reason, retaining a materially grounded 
view of self-image is important for my argument. As I point out elsewhere, 
Feldenkrais talked less about self-image and more about skeletal awareness in 
his later years, perhaps trying to get to what he saw as the core of the issue; 
literally the skeleton, the bones, the structure, avoiding the complex, 
boundary-shifting flesh and intangible psyche. 
Nietzsche's subject as multiplicity and active 'I' is included in Grosz's 
study and offers a richer view of human action within an open multiplicity than 
the cybernetic theory that interested Feldenkrais. The idea of self-image can be
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seen to pertain to the multiple subject, and the active ‘I’ to Feldenkrais’s 
‘potent self’. Expanding awareness and self-image becomes then an ethical and
existential pathway, and puppetry a way of giving form and voice to some of 
the multiples, which amounts also to listening to the ‘voices’ of nonhumans 
(Latour’s term). Grosz's arguments for the body as thing and nonthing and for 
the gradation of animateness help avoid the traps of monism and holism, and 
offer a conceptual model whereby the self-image and awareness are offered as 
fragment and phase within a multiplicity of other experience, but nevertheless 
vital to a lived ethics. It is in this bigger framework that I situate my work, 
using FM and puppetry as connected practices to explore such an ethics.
3.5.3 Towards somatic ecology
In Exhausting Dance: Performance and the Politics of Movement (2006),
Lepecki addresses Schilder via choreographer, Le Roy, whose notion of the 
body is extremely osmotic and, importantly, includes discourses in that which 
can be incorporated and expelled. Le Roy identifies the body-image as being 
‘as much a function of the subject’s psychology and socio-historical context as 
of anatomy,’ saying ‘there are all kinds of non-human influences woven into us’
(Lepecki 43). This leads him to ask whether another alternative to the body-
image than the anatomical one exists. I don’t understand him to mean there is 
a need to jettison what he calls the anatomical body-image completely, which 
might be seen as what Schilder and Feldenkrais begin (but do not end) with. 
Rather that the very ideas that Schilder calls up ultimately suggest a 
multiplicity of possible body-images which would indeed render the individual ‘a
notion completely devoid of sense’ (43).
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Le Roy aligns ‘body-image’ with Deleuze’s notions of becoming and 
‘open subjectivity’, and with Artaud’s 'body without organs' (taken up by 
Deleuze and Guattari). Lepecki writes of Schilder’s concept:
one’s body-image extends itself to any place any particle of one’s body 
has reached across space and across time. Wherever one has left a 
particle of one’s body (feces, blood, menstruation, urine, sweat, tears, 
semen) there one finds the limits of one’s body-image. Wherever one 
has left an imprint of one’s body (including linguistic ones, affective 
ones, sensorial ones) there is a limit of one’s body-image. (50)
He depicts body-image as: 
rhizomatic, schizoid, in the sense that it posits a body that is always 
beyond its proper boundaries, beyond traditional metaphysical notions 
of presence: a body that is always late to its arrival and always ahead of
its departure, a body that is never quite there in the context of its 
appearing. (50-51)
In light of the discussion in this chapter, Lepecki’s summary might be seen as 
pointing towards somatically sensitive puppetry as an activity which 
acknowledges and plays with the expansiveness of person-image.
Lepecki takes the idea into the heart of performance theory. The power 
of the human body in performance is related to its state of constant becoming. 
The constant becoming is the fertile ground on which FM is seeded; through 
observation of this becoming, a dual awareness, both focused in and diffused 
out, can emerge. The puppet, that which I am in relation with, both becomes 
me and remains recalcitrantly itself (Schumann 49)33. I also become, or come 
into the puppet, and my thumb prints, or sweat, or whatever, add to its patina;
it cannot completely refuse me. There is an ecology or meshwork of multi-
33 Latour constructs a more complex narrative around the recalcitrance of nonhumans and 
their role in his 'collective' (2004a:77-82).
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directional relations. In Chapter 6 I further investigate how Le Roy draws on 
Schilder in his performance, Self Unfinished.
Understanding person-image as that which gives coherence to lived 
experience, but also as being infinitely malleable, serves an analysis of how 
puppets can extend and explore the multiplicity of possible person-images. 
There is the potential to switch and merge figure and ground.
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Chapter 4
Feldenkrais Method and self-image:
‘something invisible, visible’
There is an utter transparency and simplicity to Moshe’s work that 
makes visible - what - the skeleton? the person? I am at a loss to say 
what. But under his directed non-doing, minimal efforts, divine physics 
of least action, the person is made visible - in an act of re-creation? The 
person lies there, relaxed and happy, his or her vital functional 
pathways laid utterly bare, obvious, empowered - he renders something 
invisible, visible.
(Reese 2001:20)
Wherever you are, there is somewhere further you can go.
(Ingold 2007:170)
4.1 Introduction
‘We act in accordance with our self-image’ is the first sentence of 
Awareness Through Movement, the book Feldenkrais most aimed at the 
general public (1990:3). Although the method remained (and remains), by its 
nature, experimental, Feldenkrais had by this point developed and grounded it 
in long theoretical and practical research. Here he most clearly sets out what 
he means by self-image, asking how much of ourselves is included in our 
image of ourselves as we act1. His first reference to it is in Body & Mature 
Behaviour, where he writes ‘The image of our body and its relation to space is 
an essential element in every sensation’ (Reese 2015:293), clearly linking 
1 He means in daily life, but this can include ‘acting’ as performance.
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inner space, sensation and movement with environment. Reese describes 
Feldenkrais’s touch as giving him ‘a vividly clear, inner vision of myself' 
(2001:21), giving a sense of self-image as a felt, experienced process which is,
however, tricky to pin down. It is part of the ‘elusive obvious’; the title of one 
of Feldenkrais’s later books (1981). Self-image is more like a kinaesthetic 
sense of self than an image, although it does not preclude a visual or visualized
component. The liberating question then is how to improve, not how to attain 
perfection which, at the moment of its attainment, is fleeting and fragile. 
Feldenkrais calls improvement ‘a gradual bettering which has no limit’ and 
opposes it to ‘cure’ which is ‘a return to the previously enjoyed state which 
need not have been excellent or even good’ (1990:37).
FM is about developing or extending self-image, and, more specifically, 
about shifting a fixed way of being/seeing (oneself) into a directable process. 
Another way of describing what it means to fill out self-image might be the 
appropriate use of the whole self to perform any action, which can be identified
as occurring when there is an even distribution of effort throughout the whole 
person or 'eutony'2. Feldenkrais puts sensation and attention at the centre of 
the experience of living. He has in mind an ideal of a ‘generalized human’ 
capable of ballistically pure movement, even though any individual will never 
achieve this completely or consistently; everyone can improve and 
improvement is unlimited.
FM works with the premise of an enworlded, embodied person: both are 
problematic terms, involving putting something into something, which is why I 
prefer to think of a person as part of the meshwork. The meshwork reaches
2 Gerda Alexander used ‘eutony’ to describe her work in 1957 and says it can be achieved 
by eliminating dysfunction and finding ‘an optimal tension balance’ (19-20). According to 
Schechner, Feldenkrais knew Alexander and employed the term knowingly (101).
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into and out of the person; she is in and of it. Organization, coordination and 
orientation in space are important indices for the practitioner and student, as is
the timing of a movement. Schilder discussed the body-image as an ‘image in 
space’, emphasizing that there are ‘no human experiences without the 
experience of one’s own body’ which ‘always has an extension in space’ 
(1942b:181). He states that ‘Space is a creation and a development. Unified 
space is a late product of development and is in no way given before 
experience. It also is in no way the form with which experience is melted’ 
(183). This last point requires a little unpacking; Schilder seems to be saying 
that space, as we conceive of it, is emergent, or a product of experience, not a 
pre-existing thing nor a co-existing thing. This is quite Ingoldian. Feldenkrais is
concerned with refining the organization of this extended body, the person, in 
and as space, and in relation to other extended bodies (animate beings and 
things) it encounters. According to Ingold, ‘every thing is a parliament of lines';
he points to the origin of the word ‘thing’ as a ‘a gathering of people, and a 
place where they would meet to resolve their affairs’ (2007:5) (his italics). 
When reapplied to all things and extended bodies which inhabit and embody 
space, this makes them the focus of exchange. I find specific support from the 
floor through my foot which transmits in a particular way to the rest of me 
depending how my foot meets the floor. The dance between me and a puppet, 
or me and a student in FI, is influenced by how I meet the other person or 
thing, by how our lines intertwine.
Feldenkrais’s notion of self-image is scientific and phenomenological, 
whilst also including something more. He does not take self-image as a given, 
shared experience, but sees it as particular to the individual and is interested in
the potential for its refinement in any person, not just in cases where it is 
seriously damaged. FM involves refining the body-image through mental 
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images and imagination and through movement. Often in FM a movement will 
be performed on one side of oneself and imagined on the other. It has been 
shown that thinking of, and even watching movement produces similar brain 
activity to performing it (Leisman 2). Most people have experienced the 
discrepancy when going to pick up a bag that was heavier or lighter than 
expected, or something similar; before action, the person makes an 
unconscious plan. Gallagher points out that if one is aware of one's body in a 
motor act, the awareness is a 'pre-reflective, performative awareness rather 
than a vivid perceptual presence' (91). The strategy used in FM in order to 
learn is to go into a particular detail of functioning, then return to the whole 
person repeatedly such that the body schema is improved, drawing conscious 
attention to the body-image in the process. Awareness and attention are 
different. The person brings her attention to the details, but increasingly 
functions as a whole organism with awareness where body-image and schema 
match. This amounts to knowing what I am doing so I can do what I think I am
doing.
Bringing this discussion back into the realm of theatre, improvisation 
guru Keith Johnstone observes that the body does not end at the skin (echoing
Schilder). He refers to a parabola around the person, likening it to director, Yat
Malgren’s image of a Swiss cheese and Lecoq’s ‘boule’. He quotes Barrault 
saying: 
The living human being is surrounded by a magnetic aura which makes 
contact with the external objects without any concrete contact with the 
human body. This aura, or atmosphere, varies in depth according to the 
vitality of human beings … The mime must first of all be aware of this 
boundless contact with things. There is no insulating layer of air 
between the man and the outside world. Any man who moves causes 
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ripples in the ambient world in the same way a fish does when it moves 
in water. (Johnstone 58)
This is quite some responsibility. In spite of Barrault’s mysterious terminology, 
I believe he, Johnstone, Malgren and Lecoq are all talking about what 
Feldenkrais would call self-image; the way one moves in the world, or projects 
oneself into the world and accepts the world as one's grounding. Schilder 
writes specifically about this phenomenon: 
One sees again that every actual change in the postural model of the 
body also changes the surrounding zone, makes it asymmetric according
to the specific life situation. We feel these zones especially when 
somebody else tries to come nearer to us. We feel even that when 
somebody comes near us he is intruding in our body-image even when 
he is far from touching us. This emphasizes again that the body-image 
is a social phenomenon. (2000:212)
While not much can be done about what one ‘is’ in the world, aside from
on a superficial level, a lot can be done about how one moves and this will 
influence the ‘ripples’ one makes. This is not to say that the superficial - make-
up, clothes, costume, feeling fat/thin, fit/unfit and so on - have no impact on 
how one moves. Person-image is very pliant; it is in and part of the world, not 
separate from it, and things can be included in and influence it, as seen in the 
previous chapter. Johnstone references Malgren observing people who are ‘cut 
off from sensing areas of themselves,’ having ‘no arms’, or ‘no legs’ and so on 
(58). The self-image that Feldenkrais is addressing is felt from the inside, but it
is also seen from the outside, as Malgren noticed.
On a common, everyday level people respond to personal space, or self-
image, and recognize instinctively that not everyone’s is the same and that 
context also shifts it all the time. This relates partly to survival and comfort on 
a social level, simply allowing each other to breathe and feel unthreatened. 
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Self-image in FM relates to how widely and evenly awareness is spread 
throughout oneself, or about how much of oneself one senses. The more one 
senses, the more malleable the projected image becomes; this is central to the
work of the actor. FM is not, however, only concerned with body awareness, 
but with self-image and Awareness Through Movement. In a handout for his 
Tel Aviv classes in 1975, Feldenkrais states, 'Training a body to perfect all the 
possible forms and configurations of its members not only changes the 
strength and flexibility of the skeleton and muscles, but makes a profound 
change in the quality of the direction of the self' (2010a:73).
4.2 Feldenkrais and self-image
Feldenkrais’s chapter on self-image in Awareness Through Movement 
begins:
Each one of us speaks, moves, thinks and feels in a different way, each 
according to the image of himself that he has built up over the years. In 
order to change our mode of action we must change the image of 
ourselves that we carry within us. What is involved here, of course, is a 
change in the dynamics of our reactions, and not the mere replacing of 
one action by another. Such a change involves not only a change in our 
self-image, but a change in the nature of our motivations, and the 
mobilization of all the parts of the body concerned. (1990:10)
He makes it clear that this has nothing to do with local improvement, say of a 
wrist’s flexibility. The ‘change in the dynamics of our reactions’ clearly locates 
the work on a social level; the onus of the work is on awareness, not on 
movement per se. He considers habit, the formation of self-image in relation to
the world and other people and self-image in the motor cortex where the 
mouth and thumbs have bigger representations, showing that function (what a 
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person does) influences the development of self-image. While his claims for 
human potential might be criticized by today’s neuroscientists as falling into 
the small percentage of brain-use fallacy3, he makes an important point about 
objective-led learning, claiming it stunts further learning by tending to make a 
person stop when they have reached sufficiency rather than continue to seek 
improvement. His ideas apply to how the brain (or person, or self) is used, not 
necessarily how much of it.
He is critical of education in a society which seeks no more than to 
reproduce itself rather than improve. If children are valued for their 
achievements, relative to societal expectations, they are robbed of 
‘spontaneity’; a person should value herself as an individual regardless of her 
place in society. He recognizes the difficulty, however, in overcoming patterns 
of action and underlines the need to change their dynamics, contending it is 
counterproductive to try to use willpower to overcome obstacles. He also sees 
the lack of awareness of many parts of the body for most people, particularly 
the parts less clearly involved in daily activity. The size of different parts in the 
self-image is not coherent with physical reality. He uses this in his method as a
touchstone, a means by which to calibrate self-image and the physical reality 
of the person and her environment more closely with each other. 
In this chapter I draw on several lessons from Alexander Yanai (AY); the
time has come to explain what this is. AY forms a body of about 600 lessons 
developed from the early 1950s to the late 1970s in the eight weekly public 
classes Feldenkrais taught in Tel Aviv. This period of intensive teaching can 
truly be called practice-based research; Feldenkrais taught a lesson, refined 
and taught it again until he was happy with it. He recorded over lessons he 
3 Even science websites for children now debunk the idea that humans only use a small 
portion of our brains (Chudler).
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deemed lacking. As such, this body of work represents a true opus and, while 
Feldenkrais continued to refine and develop his work, AY offers the most 
comprehensive vision of his ATM work as it developed and affords the 
opportunity to observe him returning to and refining themes. Later series such 
as Esalen 1972 are more like the condensed works of a mature artist smelting 
all his knowledge and creativity. The AY lessons show how he undertook a 
systematic investigation of human functioning and self-image and transformed 
this into a process others could follow. They were taught in Hebrew, recorded, 
and have been transcribed and translated into English by Anat Baniel and 
Jeremy Krauss4. 
Since ‘we act in accordance with our self-image’, improving it becomes 
the key to potent action and to the fulfilment of intention. Feldenkrais makes 
the point that ‘systematic correction of the image is more useful than 
correction of single actions’ (1990:23). Thus, even in ATM (and FI) lessons 
which might seem to focus on a local movement, say of the arms and 
shoulders, such as AY 18 "Chanukia" (vol. 1a:103-110), there is a continual 
process of relating to the whole, both through movement (in AY 18, for 
example, lifting the pelvis is an auxiliary movement and it becomes clear that 
the spine, ribs and sternum are all involved too) and through bringing 
awareness to shifts taking place in the student’s self-image. FM practitioner 
trainer, Jerry Karzen, talks about ‘Samurai awareness’, which I have also heard
referred to as 360° vision5. This is the ability to maintain awareness of oneself 
and one’s surroundings simultaneously; to be able to focus on the particular 
and the general at once, including what is above, behind and below me as well 
as to my front and sides, such that I can act without hesitation in relation to 
4 An ongoing process.
5 In a FM practitioner training in 2004 for which I translated.
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anything in my environment, and move in any direction without prior 
reorganization of myself. Feldenkrais considered this kind of super-awareness 
to be within everyone’s grasp.
Many performer trainings work on this kind of awareness; in my own 
experience, the mask and chorus work at Lecoq comes to mind, where limited 
vision in masks requires the development of other ways of sensing what’s 
happening on stage, and the large group in a chorus learns to flock like birds, 
each individual sensing where to go. Learning occurs in the group, not just in 
the individual. It is social. Lecoq’s ‘équilibre du plateau’ exercise, used to 
prepare chorus work, is a brilliant example of group-dependent learning. An 
audience on four sides witnesses the entrance of one actor, followed by 
another and another and so on. The whole group, including the audience, 
learns together to judge the ‘balance’ of the space, but also the timing of the 
entrances and movement within the scene. It is the theatrical situation pared 
down to its core; audience, space and players work together. Feldenkrais 
taught ATMs where he makes group organization a focus (e.g. Esalen 1972, 
"Lesson 34: Rolling..."). In puppetry, in the case of multiple puppeteers on one
puppet, and/or many puppeteers in a limited space, the skill of expanding 
one’s awareness beyond oneself and working as an element in bigger organism
comes into play.
 FM trainer, Elizabeth Beringer, compares Feldenkrais’s hunches and 
deductions based on the neurophysiology of his time with current findings on 
neuroplasticity and systemic complexity (2001). On moving, sensing, thinking 
and feeling, she says, ‘It’s not that one affects another - they are each, to a 
greater or smaller extent, an integral part of every action’ (36). This was 
Feldenkrais’s opinion, although he thought this was due to the proximity of and
diffusion between structures in the brain, rather than the result of the complete
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functional integrity of all these elements, which has now been shown, for 
example, by Damasio (2000). Beringer references Penfold’s homunculus, also 
used by Feldenkrais in Awareness Through Movement to show the 
‘representation’ of the body in the brain. However, Preester and Knockaert 
point out that neuroscience has largely abandoned this ‘somatotopic’ idea of 
representation or map in the cortex and thalamus, saying ‘there is a recording 
of constantly moving functional activation patterns’ and ‘representational 
plasticity, shaped and modulated to a considerable extent by the unique 
experience of the organism in its environment’ (12). This actually works better 
with Feldenkrais’s outlook than the more rigid idea of the homunculus. 
Self-image is a useful catch-all term to describe the functional unity of 
the person. Reese summarizes: self-image ‘stands for the functional whole, 
irreducible to causal analysis’ (2015:301). He suggests that self-image is ‘more
like a map than a picture’ and that it forms ‘the core sense of self, an 
embodied, kinaesthetically rooted sense of place, wholeness and competence’ 
(71). Beringer’s notion of 'self-imaging' is helpful as it avoids the static 
connotation of the noun. She traces the idea to von Foerster, who remarked to 
her, ‘The Self should not be a noun, but a process: selfing’ (2001:36), echoing 
Buckminster Fuller, ‘I seem to be a verb’. However, the term I prefer is person-
image as I think it is important to retain a sense of something that can be fixed
into an image, although it is an image that is subject to transformation.
FM uses movement as a focus to increase awareness of self-image since
it has a clear manifestation in the material world, unlike thoughts and feelings. 
For the practitioner giving an FI, either there is movement in the upper ribs of 
her student when she breathes, for example, or there is not. For the student 
things are a little more murky. I may sense movement where there is none, or 
not sense it where there is. I may have my left ear closer to my left shoulder 
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when lying but sense that my right ear is closer to my right shoulder. FM 
develops the student's capacity to sense what is happening in her movement, 
and in her stillness. The practitioner finds ways to communicate this to her, 
verbally and through touch. In ATM, this is usually through questions such as, 
what is your sense of your left leg and right leg? What change do you notice in 
the way you’re lying on the floor since the lesson began? In FI, I am also 
asking questions. I return to the student’s head, pelvis and feet throughout the
lesson both for myself, to see how the movement is developing (does the 
head/pelvis feel lighter or move more easily? Is it more available for 
movement?), and for the student, to allow her to sense differences. Developing
self-image is a large part of the work, and it develops in relation to my 
sensing, thoughts and emotions about it.
4.2.1 ‘Improvement’
Feldenkrais did not work with or on bodies and neither does FM; he 
worked with people. In a recording from Amherst, he says: 
A functional integration, not a local improvement of the body. …My body
– who is ‘my'? With this woman I had her body cured completely, but 
she was as ill as she was before, therefore it was improperly cured, 
because she should have been cured, not her body... I didn't realise she 
had such an idiotic dichotomy. I should have treated her, not her body. 
If you treat the body, the person will remain ill as before. You have to 
treat the person, not the body’ (1980 01:39:45)6.
6 Chiming with Feldenkrais, Minh-ha writes, 'We do not have bodies, we are our bodies, 
and we are ourselves while being the world. We write - think and feel - (with) our entire 
bodies rather than only (with) our minds or hearts. It is a perversion to consider thought 
the product of one specialised organ, the brain, and feeling, that of the heart' (258). Cur-
rent science is beginning to find neurons in the gut, for example, supporting the idea of 
whole person intelligence (Watzke).
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My feeling as a person is tightly tied to my self-image. Feldenkrais uses the 
idea of improving self-image as a means to improve functioning for the person.
But what exactly is meant by ‘improvement’? Not local improvement, as in the 
case above. Improvement in functions might sometimes be clear: I want to be 
able to lift my leg up higher in an arabesque; I want to be able to play a fast 
piece on the violin; I want to improve my performance in an academic subject 
like mathematics. The last example is tricky, but it might be possible to show a
benefit from the method. Improvement must be in the whole person so she can
use what she learns.
The origins of the method lie partly in Feldenkrais's need to defend 
himself and his fellows from violent attacks in Palestine in the 1910s 
(Feldenkrais 1944, Reese 2015). So the method could also be used to improve 
violent methods of attack and make them more efficient. Feldenkrais had a 
humanist project and his early experience in hand-to-hand combat was 
concerned with defence and survival, not attack, but nevertheless, anything 
can be improved, including methods for killing or hurting people. Improvement 
is not necessarily positive. FM can be used with specific ends in mind even 
though this goes against its openness, and might be seen as an aberration of 
the method.
Sheets-Johnstone points out that FM is not focused on the future in the 
way most activity is; my intention is to cross the street, bang in the nail and so
on. She calls this ‘where-I-am-not-yet’ and contrasts it with awareness brought
to the ‘here-now-happening’ that FM asks for (1979:25): ‘By focusing attention
on what we are doing rather than what is to be done, we learn to discriminate 
between what is easy and efficient and what is wasteful and strained’ (26). The
improvement in FM comes from here-now awareness, also vital for 
performance.
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4.2.2 Awareness (through movement)
If a key to awareness through movement is the ongoing transformation 
of self-image, we need to know what Feldenkrais meant by ‘awareness’. 
Philosopher and FM practitioner, Richard Shusterman, claims that for FM, as 
well as other practices such as meditation and AT:
explicit awareness and conscious control are key, as is the use of 
representations or visualizations. These disciplines do not aim to erase 
the crucial level of unreflective behavior by the (impossible) effort of 
making us explicitly conscious of all our perception and action. They 
simply seek to improve unreflective behavior that hinders our 
experience and performance. In order to effect this improvement, 
however, the unreflective action or habit must be brought into conscious
critical reflection (although only for a limited time) so that it can be 
grasped and worked on more precisely. (2005:165)
While this is a clear and useful summary of how FM works, it is also partial and 
lacks subtlety in that it attends only to ‘conscious awareness’, which it frames 
as something like ‘paying attention to’, or simply ‘attending to’ oneself. In a 
discussion between biophysicist, Aharon Katzir, who pioneered research into 
dynamic systems in his field, and Feldenkrais, they set up a basic premise that 
‘consciousness and awareness without action is impossible’ (Beringer 
2010:163). They conclude that ‘the uniqueness of awareness is its ability to 
create schemas’, which Katzir sees as possibly ‘the act of creation itself’ (175). 
By ‘schemas’, I understand them to mean ways of doing. Thus, awareness 
allows one to invent ways of doing that are neither attached to societal or 
cultural norms, nor to the ways one has done the same thing before. Each 
moment is fresh, and involves the ability to attend both to oneself and to that 
which is not oneself. Perhaps, rather than distinguishing between self and not-
self, it would be more accurate simply to talk about what is happening. Katzir 
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says, ‘When you put awareness to the elements, you become sensitive so that 
you scan shift the elements’ (174). The elements include everything. 
Feldenkrais cites the ability of a child ‘to look at something without preparing 
the fixed mechanical feedback, but instead to illuminate what is found’. The 
child has ‘the ability to observe while he is listening to himself’ (175). There 
are unlimited ways of interacting with, or seeing something7. The direction of 
awareness inwards or outwards can exist without the two directions being 
functionally separate. Feldenkrais constantly refers back to awareness of the 
outside world (the number of windows in a building you regularly pass, or 
struts on the chair you sit in every day) as a test of awareness generally. 
Therefore, perhaps FM could be summed up as practising awareness in the 
realm of the self or self-image in order to expand this beyond the self. Or 
inward-directed attention as practice for outward-directed attention and, 
ultimately, for diffuse attention in all directions; awareness.
Feldenkrais says, ‘Once the ability to differentiate is improved, the 
details of the self or the surroundings can be better sensed; we become aware 
of what we are doing and not what we say or think we are doing’ (2010a:72). 
Here, self and surroundings are on a par. The ability to differentiate might be 
between effort or no effort in a movement of my shoulder, or between how 
hard or soft the ground feels, or how heavy a chair, or my leg feels to lift. A 
self-image that is unrelated to the ‘outside world’ is clearly impossible. To lift 
my shoulder when lying down, I must press something into the floor. 
In Awareness Through Movement, Feldenkrais simply states, ‘the delay 
between thought and action is the basis for awareness,’ elaborating, 'this 
7 This kind of creativity is referred to by education reformer, Ken Robinson, giving his ‘cod 
example’ of asking different groups of people to find as many uses as possible for a paper
clip. Small children outperform every other group, including their older selves (Robinson 
00:08:20). 
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possibility of creating an image of an action and then delaying its execution - 
postponing it or preventing it altogether - is the basis of imagination and 
intellectual judgment’ (1990:45). He is referring to a phenomenon he uses in 
ATM that can be practised - observing and using the imagination to shift one’s 
image of oneself in movement - rather than something one can or would want 
to be doing all the time; if I slip on a banana peel I have no time to stop and 
observe, so hopefully I already have patterns of movement that will prevent 
me from hurting myself too badly. Without going into brain anatomy, 
awareness - the delay between thought and action - seems to be related to the
relatively large neocortex in humans. Self-image is what exists in this delay 
and can be thought of therefore as a function of the neocortex.
Ives argues, in response to an article on the efficacy of FM, that while 
the ‘body awareness’ or ‘internal focus’ he imagines FM uses ‘may be a useful 
strategy at times for certain conditions, namely those with a large 
psychological dimension … an external focus is more effective in learning and 
performing motor skills’. He claims it has ‘been shown that movements ranging
from object manipulation tasks to whole body movement and balance tasks 
were acquired, performed, and retained better with an external focus’. He also 
notes however that ‘high-level endurance athletes tend to adopt an associative 
strategy in which focus is placed on internal bodily sensations’, but argues that 
‘association appears to work for low strategy endurance sports with a low 
motor skill component’. While he identifies ‘an inappropriate attentional focus 
and an overemphasis on kinesthetic training’ in FM, he allows that ‘self-
regulation theory’ may be a framework within which to study the method, 
which he claims has ‘a psychological emphasis’ and may affect men and 
women differently' (119).
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Ives has an outsider’s knowledge of FM; Buchanan, to whom he is 
responding, an insider’s. It is in Buchanan and Ulrich’s interest (and perhaps 
also in mine) to argue for the efficacy of FM. However, Ives seems to miss the 
point that FM is not concerned with better motor performance per se, but with 
self-regulation, or, put another way, choice or freedom, and indeed Feldenkrais
himself states the obvious point that ‘self-knowledge’ ‘can interfere with the 
carrying out of actions’ (1990:46). (The banana, which Feldenkrais refers to in 
his talk On Awareness.) Ives contrasts motor and psychological performance as
if they were unrelated, yet you cannot have one without the other. Buchanan 
and Ulrich send the ball back to Ives with a torrent of references from systems 
theorists to ecological psychologists and neuroscientists to the effect that 
‘physiological and psychological categories include many subsystems that 
interact, and, thus, affect each other’ (2003:125). It should also be 
emphasized that any ‘body awareness’ or ‘internal focus’ used in FM is never 
isolated from the environment, nor can it be. The floor, at the very least, is 
always part of the action and my awareness because of gravity. The focus in 
FM is expanded rather than inward, as seen above. Equally, while achieving 
specific goals is very much not part of the method’s protocols, the notion of 
function is central to it8.
Function in FM is both complex and simple. A function might be simply 
doing something, an action. The OED gives the definitions, ‘the action of 
performing’ and ‘activity; action in general, whether physical or mental. Of a 
person: Bearing, gestures’, as well as a basic operation in computing ‘that 
corresponds to a single instruction’ ("function"). There are many ways of 
8 In an ATM, Haller gives a direction to do a movement ‘without achievement, without 
seeking any outcome or improvement, without performance’. The ability to observe one-
self in action enables one to notice differences, which becomes the foundation for 
change. One of his students comes up with the phrase ‘an exercise in letting go of ambi-
tion’ for ATM (2010).
138
performing the function of sitting down on a chair. Some however will include 
actions not related to sitting down on the chair and some of these will actively 
interfere with the action of sitting down on the chair. The function is just sitting
down on the chair without the other stuff. Self-image influences how I perform 
any action. Functional Integration aims to clarify my actions so that I can just 
perform the function I intend (such as sitting down on the chair), such that my 
self-image doesn’t interfere with it. In a way this is like the basic operation in 
computing ‘that corresponds to a single instruction’; sit on the chair. This is 
related to ‘neutral’ in theatre and functional movement.
Gallagher's reflections on proprioception and its lack in the case of Ian 
Waterman fall within this discussion on awareness, pertaining to the role of 
proprioception in the sense of self and agency. Waterman might be said to 
have no self-image or awareness in a typical Feldenkraisian sense. However, 
he learnt to use vision to orient himself in space (if he shuts his eyes, he falls 
over). His case might lead to a desire to reframe awareness in a more supple 
way, simply as the ability to use any kind of perception to move oneself 
actively and meaningfully in the world9. The movements of a baby are 
meaningful in that they are part of a process of discovery10. Gallagher does not
endorse a motor theory of perception but wants 'to treat movement as a 
constraint on rather than a cause of perception' (8 n.6), chiming with Berthoz' 
comments on the limitations skeletal structure places on movement such that 
the brain has fewer aspects of movement to control. The movement capacities 
of the human body allow coherent perception through limitation, thus a sense
9 It would be interesting to know how Waterman's vestibular system is functioning; al-
though he seems to orient visually, perhaps there is some residual intermodal perception 
in spite of his lack of proprioception.
10 Anat Baniel spoke about the erroneous idea that a baby's movements are random at a 
workshop I attended in London in 2017. The baby is learning to organize herself, so her 
movements are not random, although they might be uncontrolled or lack intention.
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of oneself, which is particular and individual. Lack of proprioception 'reorients 
the attentional structure of consciousness' (Gallagher 58), which is 'normally of
an intermodally seamless spatial system' (59). Gallagher's distinction between 
egocentric and allocentric frames of reference is important to a Feldenkraisian 
approach where skeletal awareness acts a bridge between the two and is used 
to improve self-image. 
In relation to Ingold, awareness as Feldenkrais understood it might be 
said to be of the meshwork, or seen as a Deleuzian ‘becoming’; it relates to the
present moment as it is playing out. Ingold contrasts, ‘the hub-and-spokes 
model of place’ where points are connected in a network with ‘place as a knot 
of entangled lifelines’ (2007:98):
The knot, by contrast, does not contain life but is rather formed of the 
very lines along which life is lived. These lines are bound together in the
knot, but they are not bound by it. To the contrary they trail beyond it, 
only to become caught up with other lines in other knots. Together they 
make up what I have called a meshwork. Every place, then, is a knot in 
the meshwork, and the threads from which it is traced are lines of 
wayfaring. (99)
Awareness via expanded person-image connects into the meshwork. 
Awareness is of the lines, of the knot (person-image), and of the knotting 
(person-imaging). I find this metaphor helpful.
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4.3 Why change? Is FM a normative practice?11
Feldenkrais always entertained the opposite of an idea in order to test it.
Kaetz, writing about his Hasidic roots, references the Talmudic study model 
where there is no master, just two students in dialogue (2007). This fosters 
critical thinking and self-reliance without the need to turn to an authority. FM 
might be criticized as championing a particular way of being as right (moving in
a ballistically pure way, exercising diffuse awareness and aiming for a complete
self-image) and assuming that everyone should want or need to go towards 
this. It might be criticized as a form of self-surveillance. This notion comes 
from Foucault who writes:
there is no need for arms, physical violence, material constraints. Just a 
gaze. An inspecting gaze, a gaze which each individual under its weight 
will end by interiorizing to the point that he is his own overseer, each 
individual thus exercising this surveillance over, and against himself. 
(qtd. in Bordo 253)
Is FM a form of self-surveillance? If it is, where does it get its model and why? 
It claims to work on learning and change, but why change? What’s wrong with 
me as I am? Who is to say I should improve? And who says what the 
improvement should be? Mansbach considers that both Foucault and 
Feldenkrais were concerned with how we become who we are, how self-
11 An adjunct to these questions are the issues of wellbeing and focus on self. Feldenkrais 
gave workshops at Esalen, a centre 'pioneering deep change in self and society' founded 
in 1962 (Esalen), thus placing him in the 'Human Potential Movement' which has been 
criticized for its emphasis on self (Olliver). Kapsali (2014) offers an analysis of FM as be-
ing inextricably bound up with the capitalist context in which it arose and in which it is 
commercialized as a health or self-development practice. She identifies the importance of
recognizing this if we are to tap into its empowering potential in performer training. If 
health is made a matter of personal and moral choice, unconnected to the socio-eco-
nomic and political fabric, far from being empowering, FM and other health and well-be-
ing practices are seen as depoliticizing their subjects through their focus on the individual
at the expense of broader political awareness. See Evans (2009) for a broader socio-
political and historical overview of movement training for actors.
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transformation is possible. While Foucault’s approach is to analyse the 
structures and functioning of society and culture, Feldenkrais analyses the 
structures and functioning of the organism. Feldenkrais wants to restore 
organic individuality by disassembling habitual behaviour. Thus, in Mansbach’s 
words, ‘the method contributes to the process of individuation and the 
constitution of our own selves, by awareness and transformation of our body-
image'. But the question of transformation into what and why is still not 
addressed.
In his review of Awareness Through Movement, Kemp makes 
Feldenkrais’s aim into a very concrete question: ‘How to move so that the 
world would not collapse if I were its pivot. Or more modestly: How to become 
more pleasing to myself and thereby to others’. He sums up why FM is non-
normative but rather about individual experience, which will produce many 
different ways of being. He also sees FM as realistic, which is not to say 
unoptimistic or unidealistic: ‘It is not the hinges of the whole world, which 
nobody can manipulate, that are at issue here; but our bones, muscles, nerves
- the rather splendidly fashioned dust we are made of’. Depending on how it is 
understood, taught and contextualized, however, FM could be mistaken for 
being about correct movement and posture, and therefore prescriptive12. It 
could also be mistaken for being about inner mindfulness or self-awareness, 
which could lead to accepting outer circumstances without challenging them 
and/or towards incompetence in real action. It is worth remaining alive to the 
idea that some possible effects of the work are not its ultimate aim. I 
understand it as being about expanded awareness and sensing difference,
12 Even for people who have a good understanding of the method, it is possible to get lost 
in trying to find a movement, get it ‘right’, and thus lose sight of the real goal, which is 
increased awareness. It is almost irrelevant how you end up doing a movement; what is 
important is how you have been able to use your attention and awareness.
142
leading to potent action which fulfils the individual’s organic needs, rather than 
fitting with society’s values or norms. Organic needs emanate from the person 
herself rather than in response to societal or parental expectations or to 
cultural habits.
But what about when the individual’s organic needs or intentions are not
only in conflict with society’s expectations but also detrimental to others? The 
law attempts to regulate human behaviour by providing sanctions against 
those who act against others. It is debatable where civil liberty should end and 
state intervene, and the law does not treat all individuals equally, even when it
claims to. Perhaps ‘organic need’ can simply refer to feeling one can choose 
how to behave in any situation so long as no harm is done to others? Clearly 
this leaves room for interpretation; ‘offence’ might be considered harm, and is 
a murky term. But, after the law, common sense must surely prevail. An art-
work may be deemed offensive by some, provocative by others, tame by still 
others, and ten years later, tame by those who previously found it offensive.
Birke suggests that Judith Butler's concept of performativity might be 
used to think about the ''way the body works', its interiority’ (45). The roles 
people perform influence their bodily workings; what you do with yourself 
influences what roles you can play (in life or in performance). Habit moulds the
body, and the person. By doing something different, or differently, which is 
what happens in FM, you can change your body/self and perform something 
else. You cannot help but perform a culturally produced version of gender, or 
(a culturally produced ) transgression of gender, but you will not be stuck with 
it; you can choose a different mode. This, surely, is empowering. With the 
proviso that it remains useful to consider what power is attained and to what 
uses it is put.
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In FM, we place emphasis on the idea of force travelling through the 
skeleton in functional anatomy. The main difference between female and male 
skeletons is in the shape of the pelvis; the female pelvis has an open, circular 
pelvic inlet as opposed to the male’s narrower, heart-shaped inlet; the female 
has a broader sciatic notch, a wider angle where the two pubic bones meet in 
front and more outwardly flared hip bones. Males also 'tend to have larger, 
more robust bones and joint surfaces, and more bone development at muscle 
attachment sites’ ("Male or Female?"). These differences become more 
pronounced with puberty. There is a question then around the relative 
influences of biology and culture on adult human skeletons, but the difference 
between genders is not so large that functional organization is influenced to a 
great degree. In adulthood, it is not so much skeletal structure which affects 
acture and movement but social influence. A focus on skeletal awareness 
bypasses psychology and gender differences to a large extent and they become
subsumed to other anatomical differences; some people have longer legs, 
wider hips, heavier bones. So does FM ignore gender? Does it normalize male 
experience? One answer would be to say that it does ignore gender, but it does
not normalize male experience since it deals with each individual whatever 
his/her starting point or capacity, and works within his/her physical limits 
(which are not the same as his/her functional limits, which can be expanded). 
Physical limits might be bone structure or tightness of ligaments, which affects 
movement potential in the joints. For human adults, it now makes more sense 
to talk about cis-gender and trans-gender rather than male and female. Cis-
gender being those who identify with their apparent biological gender at birth 
and trans-gender being those who do not. It becomes clear here how person-
image is of central importance to the human being, since it relates to the 
relationship between how I feel and behave in the world, and how I appear to 
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others. But what about playing with person-image? This must be where choice 
comes in, so that I am not stuck in one mode - denying I have big breasts or a 
penis for example. I need to integrate the fact of having big breasts into how I 
would like to be, or the fact of having a penis to the fact that I feel like a 
woman.
From a feminist perspective, FM might be criticized for ignoring what 
Grosz calls ‘breasted existence’ (1994:108) in her discussion of feminist 
critiques of Merleau-Ponty which draws on Irigaray, Butler and Young. 
However, FM also ignores what might be called ‘penised experience’ simply 
because penises, like breasts, do not have bones in them. As such, neither are 
part of the moving, biomechanical person; they are fleshy appendages. But 
clearly both are involved in, and have an influence on, self-image. A woman 
with big breasts might adopt a flexion pattern in order to minimize their 
presence, or an extension pattern because she wants to thrust them into the 
world. Similarly a man with a large penis might hold his legs together and rock 
his pelvis back to withdraw his member into himself, or he might adopt a wide 
stance and thrust his pelvis forward. All manner of postural patterns is possible
in each case and these schema are achieved through skeletal organization. 
However, it would be foolish to claim that the fleshy parts of a person play no 
part in how she habitually organizes herself. FM focuses on skeletal 
organization but does not deny sexual difference since the skeleton is merely a 
route to, or handle on, the whole person. It does not concern itself with why a 
person is the way she is, but rather with how that person might explore new 
territory. If a flexion pattern is present because of large breasts FM might offer 
that woman ways of exploring both flexion and extension that result in greater 
acceptance of her breasts as part of her self-image such that she no longer 
feels the need to withdraw that area by habitual flexion. In this way FM can be 
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seen as being a potentially liberating practice in that it encourages self-image 
to accommodate physical and biomechanical need, without ignoring 
psychological need. But FM does not directly address the reasons people are 
the way they are, nor the psychological outcomes that may arise from them. It
only concerns itself with movement, which is seen as the key to the person as 
a whole. 
Feldenkrais's use of the concept of five cardinal lines to represent the 
person (the spine, two legs and two arms) might be seen as excluding people 
who are different in some way from this 'norm' (amputees, for example). It 
would be possible to refer instead to the four corners of the abdomen, or the 
two outermost extremities near the head, and the two farthest from the head. 
The movements in various planes of action of these points in the trunk is 
effectively what produces movement in the limbs of a person who has them. 
Movements in these planes are important for any person, no matter how 
apparently different from the five line model they are. Feldenkrais's 
terminology might now seem unfortunate, but he certainly didn’t expect or 
want his method to stop with him; I think he would have adapted it if teaching 
ATM to a room of double-amputees.
Rather than being a normative process, FM suggests everyone can 
improve in a way appropriate for each person; but there seems to be no 
getting away from the assumption that everyone needs to improve! 
Improvement is relative to the person. Take running. It might not necessarily 
mean to run faster; it might mean to run more comfortably, or further. 
Regarding playing the piano, it might mean learning tunes more easily, taking 
a greater pleasure in playing or playing a fast piece that one couldn’t play 
before. In one’s relations with one’s family, it might mean having more 
patience, listening more or being more decisive and having more energy. 
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Improvement is an open enough concept to accommodate most people’s 
desires. In a FI lesson, an opening question might be, what would you like to 
improve or do better? Organic need and improvement are connected to desire. 
People have desires about things they’d like to do, or stop doing. Working on 
self-image, even if this is not explicitly named, is related to making a shift such
that I am the kind of person who can do such and such, or who can stop doing 
such and such, rather than compulsively doing/not doing it. There is not an 
obvious connection between why having a more supple sternum-rib connection
might help me write a short story, but it is related to how I am functioning and 
how I am using myself, which affects everything else.
Dance scholar and FM practitioner, Isabelle Ginot, finds, ‘the Feldenkrais
community lacks a critical distance from Feldenkrais’s writings and the oral 
tradition of his teaching’ (153). Her aim is ‘to bring Feldenkrais practice more 
in tune with social spaces where it might be crucially effective’13. She points out
the discrepancy between Feldenkrais’s writing about ‘the social aspects of the 
construction of self-image’ and his individual practical response whereby 
‘developing a better self-image, individuals will evolve towards more 
autonomy, self-reliance and freedom, and this is the path to social change’ 
(154-5). Reappraising Feldenkrais’s terms in an attempt to use more specific 
and consistent language that can be understood in the professional circles 
within which she is communicating (the medical and social services), she 
identifies three variants on the concept of self-image present in Feldenkrais’s 
thought:
13 Ginot is implementing the use of FM in social institutions working with people with HIV 
and AIDS; she works with people who have become truly marginal, enabling them to re-
gain a sense of themselves, their bodies, voices and social presence. 
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1. The ‘neuro-scientific ‘homunculus’ which ‘might very well be confused
with an image in the brain, and perhaps even an image of the brain’.
2. The ‘anthropological or sociological’, ‘where culture, society, 
education and family are the main causes of faulty development of the 
self’.
3. The experiential, ‘belonging to the subject’s use of himself or herself’ 
(156).
She notes that the third of these, which seems to dominate in ATMs, and 
relates to full awareness of oneself in action, is ironically less present in 
Feldenkrais's writings than the first two. Perhaps because this awareness is 
precisely a unique affair and an unattainable ideal. It is something to work with
rather than for.
Ginot draws on Gallagher’s distinction between ‘body-image’ and ‘body 
schema’, terms which, along with self-image, Feldenkrais uses almost 
interchangeably. Gallagher refers to the possibility of improving the 
performance of body schema such that the body is pushed 'into the recesses of
awareness' (34). He elaborates, 'The dancer or the athlete who practices long 
and hard to make deliberate movements proficient so that movement is finally 
accomplished by the body without conscious reflection ... uses a consciousness 
of bodily movement to train body-schematic performance' (55). This is 
precisely what the FM sets out to do through, as Ginot puts it, the ‘interplay of 
body-image and body schema’ (154) and the development of skeletal 
awareness. 'The body effaces itself', in Gallagher's phrase, 'granting the 
subject a freedom to think of other things' (55). For Ginot, conceiving of FM as 
the ‘interplay of body-image and body schema’ has ‘fulfilled many of the needs 
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of our context of work’ in the social and health services, facilitating an 
understanding of FM: 
First, these two notions are prominent in Feldenkrais’ writings, and are 
also subject to contemporary research and interest that may reframe 
and give new precision to Feldenkrais’ intentions. Second, as descriptive
vocabulary, they are part of the professional cultures of many social 
workers. Third, they are transversal notions that include social, 
psychological and perceptive dimensions of the self. And lastly, most 
professionals agree that the many aspects of social exclusion and 
chronic disease strongly affect ‘body-image’. (154)14 
Importantly, and following the discussion around FM as a normative 
practice, Ginot challenges the idea that FM is inherently empowering and, 
aligning herself with Fortin (2008), agrees it might just as well be ‘a subjecting 
technique, depending on context and use’; she is investigating ‘the political 
uses of somatics in social work’ (Ginot 154). I want to keep in mind her 
challenge and ensure a critical distance from assumptions about the method, 
seeing it as a generative tool rather than an ultimate practice.
In performer training, one of the uses it might be put to is the 
cultivation of the body beautiful15. Although as a practice FM is not model-
based; there are no mirrors and no demonstrations, the notion of improvement
might still be used as if there were a precise end in mind. FM does harbour 
notions of right and wrong movement in the sense that ballistically pure 
movement is ‘right’ or ‘good’ and any movement which sends forces sheering 
14 Puppetry has a presence in therapy and education (Salvage, Shön) that I do not address 
extensively in this thesis but body-image/body schema and the use of puppets could be 
usefully linked in such contexts.
15 See Shusterman for an argument as to why it doesn't tend to encourage this however. 
He contrasts practices with internal and external focuses in his elaboration of 'somaes-
thetics' (2000, Part II, Ch. 7).
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across the skeleton is ‘wrong’ or potentially dangerous. But where other 
practices might look at the external aspect of movement, FM looks at its 
function from the inside. Its ‘rights’ and ‘wrongs’ are questions of physics and 
physiology. In puppetry training, especially in short workshops - often the only 
formal training a puppeteer might have - there is frequently less of a focus on 
the body and presence of the performer than there is in dancer and actor 
training16. Much of the technique of puppeteering is about organizing oneself in 
relation to things (puppets, castelets/booths, scenery, bridges, lights) and less 
about what exactly one does oneself. Awareness and the qualities of touch and 
attention are as important as the visible movement produced. Sounds like FM. 
However, the rise of 'manipulacting', 'corps-castelet' and the work of artists 
such as Moussoux-Bonté and Schönbein17, who push these to their limits, 
means that increasingly what the puppeteer does with herself is the focus of 
attention (Guidicelli).
The notion of person-image itself, when conceived of as multiple, non-
normative and in constant flux, provides a basis from which to make and 
analyse (puppet) performance which is more semiotically-minded than purely 
focused on the visual aesthetic. In Chapter 6 I use person-image as an 
analytical tool to look at specific examples of (puppet) performance in greater 
detail.
16 A notable exception is at ESNAM, France, where movement, aikido, tai chi and FM are, or
have been at times, part of the curriculum. The aikido classes are shared with the local 
police force! HDMK Stuttgart, Germany, also has movement classes including FM. At The 
Royal Central School of Speech and Drama, London, the puppetry students receive 
movement but not FM lessons while acting students also receive FM lessons.
17 Some of these are treated in Chapter 6.
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4.4 Self-image in ATM
How did Feldenkrais actually use self-image in lessons and how can this 
be related to puppetry? Aside from the majority of ATMs which revolve around 
a movement theme, there are also some which are more directly about self-
image. In Awareness Through Movement, Feldenkrais proposes twelve lessons,
two of which address self-image head-on. “Lesson 8, Perfecting the self-image"
revolves around the student lifting a foot in front of her towards her face and 
the top of her head whilst sitting. The emphasis is on improvement, going 
potentially from a self-image which doesn’t allow her to get her foot anywhere 
near her face to one where she can easily bring the foot to her forehead or 
further, or where there is at least some improvement in the ease and quality of
the movement, even if the distance travelled by the foot remains the same. 
The search, not necessarily for bigger, but better, easier movement, 
distinguishes FM from much other movement work. Feldenkrais emphasizes the
importance of rest in order to be able to observe changes and proposes 
engaging the imagination to work on improving the movement, underlining 
that ‘there is no limit to improvement’ (1990:136) and making the case that 
‘observing the self is better than mechanical repetition’ (137). 
“Lesson 11, Becoming aware of parts of which we are not conscious with
the help of those of which we are conscious" (a nicely explanatory, if not very 
succinct title!) is a version of a lesson from AY. In AY 303 "Self-image, the line 
of a ball that rolls" (vol. 7a:2079-2086), Feldenkrais asks the student to sense 
the middle of each part of herself starting from the heel, moving up to the 
pelvis by imagining an iron ball pressing down on the body and sensing at what
point it would not roll to one side or the other, or push the body to one side or 
the other. He asks the student to feel where this is rather than identify where 
she thinks it should be. Then he leads the same process in relation to the hand 
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and arm, asking the student to go up and down the lines clarifying any vague 
points, then to connect leg and arm lines by imagining lifting a limb and seeing
where the ball wants to travel from knee/thigh to pelvis, or from elbow to 
shoulder blade. He asks the student to think of lifting both the left arm and the
right leg to see how they connect.
This kind of lesson making use of the imagination and a virtual object - 
here an ‘iron ball’ - is precisely the kind I found most difficult initially. Not only 
is the student being asked to imagine movement, but also the effect of a 
relatively bizarre environmental factor - an iron ball rolling on the body. Yet 
there is also something alluring about this work in terms of exploratory 
puppetry, suggesting many possibilities for working with imaginary objects. 
There is an affiliation with Lecoq’s work on becoming materials, his 
'mimodynamique', and (his and others’) mime techniques more generally, but 
imagining the influence of imaginary objects on oneself as a means to clarify 
self-image is a new variation on these. Why should a puppeteer be interested 
in that which cannot be seen? Because it offers a generative constraint that 
might produce new ways of being in performance, but also a way of refining 
puppetry performance by working with one’s real puppets and objects in 
imagination. I return to this in Chapter 5.
The series of lessons, AY 338-341, "Primary Image", "Simpler", "Simpler
thighs" and "Simpler on the stomach and back" (vol. 7b:2313-2344), gives a 
clear idea of what Feldenkrais is getting at with self-image. He opens AY 339 
by recognizing that when he asks students to pay attention to how they are 
lying, many don’t understand what he means. He asks the student to begin to 
sense herself as if she were blind; first the face, then the sacrum, then the 
spine. Feldenkrais acknowledges that parts of the spine are likely not to be 
clear immediately; he recognizes that the attention he asks for comes with 
152
practice and without it there is no improvement; it is crucial to his method. In 
this lesson, although he starts with self-scanning whilst lying, he goes on to 
use movement to extend self-image. "Primary Image" and "Simpler" both work
with the idea of five cardinal lines. In "Simpler", he clarifies this to a ‘precise 
image of one long line so it draws the whole back - with the head above as a 
circle, with two lines for the arms, and with two lines for legs’ (2323).
The idea of five lines is often used in passing in ATMs, but here it forms 
the basis for the whole lesson and is expressed in a particular way of interest 
to me here18. He asks the student to imagine the length of the body line and 
distance of the limb lines from it and from the head, to sense the connection of
the shoulders and hips where there are dimples on the back, to sense the five 
lines in sitting with the legs a bit bent and arms parallel to floor, then to come 
into the same position as in sitting but on the back on the floor with arms and 
legs a bit bent in the air. As the lesson progresses he asks the student to roll in
various directions. He asks her not to think of ‘the real form’ but imagine just 
lines or straws and he underlines this idea throughout the lesson, asking for a 
‘concise image’ involving ‘imaginary abstract lines, fine, thin and light, without 
sensation, without any connection to reality’; ‘fine lines without any weight… 
without any substance’. His emphasis on ‘the essence of the image of the body’
(2315) is interesting; it is elusive for fleshy, emotional human beings, but it is 
what puppets concretize; they are what they are.
The way self-image is explored in AY 338-341 speaks very clearly to the
puppet as the concrete abstraction of an idea. Feldenkrais asks for a clear 
disassociation from the person’s embodied reality: 
18 It is also the basis for "Lesson 1: Scanning" in the Esalen 1972 series (Feldenkrais 
2012:1-7), but without the sense of abstraction of the fine lines without substance. It is 
notable that Feldenkrais starts this series of 43 lessons designed as a training to teach 
ATM with a lesson explicitly involving self-image and the five lines.
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The whole entire picture goes to the left. The whole picture means that 
you must make small movements if you do not want to ruin the 
relationship of these limbs in relation to reality because with one it can 
be that one shoulder is higher, one hip hurts, the stomach is fat, and the
head could be sick. This is not important. Do not get involved with it. 
Just see this imaginary drawn image that does not really have a real 
connection with the body except for these general lines. Do this 
movement until the moment it is possible to distinguish that this entire 
small drawing, this whole abstract image, moves a bit to the left. (2314)
The lines flow from the points (an image is given of the hip joints 12-15 cm 
above the floor); they are directions, ‘approximately the direction of the bones 
of the skeleton'; ‘content is just length and emptiness, without any sensory 
meaning…without volume, without weight, without size…just their direction and
their lengths’ (2316). This seems in some sense to be different to what 
Feldenkrais asks for much of the time, which is for the student to pay attention
to how she is actually doing a movement.
This essentialized and abstract notion of the body in the self-image 
might be seen as problematic, and perilously close to a Platonic concept of a 
world of Ideas versus a concrete reality of Forms. How can this essentializing 
be part of a method of becoming? I would argue because it is about the 
person’s ever-changing relationship with her sense of her ‘concise, abstract 
imagination of the body’ (2316) and by the fact that the student is asked to 
imagine it through the experiential process of movement. At the end of AY 340,
which continues to work with the theme of five lines, Feldenkrais asks the 
students to roll to the side to come to stand ‘Recreating the image the whole 
time’ (2335) (emphasis in the text19). He recognizes that our capacity to
19 The text is a translation of a transcript, but presumably gives a sense of Feldenkrais's 
stress.
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imagine is a potent source for improvement and that imagination is an ongoing
process from moment to moment. Perfection can be imagined and playing with 
this allows a person to play with the relationship between herself and her 
imagined self. 
Ingold writes that, ‘the shaman heals by dropping lines into the body,’ 
(2007:61) and while I am not entirely sure what he means by this20, it strikes a
chord with Feldenkrais's use of five lines. Ingold opposes the shaman to the 
Western surgeon who stitches up ‘the lines he already finds within the body’. 
He seems to contrast a Western approach to the surfaces and fragments of the
body with the shaman who drops lines into the person as a whole. ‘Dropping 
lines into the body’ could describe the work on self-image in FM. Sheets-
Johnstone has called the listening, noticing and paying attention in FM as 
reaching the ‘unlived lines of our bodies’ as we ‘reforge our body-image’ 
(1990:28). 
‘Scanning’ oneself is a process often included at the beginning and end 
of an ATM, in resting moments and sometimes occupying the whole lesson. It 
can take many forms, but involves asking students to become aware of 
themselves, of their weight or lightness on the floor, whether they feel as if 
they are sinking or floating, which parts of themselves are in/not in contact 
with the floor, the imprint they are making on the floor (in ink, or as if in 
sand), to imagine themselves as five lines, the relationship of parts to each 
other such distance of legs/arms from the mid-line, the distance of ear from 
shoulder on each side, the relative distance of parts of themselves from the 
ceiling (nose/toes/chest nearer), the skeletal connections throughout 
themselves and so on. The ways of scanning are limited only by the
20 Neither was a friend who is training to be a Shamanic Practitioner.
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practitioner’s imagination. I’ve been asked by Karzen to imagine myself sliced 
into virtual images by a machine working parallel to the floor I am lying on, so 
slivers (for me) first of nose, forehead, toes, chest, right side of pelvis, left 
side, front of lumbar vertebrae and so on through myself21. According to 
Karzen, Feldenkrais didn’t use scanning much in his lessons in AY22, but it has 
become something that is used, particularly in practitioner trainings, to develop
a sense of self-image. Karzen also points out, however, there are parts of 
ourselves that come in and out of awareness or consciousness, as if we don’t 
want to find or feel them. Haller draws attention to the fact that awareness and
perception of the skeleton is implicit; there is no nervous system in the 
skeleton itself and therefore no representation of it in the brain. Every other 
part of the person, the fascia, organs, musculature, tissue, cells and the 
periosteum around the bone have representations in the brain, but not the 
skeleton itself. The only way to feel your skeleton is in relation to something 
else; the environment.
The exploration of self-image through imagination is accepted as 
problematic; Feldenkrais’s biographer, amongst others, acknowledges that 
visualization rarely contains much kinaesthetic content initially but this comes 
with practice (Reese 2015:291). Schilder wrote that ‘the majority of subjects 
have enormous difficulties in imagining themselves in motion’ (2000:61). But 
rehearsing things one might say or do in the future is a normal activity and FM 
merely puts a specific emphasis on the movement aspect of that; refining a 
movement through imagination such that more of oneself is involved in it. I 
remember, for example, before becoming familiar with FM and before I had
21 Feldenkrais uses the image of the ceiling coming down to floor, asking what it would 
touch first; nose, chest, feet? (2012:189).
22 Although, as the examples explored here show, he did use it somewhat.
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undertaken any extensive performance training, my warm-up for a show which
was my first professional job23. It was very physical, with no spoken text apart 
from a little gibberish, and involved clowning, puppets, mask and acrobatics. It
was fast and precise. After setting up and warming up, I would lie semi-supine 
and imagine my journey through the whole show from start to finish. I was 
kinaesthetically imagining all the movement, including the breathing. In 
retrospect I see that I had intuited that imagining action was a good way to 
improve, and prepare for, my performance. I used my self-image in imagined 
motion to prepare rather than tire myself out doing it for real, saving my 
energy for the show itself.
In AY 303, Feldenkrais claims there is ‘a movement image, a sensory 
image, a feeling and thought image’ (vol. 7a:2081); he is working with the 
movement image as a route to influence the others. Self-image is a more 
intimate and fundamental layer than the body. It is the image one has of 
oneself as one acts; the person in the meshwork rather than as lump of flesh 
and bone on the slab of the world.
In ATM, any part of the body, self or self-image can be the centre or 
focus of action and thought, but it is necessary to move through different 
centres in order to be liberated from stasis within oneself and adherence to 
social norms of thought and behaviour. It can also be seen as the work of 
puppetry to move consciousness to different parts of the body, to move the 
centre of focus or action, and also to move consciousness and the centre out of
the body. Minh-ha writes, ‘thought is as much a product of the eye, the finger, 
or the foot as it is of the brain’ (261), and if thought, then also writing and 
creation. Her argument for the decentring and flexibility of centres of creation 
23 Playing Elise as part of a three-hander called No Man’s Land by Peepolykus, 1994-1995.
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and thought as a tenet of feminist practice fits well with the practices of FM and
puppetry as understood and discussed in this thesis.
4.5 Self-image in FI
In FI, an offer is made to align self-image with physical reality, or in 
Gallagher’s terms, to align body schema, body-image and physiology in 
gravity. In standing, an equal force is exerted from the earth's upthrust to that
of gravity down through me, hence my whole biotensegral structure becomes a
little smaller and stronger. As a practitioner working one-on-one, when I push 
through a supine student's bone I am looking at how clearly the movement 
travels through the whole person. ‘Push through’ is imprecise, but perhaps 
clearer than ‘expand and lengthen into’, which would more nearly describe 
what I aim to do. When I push through her foot I exert a much smaller force 
than the earth's upthrust (to say the least!), and she has a resting tonicity, and
is not using any muscles to balance or hold herself up (which may be her 
habit); her brain is less occupied. Since her vestibular and musculoskeletal 
systems are calm she is freer to sense the force travelling through her 
skeleton, which she can begin to sense as an object, almost independent of 
herself. The experience is often profound and lingers once the person stands 
up. FM teaches the person to allow the skeleton to support her, that is, to 
accept that she is part of the environment, not just in it.
With more experience of FM, I am progressively able to sense whether 
all of myself, all of my vertebrae, and so on, are involved in a movement and I 
have a more accurate sense of the distribution of my ‘five lines’; my limbs and 
abdomen when lying, and other aspects of self-image. If I can transmit force 
from the ground through my fourth toe to my cuboid, talus, calcaneum, tibia, 
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femur, pelvis, sacrum, spine, rib, sternum clavicle, humerus, ulna, hand to my 
student's fourth toe, the chances are the student will feel the transmission of 
this force throughout herself and therefore, when she stands up, she will have 
a precise sense of transmission from the ground to her head including the bony
connection through her fourth toe. The sense of security she gets from her 
connection to the ground allows her to sense herself. So, without intervening 
directly in a person’s thinking, and by using sensing and feeling with regards to
one’s own movement, through FM it becomes possible to shift the self-image, 
which in turn influences all movement, sensation, feeling and thought. FM uses
the discrepancies in, or the faultiness of, a person’s sense of self-image, or a 
sense of its fixity, to bring gaps in awareness to her attention. The attempt is 
more important than the realization. As Feldenkrais puts it, ‘We confine 
ourselves therefore to examining the motor part of the self-image. Instinct, 
feeling, and thought being linked with movement, their role in the creation of 
the self-image reveals itself together with that of movement’ (1990:12).
Haller says that Feldenkrais felt present wherever you touched him; he 
was omnipresent in himself, such that when Haller gave him a lesson, the way 
Moshe touched him back in effect gave him a lesson about his own 
organization (2010). I want to do some thinking about this loop towards 
puppetry. This is the heart of the matter in this thesis.
Using the skeleton accurately, without sheering forces going across it, 
should result in a feeling of weightlessness. There is then a conversation 
between ground (inanimate) and person (animate), but only one partner can 
actively reorganize itself. In FI, both partners can. In puppetry, only the 
puppeteer can, but the puppet is more complex than the ground; it may have 
articulations and issues of balance, depending on its size, method of 
manipulation and form. It is inanimate but has some attributes of the animate 
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to a greater or lesser degree; a body, joints, suppleness, responsiveness. And 
it is being used to portray life, or being brought to life, or animated. There are 
various ways of conceiving of what is happening, both from the outside and the
inside. It might also be thought of as being played like a musical instrument, 
but the puppet itself is asked to become something (alive, a character), not 
just produce a sound. Something happens in the space the puppet occupies, 
not beyond it (as with sound from an instrument). The puppeteer, like the FM 
practitioner in FI, needs to find stable support through her feet and skeleton in 
order to communicate with another body. In FI this body is a person with a 
CNS; in puppetry it is a puppet with no CNS. The puppet is pure materiality. I 
am conceiving of ‘puppet’ in rather general terms here, and actual puppets 
clearly range from the very simple to the very complex, but in principle the 
same point pertains to many kinds of puppet. While FI is a joining of two 
nervous systems, both in relation also to the ground, puppetry is a kind of 
simulation of this. The puppeteer takes a part of the material world and 
animates it by listening to the qualities and movements that emanate from its 
materiality. In FI, the practitioner listens to the qualities and movements that 
emanate from the materiality of another person. Practising FI is a good way to 
train touch for puppeteers with the potential for live feedback (puppets only 
give mute feedback) and puppeteering is a good way to sense non-muscle-
bound bodies in gravity and practise touch for FM practitioners (puppets are 
forgiving subjects, although it can hurt to see them maltreated or break!). 
Each offers the other a new perspective on touch and how one’s touch impacts 
what one is touching. The puppet also teaches me about gravity and my 
understanding of counterbalance, and moving in gravity informs my 
puppeteering.
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Haller draws on aikido and tai chi in his teaching of FM. He proposes an 
experience where one person stands, holding her arms out about belly height 
and another places his hands on hers, his thumbs on her wrists. The partners 
align the bones of their forearms. One offers gentle resistance to the other, 
who needs to find support through her skeleton such that, if the other moves 
away, her balance will not be compromised (201024). The exercise strikes me 
as an interesting one in relation to puppetry since the puppeteer is negotiating 
a similar area; how to maintain stability and person-image while listening to 
feedback from the other and maintaining the illusion of the other's person-
image. Neither the FM practitioner nor the puppeteer want to become like the 
other; the practitioner wants to give feedback which says ‘this is your skeleton,
you can find support here’, the puppeteer wants to use what the puppet is 
already doing and follow it, offering the minimal necessary support, whilst also 
projecting through it (story, a character). The processes are very close. The 
fullness of person-image in each allows for the practitioner or puppeteer to 
maintain her centre while acting as a conduit for what she senses from the 
other (person/puppet). 
4.6 Feldenkrais, Nora and puppetry
The Case of Nora (1993) is unusual in Feldenkrais’s writings for being a 
detailed case-study of a long-term FI student. It provides great insights into his
ways of working. I want to look at a few examples from it that further 
illuminate FI and illustrate that person-image is bound up with orientation and 
objects in the world. This is important for my argument since it demonstrates 
24 A DVD set entitled Learning Self-Organization. Marketed as an advanced training for 
practitioners, it is a module that Haller teaches in the third year of his basic practitioner 
training.
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that agency and freewill are meshworked and not solely in the domain of the 
subject and it enables me to make some points about puppetry and control.
Nora’s loss of a coherent self-image after a stroke leads to her being 
unable to interact with objects in the world in a meaningful way. She is unable 
to put her shoes on; Feldenkrais purposely puts them with the heels facing 
away from her and she doesn’t know what to do with them, nor which foot 
goes into which shoe. He writes, ‘Most people would be astonished … at the 
number of ways there are to be wrong … (and) how difficult it is to slide the 
feet in by chance. Orientation in space and in time gives direction and 
adroitness to whatever we do’ (1993:12). The shoes, although closely related 
to the body, compared to say a brick or a bucket (also related but less 
directly), are like strange objects to her. She knows they should go on her feet 
yet she is completely disoriented by them; she finds it impossible to integrate 
them into her self-image, or her self-image prevents her from finding a 
meaningful relationship with them. Likewise, she does not sit directly on a 
chair, but tries to ‘fit herself to the chair obliquely, hoping that by dint of 
proximity her bottom would fit the chair’ (12). And even after working with 
Feldenkrais for some time on left and right in her self-image, she spends ten 
minutes not managing to put her glasses on her face. As the mother of a 
toddler, I am reminded both of my daughter’s interest, from a very young age,
in trying to put my glasses on me, which took a while to learn, and of how, at 
two and a half, she was still frequently putting her shoes on the wrong feet 
(‘Banana feet!’ we would say and laugh). She started to self-correct this 
without prompting, possibly in response to my usual question, ‘Are you 
comfortable like that?’. Integrating the world into one’s self-image is a lengthy 
process and one that can be disturbed and regress. Feldenkrais notes of Nora 
and the glasses, that ‘even the transfer from body awareness to external 
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objects needs training,' and ‘orientation of objects relative to ourselves does 
not come from nowhere’ (30).
When employing a puppetry approach to performance-making, I want to
be able to play with this estrangement from the ‘affordances’ or ordinary uses 
of objects; I want both to develop a fuller person-image and to be able to 
enhance and reign in aspects of it in order to allow myself to play with all the 
‘ways there are to be wrong’. Hence the use of FM in theatre-making (with or 
without puppets) is not simply to improve performance (whatever that might 
mean), but also about allowing one to linger with the ‘mistakes’ and hear their 
poetry, or their novelty.
Feldenkrais writes about the process of Nora learning to read again. He 
wraps one hand and arm around her waist (to feel ‘the slightest changes going 
on in her’) and the other hand supports a straw she holds in her mouth with 
which they follow the words. (He wants to link the words seen on the page with
words formed in the mouth, which are experienced earlier developmentally.) 
He describes what happened as ‘a symbiosis of the two bodies’ (45). Nora 
leads, although she is the one who does not know, as it were; Feldenkrais has 
created a situation in which she can learn. He supports her action, and when 
she falters and stumbles over a word, he quickly supplies it; he does not allow 
her to ‘stiffen with anxiety’ as he puts it. An argument between them will halt 
the learning, for example, if he goes too quickly. This symbiosis is reminiscent 
of that between two (or more) puppeteers working together on one puppet 
where disunity will lead the puppet to lose its integrity, for example, if the feet 
go in a different direction from the head. (A puppet whose ‘body’ is in a state 
of contradiction might of course be explored intentionally as a theme.) Usually 
the person on the head (and often one arm) leads - as Nora does here - and 
the person on the feet and/or arm(s) follows, responds and feeds back 
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(Feldenkrais’s role) to the head operator25. In FM we learn that the head, and 
more specifically the eyes, lead or pre-empt the movement and, knowing this, 
we can play with it, placing constraints on the head so it does not move and 
paying attention to the movement of the eyes, or moving them in the opposite 
direction to what might be more habitual for a given movement. (If I turn to 
look over my right shoulder usually my eyes and head will go first, but I can 
also turn my shoulders to the right and my head and eyes to the left, or just 
my eyes to the left.)
 Juxtaposing FM and puppetry practice, neither the ‘head’ (Nora, or head
puppeteer) nor the ‘feet’ (Feldenkrais, or limb puppeteer) ‘lead’ or follow’, but 
act in symbiosis; herein lies the greatest potential for the puppet and it need 
not result in indecision or lack of clarity. Sometimes one leads, sometimes the 
other. The game is constantly passed between them. A distinction between the 
FI process and the puppeteering process is that in the second the desire might 
be to create conflict within the puppet, however, to do this also requires a 
symbiotic listening relationship between the puppeteers; they need to agree to 
disagree.
Craig Leo claims it is possible to arrive at a state of immanence when 
three puppeteers combine to produce one character, which is always different 
depending on the combination (War Horse Conference). He speaks of the 
importance of intention, claiming that the horse is in a sense willed to life, and 
the puppeteers forget their physical discomfort in the process. Three
25 My experience of multi-operator puppetry (often called Bunraku in English, after the Ja-
panese form), has mostly been with two puppeteers where one is on the head, pelvis and
arm, and the other on the feet, pelvis and arm. Unlike in Japanese Bunraku, the roles 
shift depending on what the puppet needs to do. For example, in a scene where a puppet
was horizontal ‘climbing’ up a waterfall, I was on the legs and the other puppeteer on the
head and outside arm. For a scene where the puppet was spun around as if on a merry-
-go-round, the ‘head’ puppeteer took control of the feet.
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puppeteers combine, or relinquish their person-images to produce a self-image
for the horse. The puppeteers train expanded awareness, peripheral vision and 
trust, playing games with layered tasks, as well as figuring out ergonomic 
solutions for how puppet and puppeteers mesh. Breath is important for 
communicating between puppeteers as well as for animating the puppet. They 
use yoga for stamina, flexibility and breadth; FM would also help train self-
organization in relation to others (puppeteers, puppet, gravity) and 'giving the 
game'.
Philippe Gaulier introduced 'giving the game' early in his theatre 
training, very simply through the act of passing a ball26. The task would be 
something easy - responding to some music, singing a children’s song or 
whatever - and you could ‘play the game’ when you had the ball. You needed 
to sense when to give up the game (the ball) and pass it to ‘your friend’. If the 
audience was enjoying what you were doing, this might mean playing with not 
giving the game. But the moment you had a sense of becoming ‘boring’ the 
ball had to fly27. This is also the game of major and minor; you are in major 
when you have the ball and in minor when you don’t.
In any theatre performance with two or more people playing together, 
‘le jeu’ (represented by the ball) needs to be kept up in the air. My major must 
not propel your minor out of the game, for example by pelting you with the ball
so hard that you can’t catch it, unless this is a game itself. In a multi-operated 
puppet this is even clearer; the legs might have a major moment - for 
example, in a show with French puppet company A.M.K. I stomp the puppet 
26 I took several workshops with Gaulier (Ecole Philippe Gaulier), 1994-5 in London; ‘Le 
Jeu’, ‘Neutral Mask’, ‘Greek Tragedy’ and ‘Clown’.
27 ‘Your friend’ and ‘boring’ are the specific terms I remember him using, often with fruitier 
language attached.
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legs faster and faster in a kind of savage dance while the head puppeteer is 
merely keeping the upwards tension in the puppet - but this works within the 
context set by the other puppeteer and by the puppet itself. Afterwards the 
game is passed back to the head. Puppet + puppeteers function as one 
organism with awareness and self-image. Sometimes the puppet itself takes 
the major role, that is to say, its material qualities outplay the way it is moved;
it is allowed to speak for itself. This might be at a moment where the 
puppeteer simply breathes through the puppet, and there is minimal 
manipulation, or even when the puppet pulls focus without being moved at all, 
when there is no puppeteer present. In Gisèle Vienne’s work there are often 
unpuppeteered puppets or mannequins which are nevertheless expressive 
through their materiality, for example in I Apologize, where they are 
dramaturgically endowed with major.
The dance of roles takes place in FM too. Feldenkrais gives Nora ‘the 
game’ but gently catches it when she drops it and hands it back to her. When 
giving a FI lesson the game is constantly passing between me and my student;
I see if she is ready to move here (catch the ball) and she responds (catches) 
or does not, in which case I try a different game or strategy, maybe returning 
to the first game later. Sometimes I give the game to her materiality; I let her 
rest and maybe she breathes or something settles or digests. By looking at 
these three processes in parallel - the play between performers, between 
puppeteers and puppet and between FM practitioner and student - their shared
territory becomes clear and the processes can speak to each other.
From looking at Feldenkrais’s work with Nora in relation to how self-
image is bound up with orientation and objects in the world, I arrive at a point 
of identifying the play between humans and nonhumans, and between action 
and rest in theatrical, puppetic and FI contexts. Person-image is central to how
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people act on and in, how they interact with, the world and it therefore impacts
on all human activity, from puppetry to international politics, from theatrical 
performance to economic performance. International politics and economic 
performance are, to say the least, outside the scope of this thesis! But it is 
nevertheless worth acknowledging that these diverse fields connect back to the
realm of human person-images, which are formed both individually and 
collectively through the expectations and interactions of parents and society 
with the individual as it grows.
4.7 Playing with self-image: beginnings but no endings
Nancy Galeota-Wozny is a dancer who lost her ability to see herself in 
the mirror as she danced. She writes about what she experienced as a loss of 
self-image and how FM helped reclaim an internal sense of self-image, having 
been reliant on the mirror for it previously. She expresses having had a 
fragmented, even a disappeared self. Using FM, she is able to ‘envision the 
self-image as an elastic, dynamic process that adapts to our needs to truly see 
ourselves and be seen by others’:
I did not so much relearn how to move, but to move in such a way that 
I became conscious of what was in the way of my moving. The path to 
three-dimensionality involved simultaneously additive and subtractive 
processes. I was filling myself in where I was missing and shedding 
habits that prevented me from moving fully. Daily practice of ATM allows
me to be available to the generosity of space and together we co-create.
I no longer think it's just about me expressing myself; sometimes I am 
expressing space. I mine space for ideas or perhaps space mines me for 
the same. The burden of creativity is shared and negotiated between 
myself and space. (Galeota-Wozny)
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In puppetry, space is also occupied with others with whom one shares the 
burden of creativity. The mirror can also become the puppeteer's trap, so that 
visual feedback is preferred over felt sense, even though what the puppeteer 
(and dancer) sees in the mirror is not what the audience will see since the 
puppeteer is not usually looking towards the audience (into the mirror)28. 
Galeota-Wozny observes, ‘you begin to move from your own authority’ and this
might seem problematic for the puppeteer; am I not moving from the puppet’s 
authority? However, thinking back to Haller’s exercise from tai chi, I must 
maintain my centre, my stability and my skeletal connection to the ground in 
order to puppeteer effectively. No matter how domineering the puppet or its 
character might be, or how much my imagination projects out and into it, our 
power together can only come from my (supple, dynamic, breathing) 
rootedness. It is this that allows me to negotiate the transformations of self-
image Galeota-Wozny describes; allowing the space and the puppet(s) to 
express me, or me them in a meshworked flow. This is the play.
The butoh artist Hijikata29 proposed, ‘Taking into your own body the idea
that your wrist is not your own,’ suggesting, ‘an important hidden secret in this
concept. The basis of dance is concealed there’ (Cull 114). In FM, there is an 
element of detachment at times, of observing the self in action, or about to be 
in action. What does my shoulder, or my hip, want to do? What I want, or what
I do, and what it wants to do as a physical thing in gravity are not always the 
same. (The difference between my person-image and how I actually am.) 
Hijikata’s idea speaks to puppetry too. (In the next chapter I look at where
28 Interestingly Schönbein, whose work I look at in Chapter 6, often uses a mirror as she 
develops her work, but seems to temper this experience by allowing her puppets to pos-
sess her, body and soul. The mirror is an 'étape de travail' or stage in her working pro-
cess.
29 I worked with his wife, Akiko Motofuji.
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Kleist’s seminal text on puppetry and dance fits into this story; Hijikata’s 
thought is close to the ideas explored by Kleist.) My hand alone (or my foot or 
shoulder-blade) can be a puppet. I play with whether this hand, or this puppet,
is part of my person-image or not. With a puppet, there are many choices. 
Kaplin's scale ranges from a puppet I incorporate into my person-image 
(nearer to mask or body-mask, or a set of false teeth) to a puppet that dangles
from strings from my hand to one I move remotely through some other device 
or technology. How do I choose to expand or contract my person-image? If an 
actor radiates into space to fill a theatre with his presence, a puppeteer focuses
her person-image through the puppet, and places it precisely where she 
chooses (ideally).
Ingold claims that while place (a knot) was ‘once a moment of rest 
along a path of movement, (it) has been reconfigured in modernity as a nexus 
within which all life, growth and activity are contained’ (2007:96). On this 
basis, it is also possible to conceive of the modern self as contained. Not 
actively moving, from place to place or in the knot, but being transported, the 
person-image shrinks. Not actively moving one’s attention or awareness, the 
person-image shrinks. Playing with it and its placement, which is done in 
complementary ways in FM and puppetry, helps it grow. Feldenkrais’s vision 
was of an enworlded, meshworked, social self-image, in a constant process of 
creative production and nothing like a static thing. In thinking about puppetry, 
I want to join a move away from discourse about objects and object relations 
towards an idea of a meshworked flow of action where objects are seen as 
verbs (Jones 264, War Horse Conference).
Some storytelling traditions eschew endings. Feldenkrais grew up in a 
Hasidic community and its stories often have elusive or riddling ends, like his 
ATMs. A puppet’s poetry often springs from its ‘incompleteness’, the way a few 
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characteristics or movement possibilities are essentialized within it, leaving it 
open to reconstruction by the person experiencing or watching it30. 
Understanding self-image involves switching between minute detail (how is my 
little finger involved) and the broad strokes, or function of a movement. I hope
that a picture is emerging here of the intertwining and open-ended practices of 
puppetry and FM as potent processes of aware-ing and person-imaging. As 
Ingold says, ‘Wherever you are, there is somewhere further you can go’ 
(2007:170).
30 As attested by Craig Leo regarding the War Horse puppets and puppetry; the puppets are
not perfect horse-likenesses and the process of creation happens anew each performance
(War Horse Conference).
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Chapter 5
Towards training: Awareness Through Puppetry
5.1 Transition from FM to puppetry
Can you learn all you need to know about puppeteering by paying 
attention to how you move? For Haller, the particularity of FM is the focus on 
increasing sensitivity to become more aware of what you’re feeling. Reese 
writes, 'Feldenkrais-trained means a kinesthetic depth completely divorced 
from technique. You can then do any damn thing with your hands and it will 
work because your sensitivity will be reliable' (2002:36). This minute sensing is
at the heart of puppetry too, however there is no right way. Puppeteer, Iestyn 
Evans, says (in a very Feldenkraisian spirit), 
Across theatre and film and television, I have heard of performers who 
believe that you can’t puppeteer unless you consider the “breath” of the 
puppet, and other performers who believe that the concept of breath is 
pretentious and unnecessary. They are both wrong. People should use 
the techniques that they are comfortable and confident with, stay 
curious and open minded to other techniques, and recognize that ways 
of working that feel wrong and unnatural to them might be perfect for 
someone else.
Some skilled practitioners don't need the concept of breath; perhaps they are 
already using it instinctively. A set of principles may not accommodate intuition
and emergent skill. You can be a satisfactory and even a very good technical 
puppeteer without increased awareness, but if your aim is always to improve, 
always to learn, then it is in this area that you can do it. Reese talks about 
kinaesthetic sensitivity as if it was not technique, but more like proto- or pre-
technique. Puppetry is not concerned with the limits of human movement in 
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the way some dance forms are - it is not concerned with movement per se - 
but with the observation of, and sensitivity to movement in oneself and in 
one’s materials. In this sense, FM as awareness and sensitivity-training offers a
good foundation for learning puppetry.
Although I have found the pairing of FM and puppetry frequently proves 
problematic, particularly on a conceptual level, one dealing with animate and 
the other with inanimate movement, I am looking at what the two practices 
offer each other, and the differences between the hard and soft realities each 
person experiences. The meshwork is a useful metaphor for visualizing the 
cohabitation of different kinds of life, slow/inanimate and (relatively) 
fast/animate and how these are caught up together. Is a tsunami or an 
avalanche inanimate? Movement and speed are not the sole domain of the 
animate and the movement of puppets taps into the physics of moving things 
to give the impression of bodies animated from within (Baker, Watson).
While FM explores developmental movement like sucking, rolling and 
moving on all fours, children don’t just play with their bodies in movement, but
with the world and its objects. A rediscovery of naïve, aimless object-play can 
be as powerful as that of primitive movement. Where FM focuses on 
defamiliarizing movement in order to discover it afresh, puppetry can take this 
idea and apply it to the defamiliarization of objects to bring awareness to one’s 
movement and thought-habits in relation to them. Where FM focuses on 
movement, a somatic approach to puppetry adds a particular focus on handling
or manipulation - a specific area of movement - and applies FM principles along
with puppetic attentiveness to enlarge the scope of both practices. FM and 
puppetry are both arts of listening or attending to. Any object exploration or 
performance that uses objects in a different way from that for which they were 
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intended is potentially an area for dishabituation - for both performer and 
spectator.
In the previous chapter, I began to suggest how FM can serve puppetry,
but also how puppetry might serve FM and an exploration of person-image. 
Taking Ingold quite literally, in this chapter I investigate the opportunities for 
growth that emerge from following lines of the meshwork in unexpected 
directions. The puppeteer puppeteers the puppet, right? But what can the 
puppet teach the puppeteer? The practitioner guides the student in FM, right? 
But how can the student guide the teacher? Feldenkrais said, ‘Bad teachers 
remain the best all their lives, and their pupils never overtake them’ (Amherst 
1980, 14 30:30). But it is also possible to move beyond the linearity implicit in 
the idea of overtaking; Ingold’s meshwork provides a conceptual model for 
situations where learning is constantly looping, and where the distinctions 
between teachers and students are blurred. What can things teach us? Or what
do they offer as guides?
Parmentier argues, ‘The brain is essentially anthropomorphic and reads 
the world, particularly movement in the world, in terms of its own experience,’ 
hence the puppeteer ‘has need of only the barest sketch of animal or human 
movement for this figure to be empathically filled in as a living entity’ (162). In
this case, the ‘experience’ of the brain, which might also be called person-
image, profoundly affects how it ‘reads the world’. In order to enrich my 
reading of the world I can fill out my person-image, and I can consciously use 
things in the world to do this. In relation to actors, Sofia contends that, ‘the 
pre-reflective status of the body schema’s activation prevents the actor from 
willingly inhibiting it, so that he has to construct a rather artificial body schema
in order to attend a higher pre-reflexive control, different from our daily pre-
reflexive experience of it’ (78). He claims this artificial schema is constructed 
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differently according to different acting traditions but usually involves 
deconstructing neuromotor routines and reconstructing new ones in their place,
'at a different level of control'. This could describe what happens in a FM 
lesson. Adding a puppet into this mix complicates matters; the artificial body 
schema needs not only to be constructed, but to be transposed onto, or 
projected into the puppet.
In his study of ‘manipulacting’1, Piris states:
Acting and puppetry entail two different forms of body schema. In 
acting, the body schema of the actor is characterised by his own body 
on stage interacting with other performers or props. In puppetry, the 
experience of the world of the character is evoked through the puppet 
and requires the puppeteer’s body to experience the world in another 
way than the actor’s body. The body schema encompasses two bodies: 
the actual body of the puppeteer and the apparent body of the puppet. 
(2012:57)
However, prior to experiencing the world in another way, the puppeteer’s work 
relies on an intimate understanding of her own 'body schema' or person-image 
in order to play with this between herself and her puppet(s). Where puppeteer 
and puppet are co-present, Piris argues there needs to be a ‘hybridization of 
the two forms of body schema’ (2014:31). This idea lacks a sense of 
directionality in terms of focus and movement; person-image, or body schema,
are not things but processes or becomings, therefore, in terms of the puppet, 
there is not so much a hybridization as choices around how to play with body 
schema via person-image. Piris proposes interestingly however that 'the 
puppet is not an Other but the image of an absent Other' (41), hinting at a 
play with person-image by the puppeteer. In Chapter 6 I return in greater
1 A term first used by Annie Gilles in 1994 (Piris 2012:17).
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depth and with concrete examples to his argument.
The more distinct from the performer the puppet is, the more complex 
the exchange of person-image. A piece of clothing or a mask might transform 
my person-image by calling me to inhabit it. There is an intermediate step 
where puppets are worn and parts of myself are ‘loaned’ to the puppet (my 
legs are the puppet’s legs for instance). But many puppets are not worn, in 
which case to what extent can they still be considered to be incorporated into 
the puppeteer’s person-image? Perhaps puppetry using non-worn puppets 
involves creating the sense that the puppets are not extensions of the 
puppeteer at all, but have independent person-images of their own. Such that 
my aim as a puppeteer is not only to give the impression the puppet thinks, 
but that it has a person-image, which is to say that all of it thinks; thinking is a
body thing, not just a head or brain thing2. My understanding of person-image 
as process relates more to the puppet as verb (Jones) than to Piris's fixed body
schema.
5.2 Towards 'Awareness Through Puppetry'
Puppetry is an art of movement, so let’s play with the idea of Awareness
Through Puppetry, in the vein of Awareness Through Movement. They are very 
much connected. There is no puppetry without movement and no movement as
we know it without things (principally a world) to push against, or move in 
relation to. Puppetry and FM are both involved in sensing and moving things (I 
could also say bodies), or moving with things, or again, suggesting movement 
to or giving impulses to things, inside and outside oneself, or choosing how 
2 In wonderful contradiction, Jones of Handspring acknowledges the thinking which 'refers 
to the totality of the movement the puppet makes' (266) while War Horse puppeteer, 
Tommy Luther, claims the thought process 'comes from the head' (Kohler 145).
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much inner movement to send outwards. The human being is of course not a 
thing like another, but it is nevertheless a material entity that can be touched 
and moved and it shares this with things. Both puppeteers and FM practitioners
learn to move bodies outside themselves such that those bodies express 
something they didn’t before. The puppeteer starts with an inanimate body 
and, some would say, brings it to life. But, following Barba’s idea of the actor’s 
extra-daily balance, one might also say she simply finds some kind of extra-
daily relationship with the thing; she pays it more attention than is usual with 
things in daily life. Barba identifies ‘precarious’ extra-daily balance as a 
characteristic ‘common to actors and dancers from different cultures and times’
and claims that the ‘extra effort dilates the body’s tensions in such a way that 
the performer seems to be alive even before he begins to express’ (Barba and 
Savarese 32). The puppeteer’s extra-daily attention does the same for the 
puppet, and, in a way, is also a question of balance; a balance of both focus 
and physics, as the puppeteer’s centre of gravity is shifted outside herself and 
she throws an imaginary centre of gravity into the puppet. Depending partly on
her skill, which one would hope would progressively develop but which doesn’t 
always3, and partly on the in-built expressivity of the puppet or object, she and
her viewer if she has one4 will be more or less bewitched or caught up in the 
thing’s expressivity.
Something as simple as switching hands when puppeteering to use one's
less habitual side can refresh one's practice. Bringing awareness to 
3 An aikido-ka said to me recently that we always get better with practice. I beg to differ; 
it is just as easy to practise bad habits as good ones, so improvement does not always 
result from practice. And aikido in particular is structured to maintain the sensei’s posi-
tion in the hierarchy.
4 My concern in this chapter is not uniquely with puppetry as a performance mode, but 
more with it as a practice that brings something to the doer - whether in professional 
training, amateur practice, schools or medical research; see Kneebone for a collaboration
between puppeteers and surgeons as an example of its non-performative applications.
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asymmetrical organization for movement is a central tool in FM (Worth). Some 
puppeteers work ambidextrously, and these can observe differences between 
using their left and right sides. But even a master such as Stephen Mottram 
admits to not changing hands if he can help it. Perhaps he is missing out on 
taking his mastery to another level!
The FM practitioner starts with a responsive live human body and works 
through touch and/or words. (Puppeteers are not necessarily in direct physical 
contact with the things they animate; they might manipulate light or air5 to 
animate things and words might ‘animate’ a still puppet in that the animation 
occurs in the imagination of the audience. What the puppeteer does is part of a
wider semiotic whole including lights, set, audience and so on.) The student of 
FM will respond partly in accordance with his person-image and how adept he 
is at using his attention, and partly in accordance with how well the practitioner
finds a way to communicate with him (which is to say, how full the 
practitioner's person-image is and how adept she is at using her attention).
Where is my awareness as a puppeteer, or what is aware? It is not just 
my puppeteering hands. Puppetry is not in the hands even when these provide 
the interface with the puppet; the arms (and hands) have to grow out of the 
ground (to paraphrase Haller). The materiality of the puppet itself responds to 
my input; a new quality of movement is born by this exchange between 
puppeteer and puppet. I can include a puppet in my person-image (my knot 
engulfs the puppet, bringing it in to me), I can draw the line of the puppet 
tighter into my knot, I can extend my person-image into a puppet (I grow my 
lines towards the puppet), I can endow the puppet with person-image (I
5 Italian shadow puppetry company, Gioco Vita, often animates by moving the light 
sources rather than the puppets; French company, Non Nova, use electric fans to anim-
ate plastic bags in L’aprés-midi d'un foehn ("L'aprés-midi").
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project a tangle for the puppet). These are not quite the same. Jean-Louis 
Heckel, former pedagogical head of ESNAM6, says that to be a good puppeteer,
you need to be a good actor7. I understand this as meaning you need to be
able to create an artificial body schema, or person-image, then inhibit it in 
yourself and put it in something outside yourself, and be able to play with this. 
You are involved, as a puppeteer, in sending movement and energy outwards, 
but also in receiving a response from your material.
As Evans points out (above), there are no right answers in puppetry (or 
FM). Whilst typically a more supple, more articulated puppet will be more 
expressive and possibly more receptive of a person-image with which I endow 
it, the expression a puppeteer might want may well come out of her 
relationship with a stiff cardboard cut-out, or some pebbles8. Meaning arises 
from the articulation of all the semiotic elements present in the performance, 
including the space or setting and the audience itself. While FM can help the 
puppeteer learn about human movement, it also prepares for thinking in 
gestalts and working on spontaneous action.
FM trainer, Larry Goldfarb, writes of FI in his introduction to 
Feldenkrais's book, The Master Moves: 
In this work, practitioner and pupil are in touch communication. The 
practitioner does nothing. But it is not the “nothing” of passivity. The 
practitioner feels what is necessary for the pupil’s learning and through 
the double feedback loop, pupil and practitioner, the pupil experiences a
6 Also formerly director of Nada Théâtre; now director of La Nef - Manufacture d’Utopies, 
Pantin, France.
7 In various conversations; it is a theme to which he returns.
8 I made a show once with a cast of metre rules; Le Mètre, 2007, La Nef - Manufacture 
d’Utopies, Pantin, Paris.
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new pattern of possibility. Such a communication requires a synchrony, 
and active linking of sensory and motor processes between practitioner 
and pupil, what Moshe called, “dancing together”. (1984:6-7)
While this can’t be transferred directly to one-person puppeteering in that the 
puppet does not have a nervous system or the ability to act on its own, it 
relates to the work of the puppeteer in listening and responding to the material
qualities and feedback from the puppet. In Chapter 2, I refer to a masterclass 
with master string puppeteer, Christopher Leith, where, hanging around with 
our puppets, we were in a similar passive listening state to that described by 
Goldfarb. Two or more person-puppeteering is nearer to “dancing together” in 
Feldenkrais’s sense since the nervous systems of two or more people are 
connected through the puppet. The relationship between two puppeteers and 
one puppet could be simplified, for example, to holding a bamboo stick 
between an index finger or the palm of a hand of each puppeteer9. Here the 
sense of how much each of us is ‘doing’ becomes clear and it is possible to 
explore a zone where neither person leads.
Although I have no experience of puppeteering giant puppets such as 
those of Royal de Luxe, I imagine that there is a vestige of ‘sensing’ what the 
other puppeteers are doing, although they must use a lot of visual feedback 
too (Royal de Luxe). Even if we are not puppeteering the same puppet, if we 
share a stage we are negotiating space together in a shared rhythm of 
performance that also involves this kind of passive but not inactive listening. 
Charleroi Danses' Kiss and Cry is a good example of this in a context which is 
not traditional puppetry. Hands are the dancers and miniature sets the 
‘castelets’; along with film crews, they occupy a large space together as this
9 This is an exercise I first came into contact with in the L.E.M. at Lecoq.
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romantic tale is woven, filmed and projected live, to take on epic proportions. A
hand-performer’s arm is passed around a camera operator’s shoulder as they 
create the live-filmed scene together; a dance between camera, performer and
set. The whole cast and crew dance together in a sensitive choreography which
is present as background breath to the cinema scale projections. 
Whether the puppet-puppeteer relationship is direct, involves one or 
more other people or is reified in space, how does person-image come into 
play? In AY 496: "The face" (vol. 10b:3379-3386), Feldenkrais asks the 
students, with eyes closed and without the use of their hands: 
In which place do you distinguish the border where the nose ends in 
space? … find the transition from the nose to “not-nose”… approximately
in the space around … Begin on the face from something that is close to 
oneself, from inside the mouth. From inside the space of the head 
distinguish the nose and pay attention at which place there is no nose …
not the form of the nose, but the transition from the nose to the 
surrounding. Where does it stop? Where does it begin in the air? (3379)
Using the notion of going from the proximal, ‘something close to oneself’, to 
the peripheral (here the tip of the nose), Feldenkrais wants to clarify the 
boundary between self and not-self. This relates to the use of focus in object 
manipulation; to create a sense of autonomy or life in the object in my hands, I
need a clear sense of where I end and it begins. Then I can play with how I 
direct the audience’s attention. I can clearly delineate between the object and 
me, so that they see both and they see two, I render it so that they see the 
object (one), I can merge with the object so that they see one (as in body 
masks such as those of the Bahaus), and I can merge so that they see two 
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intertwined10. All are dependent on a clear sense of my boundary. However, if a
thing can become part of my body schema, as I hope a puppet can so that I 
can use it precisely, can I also extend my sense of boundary to include a thing 
or material? On the one hand, I might want to do this to feel familiar and at 
one with my puppet, but on the other, I might want to be able to give the 
impression that the puppet has its own body schema and person-image, 
separate from me.
Being able to play with the boundary is key. Influenced by cybernetics, 
Feldenkrais writes:
When a group of substances gets a boundary - in our case the skin - it 
separates that matter from the rest of the world, and makes an outside 
world and me. Now, the boundary creates the situation that the outside 
world and myself are actually the same thing; because the piece of 
matter that is the boundary cannot exist by itself, it must gain means of 
acting, thinking, moving, sensing. And to produce activity, it must have 
energy, which can only come from the outside. We take air, water, food,
and we reject what is useless. Now, all these things pass through the 
boundary; therefore individualisation means separating the world into 
an individual and an outside world, and the relation between that 
individual matter and the rest of the matter, the piece of matter in the 
boundary and the rest of the matter, involves continuous interchange. If
that interchange ... is interfered within its continuity and its simplicity, 
then there is illness either in the world or in the person, or in both. 
(1984:36) 
Feldenkrais’s description of the organism recalls Ingold’s meshwork; the 
organism is a knot of lines, trailing in and out. The concept of the person as the
sum of her actions in the world is useful with regards to puppetry and a
10 Rene Baker sets an exercise playing with focus where the audience sees just the puppet, 
just the performer or both ("The Puppet", "Who do you see?")
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puppetry approach to theatre-making. Puppetry is an art which magnifies 
action in the world for an audience, in the way swinging an axe magnifies the 
force I put into the action so that I can chop wood, and the hammer magnifies 
the hardness of my skeleton and provides me with a surface through which I 
can express this hardness without damaging my soft flesh. The puppet is a tool
which magnifies action and as such it carries with it a certain level of 
responsibility.
Schilder was in no doubt, and Feldenkrais concurs, that ‘Our relation to 
the earth, to gravity, is an outstanding factor for the mechanics of movement 
and for the perception of the body-image’ (2000:174). This seems almost too 
obvious to state but it is the very ubiquity of gravity, as well as the human’s 
biotensegral/biomechanical experience of it, that makes it easy to overlook. I 
contend that puppetry and object theatre require one to relinquish one’s goals 
and discover how the thing one is working with moves (in gravity), what life it 
has, what it might say or how it might express through its muteness. This is 
perhaps true to an extent of all art-making involving physical materials such as
paint or stone, and even to a lesser extent art-making which uses more 
abstract materials such as words, musical notes or computer programming. But
pre-rational, aimless play with materials is fundamental to puppetry, which on 
a basic level involves moving with materials and discovering their movement11. 
It is also central to FM and connects back to the developmental movement of 
babies as they explore and hone person-image. Without this play the puppet 
becomes a cliché manipulated by human hands and minds; the least 
interesting option when puppet can also mean bridge, go-between, connecter 
or translator between human and nonhuman worlds. It is this potent, political,
11 Baker is an important proponent of this approach in her teaching on puppetry courses 
and workshops internationally.
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powerful and unpredictable puppet that interests me. 
I propose then that FM can open up and enhance one’s experience and 
exploration of this powerful puppet. Built into FM is the eschewing of goals, a 
return to the first level of exploratory or epistemic play (what does this do?)12, 
where a baby discovers her body and how to move and organize it in gravity 
against different surfaces of resistance. What can we learn from things 
(including the world thing we are on/in/along)? How do things inform person-
image?
5.3 Things as guides / miming the world (Jacques Lecoq)
Lecoq, my most important theatre teacher, asked us to mime the world,
its objects, elements, materials and dynamics. This is how children come to 
know the world: ‘the act of miming is an important one, an act of childhood: 
the child mimes the world in order to know it and to prepare him/herself to live
it ... Mime is to become one with and therefore understand better’ (1997:33)13.
Mime for him is being able to play an other (‘un autre’), to give the illusion of 
any thing (‘toute chose’). We mimed, or became one with, objects, plants and 
animals, materials, colours, spaces, buildings, rooms, cities… in a training 
which brought us to know ourselves through our (re)discovery of the world. 
But Lecoq also saw a use for mime to heighten awareness of habit; he
12 A concept introduced to me by Baker in a workshop in 2013, Corinne Hutt identified dif-
ferent modes of play; epistemic play is exploratory play where knowledge of things is ac-
quired, driven by the implicit question, 'What can this object do?', and ludic play is driven
by the question, 'What can I do with this object?'. Both have a role in theatre-making, as 
well as games with rules. Later in this chapter I consider the use of the imagination in FM
and how this is a mode of play. 
13 My trans. of ‘l’acte de mimer c’est un grand acte, un acte d’enfance: l’enfant mime le 
monde pour le reconnaître et se préparer à le vivre … Mimer, c’est faire corps avec et 
donc comprendre mieux.’
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suggests a bricklayer whose acts have become automatic through repetition 
will rediscover the sense, weight and volume of the brick by miming his action;
‘Mime allows you to discover the thing afresh’14. This is close to the FM 
practices of becoming aware of what one does in an habitual movement and of 
refining a movement through imagining it. It is also a way of studying how the 
brick becomes part of one’s body schema. The idea of imagining, then miming 
one’s gestures as a puppeteer could be used in puppetry training for somatic 
feedback.
Hinting at this, puppeteer and FM practitioner, Nicolas Gousseff, asks, 
‘What do I retain of my imprint, of the way I touched something? What can my
hand give when it touches something? What does my hand know? What do the 
imprint and the grasp know? The hand is the site of all grasping, all imprints, 
so it’s the memory of all objects. So, do we need the objects in fact?’ 
(Fredricksson 241). He acknowledges the way things have collaborated in the 
making of person-image, so that their presence persists in us. However, the 
presence of the object, or the embodiment of the thing is part of what 
nourishes its absence. Without anchorage in the thing, the mime floats, 
physically and semiotically. Human dexterity is the product of relationships 
with the things people touch. The things of technology are an extension of 
human dexterity, not to be mistaken as things in themselves with a force of 
their own (Adorno 200). To grasp this, a constant exchange between somatic 
awareness and thing awareness is needed. Mime in Lecoq’s sense can be added
to a Feldenkraisian use of the imagination in the arsenal of ‘a differentiated 
education’, to use Adorno’s term.
A somatic approach to puppetry offers the opportunity to develop one’s
14 My trans. of ‘Mimer permit de découvrir la chose de manière plus fraîche.’
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parallel sensation and observation of oneself and one’s puppet; the dual focus 
expands on an idea already present in FM where students fill out their sense of 
self-image and develop the capacity to split their attention simultaneously 
between parts of themselves and between parts and the whole. Puppetry as a 
somatic technology extends this out into the world, thus lending a potentially 
ethical slant to it as a practice as my me-world and world-me lines of attention 
grow.
By assimilating ourselves to things, becoming things as puppeteers, 
perhaps we can learn lessons about ourselves as well as about things and what
it’s like to be a thing, or treated like a thing. Rather than an education which 
treats people like things, if students were asked to play at being things they 
might discover something more about themselves and their person-images in 
relation to each other. Total assimilation to the thing, however, is potentially 
dangerous. As Gross notes of Pinocchio, he easily becomes violent, smashing 
the cricket against the wall, using the hardness of his wooden matter against 
the small insect. Gross notes the view of him as ‘something of a Fascist’ (ch. 
1), casting Fascism as involving people developing the capacity to act as if 
made of inert matter, with no capacity for sensing feedback from their actions. 
Unsurprisingly, the story of Pinocchio is often told with puppets. Puppets can 
take a physical battering, and give one, as seen in the Sicilian Opera dei Pupi. 
Blumenthal cites Jarry's Ubu plays where puppets 'get impaled on spikes, sliced
in half, flushed down toilets, and expelled from a pig’s anus' (88) and Francis 
delights in one of Zaloom's reasons for choosing to work with puppets; 'you 
can hurt them and throw them out the window and not get into trouble' (19 
n.8). They are useful for allowing us to play with and speak of violence and 
violent acts without inflicting violence on humans. However, acts of violence 
with and through the puppet are mastered or intentional, and in this they differ
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from unpremeditated acts and require as much awareness from the puppeteer 
as the gentlest caress. But puppets are capable of speaking of human power 
and agency over the material world in such a way that they offer a site for 
reflection on this agency and its implications. 
I cannot help observing, as the mother of a two-year old, how my 
daughter tests the softness and (particularly) hardness in her environment by 
bashing and hitting things, as if testing how her own hardnesses and 
softnesses meet others in the world. The violent treatment puppets often get 
and call for seems to be related to the childish instinct to bash things; it is a 
way of discovering where I end and the thing or world starts, and also a way of
realizing that it hurts to hit things (or people) and some things get broken if 
you smash them (or they hit you back). Perhaps an educational place for 
pretending to be things, materials, elements, animals and other nonhumans 
offers a chance to develop a broader sensitivity to the implications of one’s 
actions in the world. Mime in this sense takes on an ethical value as well as 
having benefits for the imagination and observation of the world, the qualities 
it is used to develop in Lecoq’s pedagogy. For the puppeteer it becomes an 
exercise in empathy; how do my instruments of performance ‘feel’ about how I
treat them?
Puppets can help people recognize themselves as things, as material 
bodies, and in this recognition lies a fuller image of our humanity. In the same 
way Feldenkrais talks about completing the self-image, it is possible to think 
about completing the species-image, or the human-image, to include all those 
difficult facets that often get called ‘evil’. FM offers a method for improving 
awareness; self-awareness, species-awareness and environment-awareness, 
the three being inextricably linked such that work on one will also have an 
effect on the others. Puppetry offers an added awareness, a specific kind of 
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environment-awareness pertaining particularly to how I handle things. 
Puppetry as a somatic practice (Awareness Through Puppetry: ATP) holds a 
space between FM and puppetry, stakes out a new territory and offers a 
particular practice.
5.3.1 Things as guides / monomotivation and intention (Dennis Silk)
Consider the concentration in a shoe-brush. It is all wood and bristle 
with a task in hand… It has such dramatic talent./ It has one fixed stare.
It is the thing-stare, the stare of the force which won’t be diverted from 
its aim, and will explode on stage. (Silk 228)
Silk sees things not always as an end in themselves but as guides for ‘personal 
actors’, echoing Lecoq’s practice of miming the world. He imagines the 
‘playgoer’ asking ‘isn’t it a little frivolous, a little whimsical, to deprive the 
personal actor of part of his function, and to search out instead the dramatic 
life in a shoelace, a bicycle pump, a hair dryer?’ but categorically states: 
The playgoer is wrong. It’s because the personal actor has lost the thing
in himself, the strong concentrated thing, that we turn to a theater of 
the thing15. He’s squandered his strength in a hundred personal 
emotions which he then inflicts on his role. But the thing-actor has 
guarded its strength. It's a form of locked up energy… The personal 
actor should be locked up in a furniture warehouse an entire week and 
study the concentrated life in a chair, a table, a commode - the 
unhurried life. (228)
Silk is interested in the monomotivation of the thing. It is an extreme and 
perhaps only partially convincing proposition (more of a provocation?). Gross 
15 Lecoq also said, during my training, that mime, or silence, resurged when there was a 
crisis in theatre and it needed renewing.
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observes that Silk’s thinking is part of a tradition of writers who latch onto the 
puppet to help them think about theatre, including Kleist, Shaw, Craig, Brecht, 
Ghelderode, Lorca and Artaud (ch. 2). He identifies the power of thing-ness ‘to 
show us something of the mechanical side of human life itself, and how it 
conditions the movements of its manipulator. Each depends on the other’ (ch. 
5). Gross also muses on the expressive capacity of things; ‘I am always drawn 
to the idea of life in nonliving things, the sense of animation in what appears 
inanimate ... There is a moment when this lifeless object seems not just moved
but self-moving, a thing with a soul, a need, a desire, a power of sensation, an 
intent of its own’ (Coda). He could be describing the moment the object 
becomes a puppet and, ironically, it is not that it appears manipulated, as the 
everyday use of the word ‘puppet’ or expression ‘puppet-like’ might suggest, 
but precisely that it appears to be alive and self-moving, as if possessed of a 
person-image.
Similarly, in a person’s movement, when she appears to move in 
harmony with her need, desire or intention, she appears to stand taller in 
gravity and no longer to be dragged down or moulded by the outside world. 
There is a sense of physical life, where physical means obeying the laws of 
physics, emanating from the person as she takes her appropriate space and 
stature in the world. A very tall man no longer stoops to bring himself down to 
the level of other people; a violinist’s posture no longer retains the shadow of 
her instrument; an office worker no longer has a chest caved in from sitting 
hunched over a computer. The capacity to swing between sensing oneself as a 
flesh and bone object in gravity as well as a person acting in the world is 
essential in FM and is a useful emphasis when using the method with puppetry.
Complete person-image aligns with physical reality.
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Things too can swing between their thingness and their aliveness; 
articulating this swinging is the art of puppetry. Silk imagines ‘Thing Theater’ 
where ‘things are granted a higher dramatic status than in the theatre of the 
personal actor’ (228). He goes beyond Lecoq: 
A real acting school would have classes where personal actor and shoe 
brush study together. The personal actor would imitate the mask-like 
force of the shoe brush, the shoe brush the attack and variety of the 
personal actor. And a real theater would oscillate between a vivid 
personal life and a massive thing life. Health, in the theater as in life, 
concedes these two extremes. (229)
Gross echoes the sense that observation of thing life has a lot to offer:
To find this life in objects returns us to life, to the experience of life 
arriving from inside us and outside us, in all of its surprise, its energy of 
conflict. The thought of life has to do with how things survive. The idea 
of life in the object is also something fought over. We wrestle with an 
unsuspected form of life as with an angel, as if to steal from the object a
blessing, to receive a new name even as we rename the object. (Coda)
There is an echo of the Feldenkraisian non-habitual here. In The Potent Self, 
Feldenkrais, partly in reaction to a psychoanalytical view of cross-motivation 
(which, however, he demonstrates is unnecessary in order to understand or 
overcome it), aims to show why monomotivation is desirable for a person and 
how to achieve it. In his talk, On Awareness (1971), he gives the example of 
the impossibility of solving an equation when angry. A clear parallel can be 
seen between Silk’s analysis of the ‘monomotivated’ brush, at one with its 
function, and Feldenkrais’s monomotivated human, whose intention is 
expressed precisely in her action. Feldenkrais writes:
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The ideal conscious action corresponds to a clearly recognized unique 
motivation. The conscious act is monomotivated, and the skill of acting 
consists in acquiring the ability of inhibiting and excluding all the 
parasitic elements that tend to enact themselves by habit, conditioning, 
and stereotyped motion. Most of the time we fail to achieve what we 
want by enacting more than we are aware of, rather than by missing 
what is essential. (2002:20) (His italics.)
He is inciting us to become one with the function we wish to perform, which, in 
Silk’s universe, is to be thing-like. Feldenkrais asks us to become minutely 
aware of a shoulder-blade, a finger, a foot and so on, oscillating back and forth
to a sense of one’s whole self during rests in the lesson and at the end when 
we reintegrate into the world of moving vertical bipeds involved in society, with
a refreshed person-image.
Silk’s muster of theatrical players includes ‘the personal actor, the thing-
actor, the mask’ (a fractional puppet) as well as the puppet and ‘parts of the 
human body, a finger or a toe for instance, when considered in detachment 
from the parent body’ when they ‘become things in their own right’ (229), or, 
as Jurkowski sees it, with a slightly different accent, ‘the hand as material’ 
(2000:63). I would argue that FM facilitates an exploration of these ‘finger-or-
toe-thing(s)’ as well as an exploration of a person’s intimate interaction with 
them, and that this can also be extrapolated outwards, so that it facilitates the 
exploration of thing-things, mask-things and puppet-things, to use Silk’s 
terminology. Silk identifies a fear of animism: ‘We’re afraid of the life we’re 
meager enough to term inanimate. Meager because we can’t cope with those 
witnesses’ (240)16. The me-as-thingness aspect of FM opens up the possibility 
16 He is echoed by Schumann; 'We who think of ourselves as subjects don't even know don-
keys well enough, not to speak of fence posts and rocks, to which we assign the job of 
object, because we haven't discovered their individuality yet' (48).
190
to approach animism from within, where the human is part of the material 
world and can sense and imagine herself as concrete object, material, or 
inanimate thing. Transformation of the person-image comes about partly 
through developing sensitivity to my skeletal, thingy self in movement.
Silk seems to imagine that the thing too can ‘learn’, although its 
learning is presumably tied up with the actor, who learns to bring out more of 
its potential, or invent more ways of playing with and through it. But doesn’t 
the thing too have habits? A mug has a handle by which it has frequently been 
held, a chair invites me to sit where it is worn from all those sitters, a book’s 
thumbed pages ask to be opened where the spine is already cracked, a 
staircase shows me where to tread from the wear on its carpet. Not quite 
Gibsonian affordances, these qualities are more like the object-images of these
objects; they are the ways they have already been used which have marked 
them. But, approached in non-habitual ways, these things are openings to 
other worlds, other imaginaries. Where else can I put my hands? How does it 
want to move? How else could I sit on or hold it to give it a rest from its habit 
or a new experience? How does it + me enlarge its existence? What is the 
specific story it has to tell now within the cumulative one that it wears? These 
are the kinds of questions I have in my mind as an FM practitioner in FI 
(replacing it with him/her) but also as a puppeteer.
Chairs, for example, have a long history of metamorphosis in 
contemporary theatre, from Kantor to Complicité, to name only two of the 
most famous non-habitual chair-users in theatre17. In a show called Rose by 
French puppet company A.M.K., based on Gertrude Stein’s The World is Round,
we puppeteered an articulated chair which referred to Rose, the main 
17 Eleanor Margolies devotes a chapter to chairs in her PhD thesis and writes about both 
Complicite and Kantor in depth.
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character, in an episode in her imagination. The chair was a jointed version of 
one she had in her nursery room, suggested in our setting for the staging (fig. 
7). The anatomy of the chair, even before it is deconstructed and articulated, 
clearly speaks of the human body. Is it only objects that refer to the human 
body, tools or human-made things that have ‘habits’ or habitual and non-
habitual ways of using them? A leaf or a rock also has 'habits'; what it normally
does without interference. Watson's Ephemeral Animation project (from 2009) 
was inspired in part by Silk (Watson 2012) and sought to capture the secret 
lives of things. Puppetry, or object theatre, is about finding the non-habitual 
lives of things (endowing them with self-image, or a history), and FM about 
exploring the non-habitual in human movement. There is common ground.
Fig. 7 Krystin Fredricksson and David Lippe puppeteering an articulated chair in Rose, Cie 
A.M.K., 2005. Image © Cécile Fraysse.
192
Puppetry and FM accept that there is a way the thing or body wants to 
move which is dependent on physics. FM explores the expressiveness or 
variations accessible to a person within the bounds of what is functional and 
non-destructive. With things and materials there is also the option to go 
beyond this, for example a paper puppet might be burnt or an ice puppet might
melt18; the thing is no longer, it can be destroyed, it can ‘die’. But a new piece 
of paper can remake the lost thing. With a human being this destruction means
death. This is blindingly obvious. Yet the misused energy in the system, that 
leads to sheering forces that work against the skeleton and lead to the slow 
destruction of the organism, is accepted by many as normal ageing. I can’t 
help thinking of the Monty Python chocolate box sketch in which the surprise 
selection includes a ‘lightly killed’ frog covered in glucose ("Monty Python")! It 
is as if lightly killing ourselves to achieve certain ends is alright. Returning to 
Silk, perhaps things can learn variation, expression and the non-habitual from 
people, and people from things, the need to remain within certain physical 
limits in order to survive and thrive.
Learning must maintain, however, a sense of lightness and not too 
much concentration, a quality that Feldenkrais was keen to keep at bay. Gross 
expresses how ‘idle movement’ brings things to life:
Suddenly a thing you hold, that lies useless or useful in front of you, 
seems to have a face, a will of its own. Without hands, it gestures; 
footless, it takes a stance; silent, it cries, a word, a murmur, a shriek, a 
mockery, a warning, a consolation. The life is often hidden in plain sight,
waiting patiently to be recognized, emerging in the most idle 
movements, provoked by setting one object beside another, by an idle 
glance or touch. (Coda)
18 For example, in Yves Joly’s 1949 show, Tragédie de Papier, a paper puppet is cut up and 
burnt (Jurkowski 2000:63), and in Emilie Valentin’s 1996 show, Un Cid, puppets sculpted 
in ice melt ("Un Cid.").
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Person-image and the fictional self-image of a thing need to be given a space 
in which to emerge; they cannot be forced or willed.
Silk was interested in the movement in things, not just in things 
themselves. He gives us images of the twofold lives of the pendulum (‘there, 
and back’) and the flag (‘folded back on itself, then declaring itself for 
movement’) (239). I am reminded of one of Lecoq’s twenty movements, the 
'éclosion', which starts folded in on oneself to expand out and then return (fig. 
8). The emphasis is on the impulse which begins the movement in either 
direction, which should be definite but not explosive or sudden, followed by a 
growing or closing, like a flower opening or closing, captured by time-lapse 
film. The rhythm is the jo-ha-kyu of Japanese theatre and other arts19, 
explained by Pradier thus:
The first phase is determined by the opposition between one force which
is increasing and another force which is resisting the development of the
first (jo ‘to restrain’); the second phase (ha ‘to break’, ‘to interrupt’) is 
the moment when the resisting force is overcome until one arrives at 
the this phase (kyu ‘speed’), when the action culminates, release all its 
power and suddenly stops as if meeting an obstacle, a new resistance’ 
(Barba and Saverese 243-4).
19 I say this from my experience of working with Noh performer, Shiro Daimon, and Kabuki 
actor, Morohiko Hanayagi in a three-week workshop in 2000, as well as from working 
with Yoshi Oida in a short workshop in 1992.
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Fig. 8 My rendition of Lecoq's schematic drawing of the 'éclosion' (1997:83).
Silk frames objects, as they are used, or played, and stored, in this 
‘folding and unfolding life’ (239). In seeming contradiction with this, Jurkowski 
quotes mime, Ladislav Fialka, who says, ‘The puppet can’t perform fluid 
movements, it can only convincingly perform the beginning and end of a 
movement, the puppet’s movement develops from one phase to the next, from
one pose to the next, from one gesture to the next. What happens during this 
time is of no importance to the puppet’ (2000:54). However, this seems to 
suggest that the puppet takes care of the movement in between ‘poses’ simply 
and on its own, as in Silk’s folding and unfolding. Since the thing requires an 
agent from the outside to move it, it teaches very clearly about beginning and 
ending a movement, a narrative, or a moment (a mini-narrative). This clarity 
of action (and inaction) is surely something Silk had in mind when he claimed a
place for things as teachers. 
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Opening and closing, folding and unfolding, are fundamental movements
in nature; in flowers, in joints, in eyes. Moshe Pinchas Feldenkrais was named 
after a famous ancestor in his Hasidic lineage, Rabbi Pinchas of Koretz. Kaetz 
investigates how aspects of the method were seeded in Feldenkrais’s Hasidic 
roots. Without offering further analysis, he gives an example where his and 
Pinchas’ thinking overlap:
Explaining the Kabbalistic principles of “direct light” (expansion) and 
“reflected light” (contraction), Pinchas taught: “If you drop your hand, 
this is according to the principle of expansion. If you lift your hand, this 
is according to the principle of contraction". (64)
A key aim of FM is to reduce co-contraction of the antagonist muscles 
which must work together in a coordinated way to create movement through 
extension and contraction, rather than against each other, dampening the 
movement. In The Potent Self (1985), Feldenkrais asks the reader to turn her 
hand palm up, then palm down, and notice that when it is turned up the fingers
tend to bend, and when down they tend to straighten. Feldenkrais remarks, ‘So
though you were only required to turn your hand, you were in fact enacting 
something more in addition, namely the bending and straightening of your 
fingers’ (15). He goes on to explain the reason as being ‘that we “habitually” 
straighten our fingers when the palm is turned downward while taking hold of 
objects or grasping things. In the other position the hand is clenched most of 
the time, and the fingers bent, as when bringing an object toward ourselves to 
look at, smell, eat, or listen to’ (16). Feldenkrais is interested in this because it 
demonstrates that even a simple action is rarely monomotivated; if the hand 
were a thing not attached to a human but with the same physical properties, it 
would behave differently when turned in gravity. Both Feldenkrais and Pinchas 
give a sense of flow between self and world through movement; expansion is 
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‘direct light’ or the act of reaching outwards to grasp the world and contraction 
is ‘reflected light’ or bringing the world towards ourselves. Reese quotes Moshe
in his early book on jiu-jitsu saying ‘The torah (law) of letting go and 
contracting is very important … both the contraction of muscles, and their soft 
letting go’ (2015:105). 
Returning to Silk and his plea for things as guides; people as doers (with
habits) lack the freedom of monomotivated things to be. But is the folding and 
unfolding of the thing (the flag) simpler than that of the hand? Yes and no. A 
creature self-moves from within and tends to resist external influences. The 
flag is subject to the wind. If I animate the flag, I can make it look as though 
the wind is moving it, or as if it is moving itself from an inner impulse. Silk’s 
idea seems to have been that the passive thingness of the thing should not be 
ignored; on its own it does not do more than the wind does to it.
The thing or puppet can expand outwards towards an audience when 
endowed with self-image, and contract back down to its thingness. The 
puppeteer can let go, or expand into the puppet, which becomes part of the 
puppeteer’s person-image and now includes the extremities of this new 
physical form, and contract back towards herself, bringing the puppet back to 
its status as thing. She can endow it, or part of herself, with a separate self-
image so what is enacted is more like a dialogue. The puppet/thing can help to 
teach monomotivated action if the puppeteer respects its thingness and gives 
into it. A dissonance might be sought with the material form; a dialogue 
between union and separation might be desired as seen in the work of 
Schönbein or Moussoux-Bonté (“Twin Houses”), for instance.
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A puppet needs an intention; a puppet needs to be seen to think20 if it is
to be seen as more than a thing, to be credited with life, with a consciousness 
of some kind (given that the audience knows it is a puppet and their perception
will circulate between believing in the puppet and noticing/not noticing the 
puppeteers if they are visible). If the puppet isn’t given an intention, it is just 
moving, no matter how beautifully, and the effect will be merely aesthetic. The 
indirect means of manipulation of string puppets makes it difficult to give them
a sense of intention, hence they often seem more purely aesthetic and less 
potentially dramatic than other kinds of puppet. Feldenkrais quotes 10th 
century Egyptian sage Sa’adia Gaon: ‘He who prays without an intention in his 
heart, his prayer is not heard’ (Kaetz 41). Clarifying your action leads to the 
ability to enact your intention. The key to clarifying your action is clarifying 
your person-image.
5.3.2 Things as guides / perfection, awareness, readiness (Kleist)
Take the word butterfly. To use this word it is not necessary to make the
voice weigh less than an ounce or equip it with small dusty wings ... 
Never act out words. Never try to leave the floor when you talk about 
flying.
Leonard Cohen (Cohen 160)
These words remind me of Kleist’s On the Marionette Theatre. So far, I 
have avoided tackling Kleist, puppet theory’s most obvious and much-
discussed point of reference regarding, arguably, things as guides. His essay 
has received many interpretations; Jurkowski describes Kleist’s romantic 
20 Alain Recoing talked about life of the puppet being reliant on it seeming to think, rather 
than move.
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understanding of the puppet as actor (1988:8) and Cixoux, de Man, Lemahieu, 
Nelson, Ray, Ridout and Ruprecht have all fed into my reading of Kleist but I 
will not rehash theirs here.
The essay hangs around a conversation. This in itself is pertinent; FM 
functions through verbal and tactile dialogue, the Hasidic tradition Feldenkrais 
hails from is dialogic, puppetry is at least a dialogue and sometimes involves 
more than two. Nelson points out Kleist's dialogue is more Asclepian than 
Socratic; the interlocutors are not equals (61), which might also be said of 
puppetry and FI. However, progress is only made through the dialogue, so, in a
sense, this is irrelevant. Kleist articulates ideas around puppetry, performance 
and control; he does not present an argument.
Mr. C., a principal dancer, considers dancers can learn from 
marionettes. Kleist's narrator asks him how it is possible for the marionettes to
be controlled so well. Mr. C. observes that it if the puppeteer places his centre 
of gravity in the puppet, the puppet's limbs will fly like pendulums with perfect 
grace and a lack of affectation impossible for a human. This happens because 
of the nature of the articulations. In other words, it is a constrained system like
the one involving the skeleton as Berthoz describes it (143-4); the structure of 
the skeleton constrains human movement and the structure of the puppet 
constrains its movement21. A proximal movement on the part of the puppeteer 
transfers to the proximal part of the puppet whose limbs swing in the only way 
they can. Part of the nature of a good puppet is that it will allow the movement
21 Jones recounts the process of making the War Horse puppets, 'Adrian (Kohler) had to de-
cide which horse-like actions he would be able to include in the puppet’s structure and 
which not. A thorough knowledge of the physical skeleton was necessary in order to be 
able to simplify the jointing and design a workable puppet. This was a process that re-
quired a deep intuitive understanding of the mechanical capabilities and ergonomics of 
the human hand and body and how the six hands of three puppeteers could be used to 
give the horse as much physical articulation as possible' (258).
199
you want to happen, and prevent 'wrong' movements, like a knee turning 
inside out.
Nelson finds Mr. C's reasoning 'kinetically fantastic' (62). It is comically 
complex and inconsistent, including accurate and erroneous elements. Kleist 
creates movement around ideas rather than making any attempt to make one 
party right. Mr. C. remarks that you could replace the puppeteer with a motor 
and the movement would be even more perfect. Mottram sometimes does just 
this, building the movement he wants into the mechanism. He claims that the 
audience does not notice the difference. He, however, does, and feels like a 
fraud22. This speaks to Ridout's reading of Kleist since it points to something 
faltering about theatre. Even when Mottram knows a motor could do a better 
job than him at manipulating, and it would be easier, he feels a fraud if he is 
not on stage actually doing it, perhaps sensing that the movement produced by
a motor might not appear authentic and the sense of liveness might be lost. 
(He does sometimes use motors so that he can move something else at the 
same time.) Maybe he also feels a fraud if he is not actually doing the work his 
audience has paid to see, as Ridout might highlight. The experience of the 
performer is an important part of the theatre transaction. In puppetry, I would 
argue this is the experience of person-image play, which I need not engage in 
if I use a motorized puppet.
Cohen asks, ‘What is the expression which the age demands?’ and 
answers, ‘The age demands no expression whatsoever… Speak the words, 
convey the data, step aside’ (2001:161), echoing Mr. C., who states that 
dancers could learn from the simple, gravity-governed, psychology-free 
movement of marionettes:
22 Conversation in a workshop, 2014.
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a puppet does not give itself airs and graces. Affectation appears ... 
when the soul is elsewhere than the centre of gravity of a movement ... 
Look at young F ... his entire soul (a dreadful sight!) is lodged in his 
elbow. (Kleist 123)
This could be a description of an incomplete person-image; if the dancer 
involved the whole of himself in every movement and had perfectly diffused 
awareness, the spectator's attention would not be drawn to his elbow. Mr. C. 
seems to suggest then that dancers should align their person-images with 
physical reality.
There are two other anecdotes in the piece. The narrator tells of a young
man who experiences a moment of self-consciousness under another's gaze 
and loses his youthful grace; the theme of person-image is not present only in 
the dancer’s observations about the puppets. The young man stares at his 
mirror image as he repeatedly attempts, and fails, to recover his own beauty 
while watched by the narrator and another witness. He is striving to rediscover 
an image of perfection he saw himself as having, fleetingly. Ruprecht argues 
that it is not his self-consciousness that prevents him from finding grace 
however, but shame and embarrassment; 'Shame and coyness are closely 
connected to the failure of fulfilling the criteria of an ideal self – and an ideal 
body' (2006:41). Interestingly in relation to FM, she points out that 'the 
attempt to repeat a specific posture' or 'goal-oriented movement, in Kleist, 
leads to falling out of balance' (47). In FM each movement is a fresh 
opportunity for discovery; mindless repetition or striving to achieve a specific 
end are counter-productive.
At another turn in the text, Mr. C. claims the wearers of prosthetic limbs
move with 'composure, lightness, and grace' (123) as if aided by integrating a 
non-human element into their person-images, just as the puppet allows the 
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puppeteer-performer to find grace in a way which the dancers cannot, 
remaining 'affected'. Ruprecht refers to Kleist's 'bewildering praise of the 
prosthesis' which she claims points up that 'flawless perfection cannot be 
separated from fragmentation and lifelessness' (2006:36). However, I would 
argue that the integration of a thing into person–image, which also has its 
parallel in FM in the relationship with the floor and the skeleton, is presented 
by Kleist as offering a pathway to awareness rather than perfection. Given the 
capacity of person-image to integrate things, it is wise to be measured about 
what prosthetics might signify. Sobchak recounts her experience of her 
prosthetic leg and feels 'fully human'; the leg is incorporated as (not into) 
herself (279, 283). She describes herself as 'physically more present to myself'
since having to relearn how to walk with the leg; 'I have discovered my center 
of gravity' (289). Fragmentation and lifelessness are not definitive states, but 
phases or processes. Person-image integrates and disentangles from things; it 
is this capacity that is fascinating, making humans truly meshworked 
creatures. The Feldenkraisian and puppetic focus on a meshworked person-
image or being in and with concrete reality works against the debilitating 
shame experienced by the young man and the affectation of the dancer. 
Feldenkrais's concept of potency includes the ability to act from one's 
organic needs rather than bowing to societal expectations. The ‘ideal’ in an 
ATM or FI is in the practitioner’s mind only as a guide which she knows is 
unattainable; the point is not the end (hence there is no model) but the 
process of  and learning that occurs. Perfection is by definition a fleeting 
moment in an ongoing process of growth. In this way frustration at not
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succeeding is (theoretically) avoided since there is no goal23. Most theatre 
experience is mediated; an FM experience is not. In FI there is a direct 
connection between the skeleton and CNS of the practitioner and her student, 
and in ATM the student’s focus is within herself and on herself in her 
environment. Given this difference, what work can FM do for performance 
beyond limber bodies, improved coordination and extended range of motion? 
What do these qualities even have to do with theatre?
 In the final section of the essay Mr. C. recounts fencing a bear and 
being utterly unable to touch it since it parries all his thrusts and recognizes all 
his feints. The dialogue ends with this exchange (Mr. C. speaks first):
‘...We see in the organic world that the more the powers of thought 
become dark and feeble, the more grace shines majestically through.
... grace returns after understanding has passed through infinity. It thus
appears in those human forms which either have no consciousness at 
all, or have an infinite one: in the marionette and in the god.’
‘So therefore’, I said in some confusion, ‘we should eat once more of the
Tree of Knowledge in order to return to innocence?’
‘Certainly’, he answered. ‘And that is the last chapter of the history of 
the world’. (125)
So, rather than being about the dancer mimicking the marionette’s graceful 
movement, the overall gist is concerned with the human moving beyond being 
governed by self-consciousness and ego, so it can master falling, the Fall being
done and dusted (Ruprecht). Mr. C.’s need to defeat the bear means that his 
23 Many ATMs do seem to have a goal, at least in terms of an ideal movement, some of 
which are deemed impossible; the point in these being observation of frustration within 
oneself. ATM is goalless in that the movement in the lesson is only a means to greater 
awareness, not an end in itself.
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observation does not match his opponent's; the bear's composure is mentioned
several times. He looks Mr. C. right in the eyes. The bear is like a master 
martial artist; his movements are easy and swift and he only responds to true 
thrusts, not to feints. Ruprecht suggests the bear wins because 'he possesses 
visual power' (2006:46), but I disagree. Spontaneous action entails more than 
just vision; it demands awareness. 
 The bear reads Mr. C.’s intention perfectly. ‘Eating of the Tree of 
Knowledge’ here seems to concern movement awareness (the puppet), 
maturity (the young man) and spontaneity, or the ability to move in any 
direction at any moment (the bear); three elements central to FM. While 
puppetry is certainly a technical art (some things are necessary for it to 
‘work’), there is also scope for both the professional and student puppeteer and
for anyone using puppets in another context (therapeutic, educational…) to 
explore how movement awareness, maturity and spontaneity are brought into 
play in a specific way through the exploration of one’s relationship with matter 
and materials. How is person-image inflected by materiality and being in the 
world?
Kleist moves through his themes in an order which reflects my 
experience with, and growing understanding of, Feldenkrais’s work. At first, FM
seemed to be about movement and learning to move better. On some level it 
is, but only as a route towards awareness (through movement). In the 
practitioner training we pored over the skeleton-object24 to understand how it 
functions as a structure, where it can move if free from the flesh and 
brain/CNS of a person. How can I best find support from my skeleton for 
movement? Human skeletons are not identical, but even given endogenous and
24 I use this term when I mean a skeleton that I can touch and hold outside my own body, 
and not my skeleton or that of another person.
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exogenous variations, there is a basic structure and function which is universal.
Looking at, touching, and imagining the skeleton-object in movement 
supplements the experiential-somatic processes of ATM (sensing my own 
skeleton) and the somatic-analytical and experiential processes of FI (sensing 
my skeleton in relation to someone else’s and finding out how to communicate 
with her). Mr. C. sees the puppets in movement and sees the freedom of their 
limbs to respond to the distal (in relation to the puppet) impulse of the 
puppeteer. Apprehending the skeleton-object affords a sense of the weight and
bulk of different parts, a sense of articular connections and the potential play 
available in different joints, a sense of the different functions of bones within 
the skeleton. In very broad summary, the ribs, spine and skull protect, the 
pelvis holds like a bowl, the pelvis and spine transmit force, the leg bones 
support and the arm bones are available to fulfil many functions relating to the 
person and the outside world. Using the skeleton-object to understand human 
functioning is a little like Kleist’s dancer observing the puppets; both attempt 
to apprehend the structural underpinnings of movement25.
In a similar vein to Mr. C., Fialka gives a sophisticated take on the idea 
of the puppet's capacity for grace; ‘The puppet performs the form of the 
movement; it is guided towards doing it and not towards how it is done. The 
live person expresses the tension of a movement more than the movement 
itself’ (Jurkowski 2000:54). Obraztsov similarly observes, ‘No actor is able to 
create the representation of a generalised human being, because he himself is 
an individual. Only the puppet can do this, because it is not a human being’ 
(Jurkowski 1988:24). Cixous thinks 'Kleist questions the limits of the human
25 In Handspring's work, moving the centre of control from the chest, inherited from 
European rod puppetry, to the pelvis is identified as giving 'a sense of African movement'
(Sichel 163). This clearly relates to Schilder's socially formed body-image, and there is a 
discussion to be had about how this impacts on movement as present in performance.
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body' (37) in its lightness, even though it is held up by threads. She claims:
the puppet does not really dance. To dance is already to want to dance. 
The puppet is simply in harmony with external constraints. Humans can 
never get there except in brief moments, in hundredths of a second and 
quite exceptionally. We live the tensing of our muscles as spontaneous. 
Slaves to the spirit that keeps us upright, we are struggling against 
external constraints. (37)
Hers is not a meshworked view of the human or the puppet where the dance is 
between the elements. I am interested in what we get out of the experience of 
communing with the material world collaboratively, rather than struggling 
against it. This is the gap that puppetry coupled with a somatic practice like FM
aims to move into: Awareness Through Puppetry.
FM is about extending experience, revealing options, proposing new 
worlds, and theatre is too, especially puppet theatre which proposes impossible
worlds. Kleist's bear seems capable of perfect spontaneous action, something it
has been trained to do for the purposes of entertainment, suggests Ridout. But
one wonders how it has been thus trained, and as Ridout points out, the 
narrator’s response to Mr. C’s question as to whether he believes this story 
amounts to this; a likely tale. It is hinted that this model of perfect 
spontaneous action (in a bear, no less) is unattainable. So, far from advocating
puppets over actors, Kleist riffs on the human relationship with matter and on 
human behaviour and how experiments in this area are doomed to failure but 
attempts are nonetheless worth the bother. Things are guides but the process 
of learning has no end in sight. It is in this openness that a somatic approach 
to puppetry has a particularly rich offering to make; education should not be 
about learning things but about learning how to learn (Feldenkrais 1980).
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5.4 Skeletons as guides
I want to backtrack a little. In FM, I construct a sense of the person-image
of my students through what I see and, in FI, what I feel and see, and I aim to 
create the conditions for the student to refine her image through her own 
attention. I think about the skeleton and how it would move if tonus was 
equally distributed throughout the person. This clearly connects to Kleist’s 
thinking and I initially related this to my experience in puppetry, both in the 
context of making joints which allow movement and expression, and in terms 
of puppeteering, sensing whether I allowed the puppet to take its space and 
managed not to inhibit its inbuilt movement tendencies. When I first tried to 
bring puppetry and FM into closer dialogue my instinct was to think about the 
skeleton as an inner object or puppet. This proved problematic and limiting, 
however, as it denies the complexity of FM, and of human functioning, eclipsing
it as a meshwork involving movement, function and person-image, which is 
where it gets its radical politico-ecological potential.
Feldenkrais noted that, 'Some would say ... that we do not 'have' a 
skeleton, muscles, glands, nervous system etc. They would say, and I agree, 
that we 'are' all those things' (1981:71). As referenced in the Chapter 1, he 
said 'your skeleton will survive your soul’ and intended to write a book about 
skeleton consciousness. However, this should not be misunderstood as inner 
feeling. You can only feel your skeleton through something else and through 
the activity you are doing; you can feel your sit bones because you are sitting 
(the activity) on a chair (the environment). Hence, FI is a process which 
provides very specific and subtle feedback to a person about her skeleton, and 
ATM is a process which enables a person to get feedback from the environment
about her skeleton (mostly from the surface she is touching and her ability to 
find support from it for her movement). Ultimately, I chose to frame this 
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research in relation to person-image, towards which skeletal awareness 
contributes, as it offers a richer conceptual connection between FM and 
puppetry.
As in FM, with the puppet I am interested more in the exchange than 
whatever movement is produced; what the doing of it gives to me, to my 
being, to my person-image. How is my person-image constructed through the 
precision of my skeletal contact with the environment and how this is affected 
when I operate a puppet? How do I develop my inner movement and to what 
degree do I and can I choose to send this outwards? My focus shifted towards 
the interface, the exchange between the puppet or person and me, rather than
the idea of moving the skeleton as an inner puppet, although this concept did 
some theoretical work for me. In particular it helped towards a materialist 
stance but also revealed that I might be left making positivistic and 
reductionist statements that I didn’t intend. Wendy Wheeler enlists Raymond 
Williams' help to create ‘a materialist, but non-positivistic and non-reductionist,
account of evolutionary cultural change’ (15), emphasizing, ‘Human and 
natural biology are palpably not human constructs, either mastered or made,’ 
but ‘they are powerfully semiotic’ (17). I am concerned with movement in the 
physical world, and with the physical laws of movement, but not divorced from 
what they mean. While human bodies cannot be seen purely as human 
constructs, and do have an underlying physical-biological reality, puppets are 
human constructs, and although they can be seen as texts to be read or 
performed, their concrete reality gives them a special status; they are unique 
things in the world with bodies in the way beings are and texts are not quite. 
(The case could be made for text as concrete entity, as body, but it would be 
hard to argue that one might perceive a text as a body, or mistake a text for a 
living being.)
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Jones, of Handspring, claims that 'puppetry in design and performance is 
a form of authorship' explaining, 'The jointing (or lack of it) and the structure 
of the puppet allow for certain forms of expressiveness and not others' which 
creates a 'semiotic grammar' (253, 254, 258). The puppeteer meanwhile:
is literally engaged in a parallel, low-key drama: a life or death struggle,
dependent on the puppeteer’s strength, stamina, muscle memory and, 
of course, artistry or talent. This is a drama that has nothing to do with 
the script written by the author, and it must be enacted by the 
puppeteer, whether or not the director is interested in it or even 
conscious of it. (254)
The puppet, then, can be seen as a text in the form of a body. Where there is a
body, there is the potential for a body-image. Structure influences movement 
but a puppet, or person, must still be moved or move; this is where person-
image as play or the interpretation of structure comes in. 
The skeleton as focus was also problematic since there are ways that it 
is very unobject-like in life, even though it is the object we become in death. 
You can amputate my arm or leg and I can see it as a thing separate from me; 
you can transplant my heart such that I can hold and touch the heart I was 
born with (is it still my heart, or just a lump of flesh? Isn't the thing that beats 
in me and keeps me alive my heart, wherever it comes from?) but you cannot 
remove my whole skeleton, although you can give me artificial limbs or 
transplant my bone marrow or give me a blood transfusion. (Blood is made in 
the bones; flow and structure are of the same source.) My skeleton is the 
fundamental object at my core and indissociable from me as I live. It is both 
structure and organ. I can lose pieces of it but not the whole thing; a body 
without a skeleton is meat in a way that even a decerebrated body is not, it is 
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still recognizably a body. (A puppet, however, can take any size, shape or 
form.) 
I have not so far referred to the work of Tufnell and Crickmay who make
and write on creative processes involving movement and materials in evocative
ways informed by somatic practice; they invoke touch, boundary and bones. 
They suggest, for example, imagining 'you have no bones' as a prelude to 
replacing the bones 'slowly... one by one' (2004:195). They include a 
radiograph of a newborn's arm showing that the bones do not touch, as 
emphasized in Levin's biotensegrity model, quoting D'Arcy Thompson alongside
it: 'the whole skeleton ... is related in form and in position to the lines of force, 
to the resistance it has to encounter ... resistance begets resistance, and 
where pressure falls there growth springs up in strength to meet it' (197). The 
way the skeleton is used produces the resistance and support it offers both in 
its form and in its structure. It is guide and guided. It grows in response to 
action and is used to act in ways governed by my person-image. Tufnell and 
Crickmay's work offers fascinating forays related to my research, however, I 
have chosen to maintain a focus more directly on puppetry and person-image, 
rather than on their broader terrain of creative process and environmental art. 
I will not address their work further here. 
Fine Art training has traditionally involved a study of the human figure and
anatomy, previously from cadavers and more recently through life drawing or 
modelling. If puppetry is a study of movement, of animation, then training in it
should have a coherent and precise way of studying human movement at its 
centre, even though its aim is not necessarily to recreate human movement in 
a puppet. I propose that FM is particularly suited to the puppeteer’s needs 
since it addresses global movements (functions) through experiential 
discovery. It is very concrete; it is not about 'energy', a rather vague word 
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used in many physical theatre trainings and martial arts deployed for this 
purpose. Not to say 'energy' has no place in puppetry, but for the puppeteer, 
an in-depth nuts and bolts awareness of movement and the refined ability to 
sense differences are useful both for construction and for puppeteering. FM is 
not focused on levels of materiality that are beneath normal human levels of 
perception such as Body Mind Centering (BMC), where blood flow and the 
lymph, for example, are given as much importance as the musculoskeletal 
system in movement. BMC might also enrich a puppeteer’s research, but in a 
basic training, FM’s focus on awareness of the functioning of the 
musculoskeletal system (although this is a means, not an end, for the method 
itself) is of more use as a grounding. It offers a dynamic anatomy life class for 
puppeteers, where movement is understood from within and not just from 
visual observation (which also has its place). FM is about awareness and 
learning how to learn in order to explore more of human potential. It uses 
movement as a means to work on these things, because movement can be 
seen and felt. It works with materiality and movement and so does puppetry. 
Puppetry concretizes ideas so that they exist as physical moving things in the 
world. ATP proposes using puppeteering to heighten awareness since it 
concretizes and amplifies movement outside oneself. 
5.5 Meshworks and skill 
Rather than an abstract concept of materiality, Ingold would prefer direct 
engagement with materials themselves, ‘following what happens to them as 
they circulate, mix with one another, solidify and dissolve in the formation of 
more or less enduring things’ (2011:16). Such a direct engagement with 
materials is the domain of puppetry, and, in a sense, of FM. Both are interested
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in what happens as it happens, rather than being focused on the outcome. In 
FI, both practitioner and student are thinking, feeling, sensing and moving and 
all of these elements come into play in a lesson. The conversation of a 
puppeteer with her puppet is differently weighted; the puppet itself is thought, 
felt, sensed and moved, but it only moves back. The impetus for its movement 
might come from the puppeteer, but this is added to by the response of the 
material - it is not possible to give the same impulse to a feather and a rock; 
they already create a different resistance in me. The wider context also 
influences the movement; to move a feather outside in the wind is not the 
same as to move it in a vacuum, or in water. In terms of the meshwork, a 
person can be seen as a more complex bundle of lines involving more variables
than an inanimate thing. 
Ingold proposes: 
Bringing things to life ... is a matter not of adding to them a sprinkling 
of agency but of restoring them to the generative fluxes of the world of 
materials in which they came into being and continue to subsist. This 
view, that things are in life rather than life in things, is diametrically 
opposed to the conventional anthropological understanding of animism. 
(2011:29)
This thinking helps appreciate the intricate enmeshment of person-image and 
world; things are in life, things are in people’s lives, people mix, merge with 
and separate from things constantly. The materiality of objects becomes our 
materiality and ours theirs. The meshwork of everything together allows stuff 
to happen; the meshwork is ‘the condition for agency’. Playing with person-
image is a way of focusing on what is possible in the meshwork. What I do with
a puppet begins with what I do.
Ingold claims:
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only the body remembers. Thus, in the relation between hand and saw 
there lies a fundamental asymmetry. The hand can bring itself into use, 
and in its practised movements can tell the story of its own life. But the 
saw relies on the hand for its story to be told. (2011:57) (His italics.)
If I replace ‘saw’ with ‘puppet’, does this hold true? To an extent, yes. The saw 
can itself be seen as a (potential) puppet; an old saw will have a patina which 
tells a story, and a brand new one will also express something before the hand 
touches it. In a piece of object theatre, or even a conventionally staged play, 
the old and the new saw do not tell the same story. Having a puppetic regard 
for things allows them to tell stories even before they are touched. The saw 
reaches out to the puppeteer, appealing to her imagination and senses. Baker 
acknowledges this is in exercises such as asking someone to pick an object to 
be themselves and then speak as the object; 'I am this vase. My life is empty 
at the moment. But I’ll soon be filled again'. An old, chipped vase with a hole in
it would tell a different story, even accompanied by the same text. Baker also 
gets participants to interview objects via a ‘curator’; ‘A can of coca cola was 
asked: “We have heard you make people happy” (the curator had given this 
information in their museum presentation), “How do you do this?” and the coke
replied: “I alter the chemicals in their brain”’ (Baker Eloquent Objects). A 
crushed can or an unopened one here convey different things. Perhaps Ingold’s
saw relies on the hand to tell its story, but the human imagination, and 
different hands, want to give it other stories too. Ingold sees things as 
acquiring meaning through use rather than having affordances, and I would 
argue that seeing puppets and objects as affordances serves to reduce rather 
than expand their emergent expressive potential. The imagination does not 
want to be bossed around by affordances.
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Regardless of whether the thing in question is obviously 
anthropomorphic or not, imagining a story for an object involves 
anthropomorphizing it or, at the very least, seeing it in relation to the living; 
seeing it as part of the meshwork. Baker notes: 
anthropomorphising doesn’t necessarily mean giving objects a head, 
eyes, arms and legs or making puppets gesticulate like a person. If I see
a car going by and imagine it to be sneaky, it is not gesturing but is 
probably moving in a stealthy rhythm. (Baker Anthropomorphism)
The new saw next to the old might look rigid and inexperienced, the old one 
well-worn, flexible and precise. The way they look is one thing, the way they 
act is another; it is actually the way they interact with my person-image. What 
is the difference in the person-image I imagine for an axe used to chop wood, 
or used to move a spider and her web from the corner of a room? The axe does
not actually have a person-image, of course, but if I am puppeteering the axe, 
I might imagine a rigid, compact person-image for the chopping axe, whereas 
the web-moving axe might have more of a sense of elongation and ability to 
reach. The chopper character might need to be more of an extension of my 
person-image whereas the web mover might require me to endow it more with 
its own person-image. Intention comes into play and can also be seen as a 
guiding rod for person-image. A feather can be used to tickle or to torture; the 
action is more or less the same, but the intention very different.
The tool is not separate from the user at the point of use because the 
user extends her person-image into the tool or incorporates the tool in her 
person-image - they become a functional whole. They are also related 
functionally in a meshwork including what the tool is being used on, with or in 
the context of. Ingold says, ‘‘bringing into use’ is a matter not of attaching an 
object with certain attributes to a body with certain anatomical features, but of 
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joining a story to the appropriate gestures’ (2011:58). Paying attention and 
shifting person-image is key to effecting a change in the dynamics of the 
meshwork in which it is entangled. What I do with myself affects what is done 
in the world. This might sound rather obvious. But often the thought ‘I want to 
change the world’ is not preceded by ‘how can I change my person-image so I 
act differently in the world and contribute to its change’. In puppetry, when the
onus is on the aesthetic or how to get such and such an effect without care for 
what the puppeteer is doing or how she is experiencing things, there is a risk 
of injury or unnecessary wear (e.g. on a shoulder joint). The audience might 
also think, that looks hard, uncomfortable, awkward and so on. Which is not to 
say that the puppeteer’s comfort should be paramount; performance is 
physically demanding. Jones thinks it inevitably will be painful; 'pain is part of 
the pleasure of performance' (264). I would distinguish, however, between 
discomfort and detrimental pain. Performance should not be dangerous to the 
individual, but it might be arduous and tiring. Pain and danger (beyond 
ordinary risk) might be a choice but one perhaps more likely to be made in the 
performance or live art arena. This is not the place to discuss the ethical issues
around this.
5.5.1 The puppeteer-puppet relationship
The puppeteer cannot see what the audience sees and at least part of 
what she produces to be seen is mediated beyond her body, so she can only 
partially feel or sense what is happening and what image she is creating. This 
is where the art of proprioceptive handling becomes so important; if I have a 
heightened sensitivity to the dialogue with the material, I have a greater 
chance of producing the desired images as rehearsed. My sensitivity will 
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communicate to the audience, even if subliminally, which will help paste over 
any accidents that occur because I can’t see what I'm producing and therefore 
can’t rectify it in the moment it occurs.
One might think that Kaplin’s distance-and-ratio puppetry classification 
model, described in Chapter 2, corresponds to a scale going from more 
integrated with person-image to less integrated, or towards the puppet being 
endowed with a separate person-image, but this is not automatically the case. 
The puppet can be part of the body and an object which allows me to 
incorporate other objects into my body schema or a channel, even when my 
hand is inside it, for a separate entity from me and my person-image. This 
relates to control (manipulation) and loss of control (possession), or 
submission, which is not the same as being out of control. It also relates to 
awareness as Feldenkrais understood it. The marionette is a technical form of 
puppet and requires great skill to puppeteer successfully since the connection 
between puppet and puppeteer is not rigid, so she cannot directly impart 
impulses to it26. For this reason, it is a fine master or guide. The puppeteer 
must allow its limbs to respond according to their weight and gravity; it is less 
forgiving than a hand, rod or table-top puppet. With these, if I get the gaze 
right and have some sort of logic to the movement (weight in table-top 
puppets, height in hand and rod puppets), I can get away with being over-
controlling or not listening to my puppet to an extent. With a string puppet my 
capacity to direct its movement is so fragile, so sensitive, that it requires 
heightened awareness. In some sense then, marionettes require a more 
analytic process for their manipulation and are not puppets to get lost in - 
26 Having watched a class in Chinese hand puppets at ESNAM in Charleville, these puppets 
too are extremely technical, requiring great dexterity in part due to their lightness and 
small size (relative to typical Western hand puppets) and the acrobatic feats in their typ-
ical movement repertory.
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Stephen Mottram is an example of a string puppeteer who works very 
analytically. And yet, if one can really be in a dance with one, this aspect drops
away - Christopher Leith is an example of a puppeteer who gave into the 
dance. ATP is concerned with this dance with the material, although just as 
analysing a skeleton-object in FM training is useful, an analytic approach to 
puppeteering can also play its part.
So, there is another scale worth imagining for ATP, which goes from 
manipulation to possession, or from high awareness of one’s activity as a 
puppeteer to being lost in it. It is related to but not identical to Kaplin’s.
5.6 Imagining things
Using Feldenkrais's ‘five lines’ image of the person, the practitioner 
might ask, how far are your arm lines from your mid-line? Are your leg lines 
equidistant from your mid-line? Is your head directly on top of the mid-line or 
a little to one side?27 The abstraction of the self in this pared down image is 
quite puppet-like in itself, involving picturing the basic relationship between the
lines that conjure the person. If a puppet-maker wanted to make a convincing 
puppet of me, she could identify these lines and their relationships in stillness 
and motion in order to reproduce my personal neutral. The puppeteer could get
a sense of these lines in motion in order to produce a sense of my gait. How do
the parts relate to each other on a basic level as they travel through space? 
The clearer the image of the movement is for the person, Feldenkrais tells us, 
the closer the movement will be to the person’s intention. A puppet can be 
made from just these lines, or even fewer as Blumenthal notes; ’four sticks and
27 The mid-line is not only a concern with regards symmetry or asymmetry in movement 
but from a neurological point of view.
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a giant bean as limbs and a head, with no body at all in the middle’ (73). Here 
the distal parts in movement suggest the proximal, where smaller movement 
usually occurs.
Mottram makes the lines implicit, working just with points28. This idea as
a tool for studying movement appears to have been developed first by 
Bernstein (Latash 277), a major influence on Feldenkrais according to Haller 
(2010) and Reese (2015:183-4). With just five ping-pong balls, Mottram 
creates a simplified, point-light puppet. He demonstrates the basic human 
walking pattern, where the head must come over the supporting foot before 
the opposing foot is raised, creating a zig-zag pathway along the ground if the 
figure is moving forwards. This pattern is unique to humans since we are 
bipedal, have a relatively high centre of gravity, and are wider in the frontal 
than in the sagittal plane. The audience sees the ‘body’. Abstraction is 
important in understanding movement in puppetry and person-image in FM. 
28 From what was initially a training tool, used for demonstrating puppetry principles, Mot-
tram developed a show, introduced thus; ‘In 1971, The Swedish Psychologist Gunnar Jo-
hansson attached white markers to a few key points on a black-costumed actor’s body 
and then filmed the actor walking against a black background. When the film was played 
back, he was surprised to find that the white spots seen moving relative to each other on
the screen contained so much information, that not only could the viewer immediately 
identify a human walking, but also the gender, age and mood of the person. Johansson’s 
research was the gold nugget which led the film industry to the techniques of motion 
capture. In The Parachute Stephen Mottram uses the idea in reverse. The white tips of 
his multiple magic wands reveal ephemeral characters whose lives we end up caring 
about’ (Mottram). I saw this show live at London International Mime Festival 2017. See 
Dziala for a video clip.
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Fig. 9 Three schematic depictions of Stephen Mottram's ping-pong puppet.
Feldenkrais uses lines while Mottram uses points to suggest the whole. In 
relation to Ingold’s meshwork of lines, Feldenkrais’s five lines give more of a 
sense of continuity into and with the material world; Mottram’s points are more
schematic, but it is interesting that the human brain reconstructs so much from
such minimal information. Picking up movement signals was once related to 
survival; it was worth knowing if there was a bear or a person in the distance. 
Mottram's model retains the spatial and temporal rhythm of movement. 
However, having seen Mottram’s ping-pong puppets performing, I think they 
are somewhat limited in the kinds and qualities of movement they can show; 
perhaps five points are not enough for nuance. 
As a FM practitioner, I look at both form and movement, with my eyes, 
and also with my hands, through touch. The way a person stands, her 
‘posture’, is movement, and tells me about her movement patterns. The way a 
person lies, the form she takes, also tells me about how she moves, and about 
her person-image. If her back is arched up off the table significantly, I know 
that there is residual tonicity in her extensor muscles and these are doing more
work than necessary when she is standing or moving. This area might be said 
to lack presence in her person-image. Form holds the traces of movement. In 
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order to flesh out my person-image, I pay attention to (scan) my form in lying,
sitting or standing relatively still, and to myself in movement. As I sense my 
student moving (more than when I observe her) I get a sense of the 
particularities of her skeletal structure, for example her hip joints might be 
more or less hooded with bone, allowing greater or less freedom of movement.
A puppet will lend itself to certain kinds of movement, some of which I will 
have been able to foresee, but some which I probably couldn’t. The movement 
of the puppet is governed by its form, but also by the movement input from 
the puppeteer, so by my form (including my size) and movement. The more 
clearly I understand how person-image is expressed in movement in myself 
and others, the more conscious choices I can make when designing and 
building a puppet, or working with a puppet-maker.
Going back to Kleist and Craig who might be seen as suggesting that the 
actor can learn from the puppet, there is an extent to which puppets are 
governed by physics, not by desires or emotions and so on, so for movement 
purposes they are indeed good guides. FM is, in a way, a puppetic view of the 
moving human in that it asks how people can move in accordance with their 
physical structure in gravity. But, just as in FM we don’t really need to know 
the laws of physics, Baker claims the same is true of the puppeteer; 
observation of movement in the world (harking back to Lecoq) is enough to 
feed the puppeteer’s creation.
I have already mentioned the imagination in terms of allowing it to 
connect to things beyond affordances. Some FM lessons ask only for imagined 
movement, imperceptible to an outside observer, or simply movement of the 
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attention, and all ATMs can be ‘done’ in the imagination29. This little gap 
between imagining and doing, the inhibition of the action, is potent. I was 
always a ‘do-er’, a physical performer, and this (tricky) place has had a lot to 
teach me. Imagining person-image in movement opens up FM and connects it 
to puppetry for me. It is the place of intention. Being about to move, or having 
an intention to move, but not ‘doing’ it. I learnt this lesson with Christopher 
Leith, and later with Rene Baker, hanging around with puppets, or listening to 
the material. Listening to the place where intention meets materiality and 
movement emerges.
Without touching, the puppeteer can imagine movement with and of the 
thing; where does the thing go, where do my hands and the rest of myself go, 
what does the thing want to do or say? But also whilst holding the thing; what 
does the imagination offer without fulfilling itself in external action? What 
wants to move first? By inhibiting movement, what fresh insight into our 
relationship emerges? If I hold a hammer, my initial image might be to hit nails
with it (or, at worst, a person; it seems made to hit), but I could also weigh it 
in my hand or make it into a pendulum, or dip it in paint and use it as a brush, 
or make it into a puppet with a long nose. Perhaps the practice of separating 
the moment of impulse and action, as in FM, allows for a richer panoply of 
possible action to emerge for the puppeteer. It offers another way of 
approaching one’s relationship with the thing and what it will come to express 
or mean. Beyond opening up the possible action within the moment, this is also
about opening up possible thoughts; questioning the habitual in relation to 
action and things and their use.
29 This can be important in cases where physical movement is impossible. Myriam Pfeffer 
recounts, for example, how she avoids an operation after a fractured femur head by ima-
gining herself walking in great detail and with many variations until she can actually 
physically do it again. She also acknowledges that this is possible because of her practice
and familiarity with herself already as an experienced FM trainer; she does not recom-
mend such a procedure for novices without guidance ("Myriam Pfeffer").
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Provocations for a puppeteer
(Awareness Through Puppetry)1
Puppeteers can gain familiarity with the idea of person-image doing 
ATMs, both where it is the explicit subject, and where it is not2. The scanning 
stage of the ATM can be tuned to their needs - grounding the hands in the 
pelvis and feet, developing a soft enveloping gaze (the material is very pliable) 
- moving towards an integrated process of Awareness Through Puppetry. What 
follows are suggestions for exploration beyond existing ATMs. The 'puppet' 
might also be an object or material; the suggestions can be interpreted 
accordingly.
1) Before touching your puppet (with the puppet out of sight, then in sight).
• Observe yourself in standing, walking and lying.
• How clear is your person-image? How much of you is included in your 
person-image?
• Where do you end? Where are your borders?
• What awareness do you have of what’s in front of you; behind you; to 
your right; to your left; above you; underneath you; all around you?
• How does the floor support you? How do you find support from the 
floor?
1 Coad offers a detailed introduction to string puppeteering which teams well with my pro-
vocations (2007 ch.7). He emphasizes finding ease and economy of movement and sug-
gests an almost Feldenkraisian approach, finding the extreme points of each movement 
and direction systematically and then establishing where the marionette remains in con-
trol.
2 For short recorded ATMs, see "audio library". For full-length recorded ATMs, see OpenAT-
M.org.
222
2) Touch your puppet somewhere on the outside of its 'body' - its hand, head, 
back etc. - not where you would normally hold it.
• Diminish the pressure of your fingers against the puppet. Sense how 
you feel the object less and less and your fingers more and more.
• When you are barely touching, what do you experience?
3) Holding your puppet as if to perform with it (whatever the technique)
• The same questions as in 1) plus
• Can you sense your person-image extending into your puppet? Has your
puppet become part of your person-image?
• Does the puppet have its own person-image? Do you endow it with 
person-image?
• Play with these variables: person-image extending into puppet; puppet 
as part of your person-image; the puppet has its own person-image; 
you endow the puppet with person-image.
• Play with the scales of including the puppet or extending into the puppet
and the feeling of two person-images, yours and the puppet's.
• Who moves first? You or the puppet? Where from? What dominates your
person-image(s)?
• Switch to supporting the puppet with the other hand and ask the same 
questions. What differences do you notice?
4) Try the same questions as in 1) and 3) holding your puppet in a non-
habitual way (not the way you normally would to perform e.g. hold a hand-
puppet by the back of its neck or cradled in your arms, hold a string puppet by
its feet or by its neck and nose3).
3 Steve Tiplady refers to similar non-habitual holding (Ylä-Hokkala et al 339) and, as previ-
ously mentioned, Philippe Rodriguez-Jorda also works with dishabituation practices, although
neither relate them to a concept like person-image.
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5) Try the same questions in different puppeteering positions, both habitual 
and non-habitual, e.g. lying down, kneeling, squatting.
6) Try the same questions on a multi-operated puppet.
• Are you each extending your person-image? 
• Are you projecting a collectively imagined person-image? Do you agree 
on it?
• Are you plus the puppet a new entity with one person-image, a gestalt 
bigger than its parts?
• Imagine, then perform, the movements you make as an ensemble 
without holding the puppet, then with it again.
7) Without your puppet.
• Imagine a precise sequence of movement with your puppet until it 
becomes clear.
• Perform the movements without holding the puppet, then with it.
After these experiments, stand and walk around; notice any changes or 
anything new or unfamiliar in yourself and your interaction with the floor and 
the space that comes to your attention. What difference to you and your 
puppetry do these questions and experiences make? Gousseff has given ATMs 
to hand puppets, with the puppeteers lying down (Fredricksson); this is 
another possibility for exploration and adaptation.
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Chapter 6
Case Studies: Protean person-images in performance
6 Preamble
Perceptions of myself and material things in their relations are at the 
core of both FM and puppetry, and indeed life; from this comes meaning. In 
the last chapter I began to sketch out a path towards Awareness Through Pup-
petry/ Puppetry Through Awareness, giving some practical suggestions as to 
how FM and puppetry might interlace. In this chapter I look at examples from 
contemporary performance which lead me to propose a future of puppetry 
which lies in a radical investigation of the basic ground where person-image is 
acknowledged as a constant, but nodal, becoming, as the now where human 
and nonhuman merge and transform together.
6.1.1 Theoretical groundwork: a critique of ‘manipulacting’
Piris uses 'manipulacting' to refer to a range of situations where the 
puppeteer and puppet are both present in performance; the puppeteer is not 
invisible or drawing focus only to the puppet, but also to herself. He calls this 
‘co-presence’ which he says ‘takes place between the puppeteer and the 
puppet’: 
This co-presence is particular because it establishes a relation of self to 
Other between two beings that are ontologically different: one is a 
subject (in other words, a being endowed with consciousness) and the 
other one an object (in other words, a thing). Yet, the particularity of 
the puppet is to present an ontological ambiguity because it is an object 
that appears in performance as a subject. Co-presence stresses this 
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ontological ambiguity by confronting the puppet with a human 
protagonist. (2014:30)
I am interested in performance which elides subjects and objects to the 
point where any clear distinction between them becomes nonsense; meaning 
and reality is born of connections and relationships. As we have seen, Piris 
assumes the puppeteer's 'body schema encompasses two bodies: the actual 
body of the puppeteer and the apparent body of the puppet’ (31). He does not 
clarify what he means by body schema and, even in the performances he 
refers to, it is not always clear where these two ‘bodies’ meet and merge. He 
writes: 
Co-presence requires the hybridization of … two forms of body schema 
… which is a challenge because it supposes solving a contradiction. In 
acting, the actors' aim is to focus the audience's attention on their body,
whereas the puppeteers' aim is to focus the audience's attention on the 
puppets. The co-presence of the puppeteer and the puppet requires that
a double focus on both the performer and the puppet is achieved. (31)
There are several assumptions here. While I agree that the puppeteer 
experiences the world 'in another way than the actor'1, he presumes there are 
two forms of body schema, but in fact there is in each case one person with 
her malleable body schema. Returning to Gallagher's distinction between body 
schema and body-image, it would be more accurate to talk about the body-
image, or, to use my term, the person-image. Body schema relates to what a 
person does; person-image involves what she thinks she does and is accessible
to awareness whereby it becomes the route to shifting body schematic action. 
Some puppeteers might have more in common with one of Kantor's actors in
1 He actually writes, the puppeteer's body and the actor's body experience the world in dif-
ferent ways, but I would argue it is the person who experiences, not the 'body'.
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their person-image play than with the puppeteer Neville Tranter, who is one of 
Piris's examples. A person adapts her body schema constantly in everyday life 
when she puts on a certain pair of shoes, uses a hammer to bang in nails, or 
drives a car2. Puppeteering is, in a sense, just a specific form of playing with 
body-image in relation to a tool or worn item. The puppeteer creates a fictional
person-image for the puppet which will help an audience see, or imagine it, as 
a subject, which is to say, as having its own person-image which produces a 
way of moving (body schema). 
Piris claims the actor’s aim is to focus the audience’s attention on her 
body, but in my view this might just be bad acting, especially if it is the priority
or only choice available. There are many things which might be said to be the 
actor’s aim; to convey the character vividly, to tell the story, to deflect 
attention from himself onto another at a key point, to find complicity with the 
other actors, to speak a line so that you feel as if he is whispering in your ear 
at the back of the highest balcony, and so on. Theatre is always about the 
whole situation. A parameter will have been decided which might be that the 
stage world exists behind a fourth wall or it might also include the audience, 
the building or the world beyond3. A pole dancer or a stripper might be said to 
want the audience to focus on his or her body, but the actor's work does not 
necessarily involve (only) this. In this sense, acting and puppetry are not as far
apart as Piris makes out. The actor is also involved in creating something in 
collaboration with all the material elements present. The difference is that she 
is not trying to make it seem as though there are other subjects present; other
2 A friend painted my four-year old's nails; 'Do I look like a different person?' she asked. 
She clearly felt like one.
3 For example In S.#08 STRASBOURG (2004) by Socìetas Raffaello Sanzio, a coach load of
passengers visible beyond the glass wall of the theatre is part of the performance (Cas-
tellucci 151). In En Chantier (2004), Mark Tompkins took a video camera into the wings, 
backstage and beyond.
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beings possessed of person-image also interacting with and emerging from 
what’s in the performance.
Schönbein, whose work I consider below, offers a subtly different view 
from Piris. She claims if the puppet plays well, the audience watches it, but if it
plays badly, they see the actor; 'The puppet stays intact and, in spite of its 
obvious dependence, always itself'4 (24). There is a sense here that if the 
puppeteer follows the puppet, the puppet will be seen, rather than using a 
conscious desire to focus the audience's attention on what she does.
Both the actor (worth her salt) and the puppeteer (including Schönbein) 
are nevertheless playing with focus. Shifting focus, or attention, is a central 
strategy used by Feldenkrais to explore and develop students' self-image. 
Therefore, rather than refer to co-presence, which involves discussion of 
subjects and objects as separate entities, I choose to discuss the movement of 
attention as it relates to person-image, which can include my puppeteering 
body and things it connects with directly or remotely. I find this less 
constraining as a concept, and it allows me potentially to address a broader 
range of performance. 
6.1.2 From Self-Other to dynamic person-image
The notion of a dynamic person-image, where a person’s awareness and
attention are constantly incorporating and rejecting parts of the outside and 
the inside in an ongoing process, avoids the Self-Other binary. For example, at 
the moment my right shoulder hurts a bit, so although my awareness is drawn 
to it, it is a zone of low awareness in the sense that it is not being supported 
4 My trans. of 'La marionnette reste intacte et, malgré son évidente dépendance, toujours 
elle-même'.
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by the rest of me. The route towards reintegrating it as a more functional (and 
less painful) part of my person-image is probably not through focusing on the 
shoulder itself, but by asking of the rest of myself, in collaboration with the 
ground, why are you making this pain in the right shoulder, or how can you 
support this shoulder better? In the last sentence the difficulty in writing 
coherently about this subject becomes clear; I use the term ‘myself’, tempered
with the idea of collaboration with the ground, but nevertheless, ‘myself’ as 
somehow distinct from something else. There are also collaborations occurring 
with the curry I ate yesterday, my toddler who was up for two hours in the 
night and the fact that Trump was elected as President last week. My person-
image currently involves all of this. 
Piris’ notion of co-presence of the puppeteer and of the puppet, which 
he relates to body schema, is of interest to me if tempered with the notion of 
processual and plastic person-image which can be used to create a fictional 
person-image for the puppet. Piris approaches his argument as a puppeteer 
and through aspects of the philosophy of Sartre and Levinas. I approach mine 
as a puppeteer and FM practitioner. My understanding of person-image is not 
based on philosophical speculation, although almost unavoidably this comes 
into play. Fundamentally my argument assumes that moving is a source of 
knowledge.
Piris elaborates on ‘the interplay between the perception of the 
objectness of the puppet and the imagination of its subjectness’. He uses 
Sartre’s idea that perception and imagination are different ways for 
consciousness to relate to an object; the object is encountered as present by 
perception but is absent for the imagination. Piris states, ’Sartre argues that 
the image is not a thing but a relation … What is imagined is an object that is 
not present but that we bring back to our consciousness. Therefore, between 
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perception and imagination there is a difference of nature and not of degree’ 
(2014:39). In the case of imagining movement in FM, the object is not absent. 
So how is this different to perception? Perception of movement would be what I
can sense moving when at rest; maybe I sense my breath moving my ribs. 
Imagination of movement would be an active attempt to imagine myself 
making some movement or other. Perception of my spine would be what I can 
actually, although implicitly, sense. Imagination might be actively used to place
my attention systematically at different points along my spine such that I 
create a more detailed image of it for myself. The distinction is not crystal-clear
since I don’t just perceive my spine but use some kind of strategy to do so; 
perception is an activity. In both cases the object of imagination is present. 
What implications does this have for Piris’ argument regarding puppets (on 
which I am merely proposing a different angle which might be practically and 
theoretically productive)?
The difference between acts of imagination and perception with regards 
to ourselves is not as clear as Piris makes out. Although Feldenkrais proposes a
specific kind of imagination of myself in often unfamiliar movement, I am 
constantly involved in imagining myself in past and future actions. It is the way
I reflect on what I’ve done and make future plans. Feldenkrais proposes 
harnessing this inadvertent process and using it in a more directed way. I 
would argue, using Piris' terms, that in FM there is an ‘interplay between the 
perception of the objectness' of myself and my imagination of my ‘subjectness’;
this is my person-image. The power of the puppet comes from externalizing 
the object, or extending the objectness of the person beyond her body and 
pouring fictional subjectness into this extremity, or endowing it with 
subjectness. 
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Piris concludes that ‘the puppet is not an Other but the image of an 
Other’ (41). I find this too categorical; a puppet can also be the projected 
person-image of an other, and puppetry an imaginative play with my person-
image to split and extend it. A way to challenge and question my person-
image. In order to explore this further I look at works from three performance 
makers: Fastoche (Pierre Tual), Chair de ma chair (Ilka Schönbein) and Self 
Unfinished (Xavier le Roy). I do not consider these pieces more broadly in the 
context of each artist's work in a detailed manner, but look closely at each 
from the point of view of person-image.
6.2 Pierre Tual and company / Fastoche (2014)5
Fig. 10 Jonathan sitting on sofa with Georges and Jimmy in Fastoche, 2014. Image © Véro-
nique Lespérat-Héquet.
5 I saw this show live in Dives-sur-mer, France, in July 2016, and had access to a film of it 
(Tual and Aspeli). 'Fastoche' means 'easy-peasy' in French.
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Fastoche tells the tale of a child who remains in the adult and projects 
the old person he might become. It evokes in literal manner the way person-
image in the present emerges from how one was in the past and contains a 
possible future if certain habits remain unchallenged. The plot, in a nutshell, is 
this; the main character (Jonathan) encounters a boy (Jimmy) and an old man 
(Georges) in the ‘real world’ and they are suddenly present, in a magical realist
way, in the flat he has been lent by a friend (fig. 10). Jonathan leads a 
hermetic life, rarely venturing out and not responding to the doorbell or phone.
His existence is perturbed by these visitations but eventually he leaves the flat.
The story is rooted in the everyday; it is described as ‘a humanist chronicle, an
interior, phantasmagorical ballad, a little naïve philosophical tale… for those 
who invent problems for themselves to make life more complicated, but also 
funnier and more adventurous’ ("Fastoche Présentation" 7). Jonathan reminds 
me of Keith Johnstone’s ‘No’-sayer: 'There are people who prefer to say ‘Yes’, 
and there are people who prefer to say, ‘No’. Those who say ‘Yes’ are rewarded
by the adventures they have and those who say ‘No’ are rewarded with the 
safety they attain’ (2007:92). Here though, a person who seems to say ‘No’ to 
the ‘real’ world (but ‘Yes’ to his imagined world) has an adventure within 
himself. Reality and imagination are pitted against and work on each other in a
way that is of interest to me since it is precisely this interplay that produces 
shifting person-image.
On stage are an actor, a musician/lighting technician sitting at a piano 
and three hand-held puppets - two roughly human-size and one about 50cm 
high. The human-size puppets are Jimmy and Georges6. They are stylistically 
slightly different, the child more like a ventriloquist's doll, but both are realist
6 Zich suggests that human-size puppets might be more troubling than smaller puppets 
which he claims retain a mysterious stillness (Plassard 82).
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without being hyperreal. Tual moves the puppets from one location to another 
on stage simply and practically; he does not ‘walk’ them. He makes them climb
over and around him in different locations; the sofa, the breakfast bar, the 
carpet and the piano/microphone area. Both have mouths articulated like 
ventriloquists' dolls. The actor makes some attempt to mask his face when he 
voices them, particularly as he sets up the characters, but he does not use 
ventriloquial technique and moves his mouth normally. He puts his hand inside 
the backs of the puppets to make their mouths move via a mechanism, and 
otherwise moves them as whole entities, changing their positions in relation to 
him, making them cling to him by attaching their hands around his neck or 
legs, and occasionally manipulating a hand to make a gesture or self-contact.
Fig. 11 First appearance of Tual with puppets in Fastoche, 2014. Image © Véronique 
Lespérat-Héquet.
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Tual's technique is a form of ‘corps-castelet’, a practice originated by 
Nicolas Gousseff under the tutelage of Alain Recoing (Conférence 00:52:00). 
Literally meaning something like ‘body-booth’, ‘castelet’ refers to the playboard
used in puppet performance, thus ‘corps-castelet’ is the use of one’s body, 
visible to the spectator, as the puppet’s performance space or scenography 
(Fredricksson 240). Our first sight of Jimmy is clinging to the actor’s leg (fig. 
11) rather than speaking or in a physical relationship with the puppeteer, which
might have made him seem more like a vent doll, such as sitting on his lap. 
Both puppet characters have come from the real world according to the story, 
both are male (and white), both rely on the central character for life and are 
needy as characters, both are voiced by him; the voices come from the actor, 
they are facets of him, this is a self-dialogue. The child is his past and the old-
man a possible future, or a patriarchal father-figure whom he can never please.
The fact the child resembles a vent doll does not perturb the central matter of 
the piece; a ventriloquist and her doll are also in a self-dialogue and all the 
same questions of control, who has the upper hand and whose voice emerges 
pertain in a similar way.
The makers claim:
We wanted to mask the link between puppets and puppeteer as little as 
possible because the puppets are part of the character. So the work was
about erasing the actor in order to give more life and autonomy to the 
puppets, while also emphasizing his presence because it’s the 
cohabitation which allowed us to explore the conflict of the hero. That 
seems contradictory, but it’s precisely this ambivalence which interests 
us; the meeting point of the animate and inanimate. ("Fastoche 
Présentation" 7)
The central character is an erasure; he is experiencing an identity crisis, and he
is staged in such a way as to erase him further in order to boost the presence 
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of the puppets. However, the show is about him. If a criticism is to be levelled 
at it, it is that drama is not about conflict, but about conflict resolution, and 
here the resolution comes suddenly and simply when Jonathan leaves and the 
characters fly off (literally, from the balcony on the end of a kite). It feels as 
though the story in the flat could have carried on and his leaving could have 
happened at any point. Perhaps this was intentional, exploring the idea that 
the choice to change, or to accept change, is not necessarily precipitated by 
anything in particular, but just comes. The piece is flawed, in my view, but 
well-crafted and skilfully performed.
The two performers are white men in their early thirties. The piece is 
about the banal existential crisis of a thirty-year old white male lacking 
direction in life, implicitly heterosexual; he is troubled by the seductive 
presence of the Marianne, the religious zealot at the door. It was loosely 
inspired by the novel Naïf. Super by Erlend Loe (1996, French edition 2003), a 
white male Norwegian writer in his mid-twenties about a self-similar and 
implicitly heterosexual character. I am stressing the young, white, 
heterosexual, male projection of experience since it is typically criticized in 
feminist circles as being mistaken as representative of universal human 
experience. Fastoche explores a certain lassitude and directionless mental 
wandering that has been seen as characteristic of the millennial generation, 
maybe more so of males, but which is distinct from older masculine 
stereotypes (macho, bread-winner, boss and so on). Its exploration of the 
uncertainty and fluidity in this tendency means it breaks with more traditional 
masculinist roles and discourse. Fastoche was made in collaboration with three 
women - the co-director, writer and puppet-maker, that is to say, the co-
producers of the form and content of the piece. However, the piece is an 
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existential inner dialogue, and not savvy about, or simply not interested in, 
questions of difference or unchallenged norms.
As a female audience member and mother, however, I felt a connection 
to the material. The piece was open enough to accommodate my experience in 
spite of initially suggesting it might be only a narcissistic, young, white, male 
story. This came partly the sense of blurring of person-image on seeing the 
protagonist, Jonathan, with Jimmy clinging to his leg and Georges to his neck. 
Their physical presence as puppets, and their need to be carried and cared for, 
cannot help but remind me of my life of the past few years, caring for a baby, 
then toddler, now young child. In the show, time passes ever so slowly, filled 
with nothing much to show for it, and there are precise references to time 
throughout; watching the minutes and days go by in a life of mundane, 
repetitive activity with little punctuation. A bit like lone life with a baby/child! 
Georges also reminds me of my terminally ill dad who, although fiercely 
independent, needed to be cared for towards the end. It is more typically 
women who (still) find themselves caring, often simultaneously, for young 
children and ageing parents.
To see this young white man in this position is quite startling. He has to 
look after them although they are aspects of himself, ‘inner phantoms’, 
‘monsters’; what Tual calls in the blurb about the show, ‘Terrifying mirrors. The
ghosts of bygone childhood. Old age in a hurry, knocking at the door before its 
time’ ("Fastoche"). These figments of Jonathan’s imagination need feeding, 
washing, taking to the toilet, playing with, keeping safe and getting to sleep. 
He is alone in his task, isolated. This resonated with my experience of life as a 
new mother, cut off from my former life of work and purpose. Jonathan gets to
walk away at the end, leaving Jimmy and Georges in the flat; he watches them
fly away on the end of the boy’s kite spool in the show’s oneiric conclusion. A 
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woman, of course, does not get to walk away typically; even when the child 
leaves home she is still mother, and the child is in some sense still clinging to 
her leg (forever part of her person-image)7. While I am fairly certain Tual and 
team did not have resonance with early motherhood in mind, the story of a 
dispersed, evolving and conflictual person-image speaks beyond the 
particularity of this character. (Although the ending brought me back ever so 
slightly to, ‘Ha! The male experience; leave the flat, close the door behind you 
and watch your problems fly away on the wind!’.)
Fastoche uses the puppets as an ‘appui’ or support for its exploration of 
person-image. ‘Appuyer’ in French means support, but also press or press into.
I find my ‘appui’ or support through my skeleton by pressing into and away 
from the ground. By concretizing the characters as puppets rather than leaving
them as voices in Jonathan’s head, the need to deal with them physically 
arises. They make real, physical demands on the actor just as the skeleton 
makes demands on the person (to move in certain ways and not others). They 
are a creative constraint. Evolving relationships must be found with them 
throughout the piece. Thus, the drama of Jonathan’s shifting person-image is 
played out between the three main bodies on stage. The joy of Fastoche comes
from the fact that I perceive the actor to be in three places at once; in his body
and in the two puppets. Not just as an idea, but as a physical reality.
The piece is punctuated by songs, mostly sung as Jonathan, except one 
which is sung by, as, or through, Georges (Figs. 12 & 13), with different 
implications for how Tual is playing with person-image. If the song is sung by 
the puppet, Tual has successfully created a separate person-image for 
Georges. If it's as Georges, the puppet has become part of Tual/Jonathan's 
7 This ‘mothering’ role might of course also be played by a single father, or a man who is 
the main carer for his child or children.
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person-image. If it's through, Tual extends his person-image into the puppet. I
think it shifts as the song develops; it starts being sung by Georges and 
Tual/Jonathan is almost invisible. When Tual/Jonathan lifts George up, he sings
the song through Georges, extending his person-image into the puppet. The 
shift happens because Tual goes from being behind, partially hidden by and 
close to the puppet, to distant from the puppet to whom he is visibly giving his 
voice. The focus is still clearly on the puppet, but Jonathan projecting is also 
very much part of the stage picture.
In the opening song we see Jonathan for the first time; uptight in his 
unstylish jumper, arms held to the sides, thumbs nervously rubbing index 
fingers, feet close together, stiff and puppet-like. He sets up the story and 
expresses the need to ‘let his body breathe’. He comes across as timid and 
afraid of life. If I were to give the character a FI lesson, my first instinct would 
be to work towards expansiveness and movement in his upper thorax, bringing
clarity to this area into his person-image. I do not have the impression that 
Tual is like this; I feel he is very much in control of the person-image with 
which he endows his character, although he almost certainly has some part of 
his own person-image which is unclear and could be clarified, and since this 
character is based on his clown (Tual), it seems likely that the fictional person-
image is related to his own. He has control over Jonathan and the puppets in a 
similar way. Not the kind of control where he imposes on them exactly what he
wants, but in which he collaborates with them, with their particular 
materialities, to give them life.
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 Fig. 12 & 13 Two points in Georges' song in Fastoche, 2014. Image © Véronique Lespérat-
Héquet (12); Jean Henry (13).
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Jonathan recounts taking the kite - symbol of the levity and freedom he 
lacks - on the beach since the boy disappears without it. This act brings Jimmy 
into his life. Our first sight of them is Jimmy clinging to his leg, and Georges 
(as yet unexplained) clinging to his neck. Both look at him - a neat reversal of 
the more typical puppet-puppeteer relationship where the puppeteer is looking 
at the puppet in order to give it focus. Jones cites focus as one of the principles
of puppetry, 'watch your puppet's face' (264). Although Tual is also focused on 
them, he allows himself to behave sometimes as if they were independent 
entities; he is 'manipulacting' in Gilles/Piris' term. He is their puppet as much 
as they are his; he is at their beck and call. I see three people with person-
images, rather than a puppeteer incorporating or projecting into puppets.
Georges, we learn, seeks Jonathan's help at the swimming pool. 
Jonathan nearly drowns them both in the process of trying to extricate himself.
Georges follows him into a supermarket where he also re-encounters Jimmy. 
Both follow Jonathan and, although he gets inside the flat before them, there 
they are, on the sofa. Jonathan becomes implicated in the lives of these two 
people. He has the cherished kite of one and left the other to drown. Whether 
he likes it or not, they will be instrumental in the shift in person-image for 
which he is looking. A person is not a stand-alone entity - she is always 
intricately mixed up in the lives of others. The use of puppets here serves to 
underline the physical interdependency of people’s person-images, created 
through and with each other.
These characters come from the outside world and through them 
Jonathan explores social aspects of person-image. Georges seems to voice 
what Jonathan thinks society, or older generations, make of him; he goes on 
and on about the wars that have been won and criticizes Jonathan for lounging 
around without a job or any idea of what to do with himself. Jonathan's person-
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image is attacked both from the outside (the characters come from the outside 
world), and from the inside (they are puppets, inner phantoms, aspects of 
himself, voiced, moved and made real by him). Georges asks how Jonathan is 
going to get money to support the ‘collectivity’. Tual explores the multiplicity of
person-image through explosion - several selves are bodily present in distinct 
spaces although only one person is on stage.
Jonathan is unable to produce the person-image that would enable him 
to integrate society ‘normally’ by suppressing his organic needs (in 
Feldenkrais's terms), yet he also has no sense of these needs. The connections
to society and himself are wearing thin. Instinctively he knows this, thus he 
produces a kind of family which enables his person-image to expand and 
converse with itself. Even alone, a person tends to multiply and seek 
connection and communication; the projections come both from the world 
outside and from within. Fastoche is an exploration of psychological person-
image and it is this, more than the central character’s person-image in the 
Feldenkraisian sense, which is moderately changed. The production pack for 
the show states, ‘Facing his visions head on, Jonathan plunges into an 
imaginary battle with his phantoms; it’s a combat with himself and the beings 
in his head,’ who are also referred to as his ‘imaginary friends’ ("Fastoche 
Présentation" 5). Since the phantoms are puppets, the main way in which the 
actor embodies them or is troubled by them in his whole person is through his 
voice.
The voices of the three male characters are very distinct and it is the 
combination of voice and image which troubles. I see three characters; I know 
one is an actor and that the puppets’ voices come from the actor. I know this 
but I allow myself to hear them as the puppets’ voices. The puppet characters 
are imaginary but they are encountered in and come from the ‘real’ world. 
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They seem to have independence and power over Jonathan; they are ‘tiring, 
omnipresent, absorbing, and they say exactly that which Jonathan doesn’t dare
to admit’ (5). (Typical of puppets to express the suppressed!) Like a FM lesson 
(ATM or FI), the puppets give access to neglected areas of Tual/Jonathon. They
force him to do things, pin him down, climb on him, wake him up, push and 
pull him, throw him off balance, provoke and interrupt him. They are puppets 
moved by the actor, so the physical conversation is with himself. At one point 
he almost kills off Jimmy who cooks the flat-owner’s goldfish due to the lack of 
fish fingers on offer. Jonathan throws him off the third-floor balcony; he is run 
over by a Volvo, pissed on by a cat, gets up and rings the doorbell8. He is back.
Tual says Georges and Jimmy are ‘not real, they’re in his head. These 
are rôles for puppets; playing phantoms’9 ("Fastoche Revue de Presse"). I 
attribute his phrase, ‘they’re in his head’, more to conventional thinking than 
describing what the show actually does, which is to impose these phantoms 
very much onto and into his body, through the exchange with his person-image
which happens in his puppeteering, and through the voices he finds, so 
different from each other. At one point, he turns and voices Jimmy without the 
puppet, the effect is electric and both funny and shocking; Jimmy is present in 
this other, yet in this moment I also recognize that he is not in but is Jonathan.
Tual makes two beings simultaneously present in one location. 
The puppets are often abandoned on stage; they are built to remain 
upright and appear tonic, paused rather than dead, with a strong physical 
presence (fig. 14). The voices, however, are very much within Jonathan/Tual 
and of him, giving a sense of a multi-layered person-image. This throws up the
8 The fantasy of throwing your unruly child out of the window is surely one many parents 
have entertained - I know I have!
9 In an interview with Laura Lalande for Téatrorama.
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question of the role of voice in person-image and the influence of person-image
on voice. The voices of Georges and Jimmy come from Jonathan; this is 
particularly clear when he speaks with Jimmy’s voice without the puppet. With 
nothing left to pull the viewer’s focus away from the person speaking, it 
becomes unavoidable that that person is Jonathan. The audience is tricked; 
until this point the puppets have a life of their own. They come from the ‘real’ 
world, they have bodies, voices, personalities, ways of moving and speaking. 
Yet suddenly Jimmy is (in) Jonathan, the puppet’s voice comes from the actor’s
body. My view of the actor’s body morphs; the voice and body don’t seem to 
correspond. I have a sense that Jonathan is possessed by the little boy, but 
also of the layered ages and phases within a single person. Jonathan was once 
this boy, although to the thirty year old man he seems remote, a lost aspect of
himself. The puppets’ voices are in and of the puppeteer.
Voice is an important part of person-image; as much as movement is 
produced in collaboration with environment, voice is also a dynamic interaction 
with the air and space around and in us. There is perhaps a point to be made 
here more generally about puppets that speak. Unless a technique of throwing 
the voice is used, the voice of the puppet will not come from the puppet. Voice 
is an intimate part of a person and her person-image, so the speaking puppet 
cannot be fully endowed with a sense of person-image of its own. 
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Fig. 14 Georges sitting alone in Fastoche, 2014. Image © Véronique Lespérat-Héquet.
 
It is possibly coincidental or unconscious, but nevertheless worth noting 
that the three male characters’ names all begin with the consonant sound, ‘je’, 
which means ‘I’ in French. The show in an exploration of 'Je'. The two female 
characters offstage are not voiced by the actor but by a recorded female; the 
Ma of Maman (who leaves answerpone messages) is echoed in the name of the
evangelist at the door, Marianne, a name which evokes the maternal figure of 
the Virgin Mary10. The female characters are described as coming from the real 
world ("Fastoche Présentation" 7). The presence-absence and otherness of 
these mother figures highlights the contradiction inherent in human 
experience; a person is always attached to others in some way but must
10 A commentary on the masculine view of the mother and females in the piece is possible. 
Marianne is represented by a comically tiny puppet; does Jonathan see himself as bigger 
and more important than this woman? The mother is of the stereotypical anxious/nagger 
type.
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acquire independence.
The themes of independence and freedom were important to Feldenkrais for
whom a more detailed self-image, or awareness of oneself in action, was key to 
potency and independence as an individual. This independence is characterized by 
freedom from feeling the need to fulfil societal and parental expectations, and 
recognizing one’s organic needs in order to attain maturity and ‘the potent self’ 
(1990, 2002, 2005). It is neither selfish nor selfless but hangs on self-knowledge 
and awareness as a route to heightened intersubjective and world/environment 
awareness. Developing the self-image (according to which one is acting) is key to 
this for Feldenkrais.
Jonathan’s mother leaves voice messages which he ignores; he seems 
annoyed by Jimmy who wants his mum. Marianne11 whispers about taking care 
of his spiritual needs; arguably another kind of mothering. She comes out of a 
massive book, presumably a bible, she is not voiced by Tual and only appears 
once. After the fantasy, which is bookended by her voice at the door, Georges 
reprimands Jonathan for missing the opportunity and not letting her in; ‘He’s 
the loser of the year ... He has no backbone, he’s a slug,’12  (fig. 15). He calls 
him spineless, an expression indicating, interestingly, an inability to approach 
life in an affirmative or potent way. Fastoche has a subtext around dependence
and independence. In spite of the process that has occurred inside the flat, the 
piece cannot end inside; Jonathan must and does return to the world outside.  
The shift in his person-image will only be affirmed when he confronts the 
outside world afresh. 
 
11 Represented by a puppet 50cm high.
12 My trans. from the performance.
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Fig. 15 Georges attacks Jonathan in Fastoche, 2014. Image © Véronique Lespérat-Héquet.
In a FM workshop I taught for drama students, one woman looked as 
though she was trying to shake off or stretch out the effects of a lesson, to 
return to her former, familiar sense of herself (as often happens); I observed 
that she might like to try not doing this and stay with the unfamiliar feeling to 
see what it brought her. Jonathan accepts the unfamiliarity imposed on him by 
Georges and Jimmy, but eventually shrugs it off. Dramaturgically, it might 
have been more satisfying (and more typical) to see a greater transformation. 
The character is just a little lighter at the end and the imagery bolsters this 
feeling with its airiness; Georges and Jimmy are carried off on the wind. The 
change is subtle and the existential precipice does not completely disappear 
from view. 
The blurb for the show suggests the ending is optimistic, that he is ‘Like 
everyone, like he was before, but with a smile’ ("Fastoche"). The piece is 
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clownish and funny, but also dark and troubling, and this is not resolved at the 
end, although there is a small sense of relief that he gets out. The struggle to 
realize a full person-image will continue, it does not stop. Jonathan leaves his 
watch in the flat (abandoning the sense of time running out, or life passing him
by?), the phantoms fly off, and the character hasn’t changed much. This is a 
gentle transformation and, from a Feldenkraisian view of self-image, this is 
interesting. It’s a first approximation. The piece is described as ‘the ordinary 
epic of a guy searching for himself. A guy like you or me, banal perhaps, but 
hero of his own life!’ ("Fastoche"). It celebrates that subtle change can be as 
powerful as radical change, which is interesting theatrically as well as in terms 
of life. Tual and his collaborators recognize that this is not a tragedy; the 
character is nowhere to begin with, with nowhere to fall. The piece is 
nevertheless engaging and memorable because it evokes co-present multiple 
person-images and this is the ongoing and never-finished story of every 
person’s life. 
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6.3 Ilka Schönbein / Chair de ma Chair (2006)13
  
Figs. 16, 17, 18 Ilka Schönbein/the Mother in Chair de ma Chair, 2006. Image © Frederick 
Guerri.
Every protrusion can take the place of another. We have possibilities of 
transformation between phallus, nose, ear, hands, feet, fingers, toes, 
nipples and breasts; every round part can represent another - head, 
breasts, buttocks; every hole can be interchanged with another - mouth,
ears (in some respects, eyes and pupils), openings of the nose and 
anus. Each zone has typical lines of extension. The anal zone extends 
over the back. The mouth will generally extend in the interior plane. 
The details are not yet very well known. Actions may create artificial 
caves in the body; the inside of the hand and the inside of the mouth 
and the inside of the genital region may be substituted for each other. 
(Schilder 2000:182-183)
Schilder's description of the malleability of body-image pertains to the 
metamorphic work of Ilka Schönbein, where a backside becomes a king’s face, 
13 I saw this show, inspired by Pourquoi l'enfant cuisait dans la Polenta (2004), a novel by 
Aglaja Veteranyi, at Le Grand Parquet in 2006, and had access to a film of it (Schönbein 
and Nota). 'Chair de ma Chair' means 'flesh of my flesh' in French.
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a head the tail of a mermaid, a back a pregnant belly, ankles knees, knees 
buttocks and so on14. Puppets amplify, distort, project and focus her gestures 
(or those of the performers she works with); they are an expression of the 
body-image of the performer, articulated in space beyond herself15. 'Schilder 
writes, ‘Whatever the psychic motives for the transformation myths may be, 
they are based on the plasticity of the body-image’ (2000:205). Schönbein 
works precisely with the plastic body-image of myth and fairy-tale; Guidicelli 
refers to her 'zoomorphic body' (71). Her first solo work was the Ovidian-titled,
Métamorphoses (1993), which she continued to transform over several years, 
renaming the last version Métamorphoses des Métamorphoses (2003)16. She 
never considers her shows finished, which is key to seeing them as ongoing 
explorations of person-image. She prefers the sense of transformation in the 
French word 'marionnette' to the rigidity of the German-derived 'figure' 
(Gérard), even though she quickly felt being a puppeteer was not sufficient 'to 
explore the whole terrain of its possibilities'17 (Schönbein 24).
Considering puppetry as a way of exploring person-image is an unusual 
way of looking at puppetry and not one all puppeteers would recognize in what 
they do (including Schönbein who shows no interest in analysing her own 
work). Schönbein elides herself and her puppets so that it is hard to say who is
14 The choreographer-dancer, Mary Wigman, and artist-performer, Valeska Gert, are men-
tioned by Gérard in connection with Schönbein (107). Interestingly both were active in 
the German and American English-speaking worlds when Schilder was developing his 
ideas, as well as Bodenwieser. The comparison between Schönbein, described as per-
forming with bohemian audacity (Cramesnil), and Gert warrants further consideration, 
particularly in relation to person-image, but this is outside the scope of this thesis.
15 I have only been unable to obtain permissions from one photographer of Schönbein's 
work (Guerri). For other images of Chair, see Castellat. For images of Chair and other 
shows, see Gérard with photos by Marinette Delanné, Schönbein's long-standing photo-
grapher. 
16 I saw it in 1996 and have see most of her work since.
17 My trans. of 'pour explorer tout le territoire de ces possibles'.
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moving who. She says, 'The puppet is totally linked to my body for me … My 
ideas are always with my body. Each puppet takes my body in a different 
way'18 ("Conversation" 11). However, she also says the puppet comes first; you
have to adapt the body to the puppet ("ILKA SCHÖNBEIN" DailyMotion 
00:07:45). What appears is a multi-directional feedback and sensitivity. She is 
no shrinking puppeteer hiding under a hood or behind a castelet. The shows 
she creates display facets of the artist at their core19. She is the castelet, and 
more; her technique is a radical form of corps-castelet which she calls 'body-
mask'20. She is ultra-present in every atom of her being; when I first saw her 
perform in 1996, I could hardly take my eyes off her feet, they were so 
inhabited and expressive, so present. Her skeletal form vibrates with luminous 
energy; her person-image seems to extend to all parts of herself and into her 
puppets, totally elastic and malleable.
She says, ‘I belong to my puppets,’ (Jusselle 47), 'I've let the puppet 
take possession of me, of my hands, then of my legs, of my face, of my 
buttocks, of my stomach, and of my soul'21 (Schönbein 24). She responds fully 
to these material extensions, saying the puppet makes simultaneous dialogue 
possible; 'you can incarnate at least two people or characters'22 
("Conversation" 11). She is in them and they are in her on a very precise 
18 My trans. of 'La marionnette est pour moi totalement liée à mon corps ... My idées sont 
toujours avec mon corps. Chaque marionnnette predn d'une autre manière mon corps'.
19 Bettelheim's psychoanalytical analysis of fairy-tales might offer a starting point for con-
sidering the relationship between Schönbein as a woman and the themes in her work. 
20 She trained for many years as a dancer in Steiner Eurythmy and in string puppetry with 
Albrecht Roser (Schönbein 24).
21 My trans. of 'J'ai laissé la marionnette prendre possession de moi, de mes mains, puis de 
mes jambes, de mon visage, de mes fesses, de mon ventre et de mon âme'. Also cited 
by Prost, 161.
22 My trans. of 'tu peux incarner au moins deux personnes ou personnages'.
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physical level, but also in utterly invested dramatic and ludic play. These are 
very real possessions through which she seems to find herself in a connection 
with her audience23. The audience relation has always been important for 
Schönbein; she started performing her own work busking on the streets and 
has expressed the sense of freedom she got from having a very direct playful, 
but also economic relationship with the spectators.
With Schönbein, puppeteer and puppet share the same status; both are 
moving and being moved. Her puppets have become part of her body schema 
and she uses them to explore person-image experientially and visually, from 
the inside and outside. I focus on Chair de ma Chair (Chair), which she calls ‘A 
solo dialogue between me and the child I was’24 ("Chair" 2006), but for me she 
is always working on the same theme. Person-image. The ways she does this 
fall intriguingly between the puppetry of Fastoche and the Le Roy of Self 
Unfinished that I consider later in this chapter. She constantly finds new ways 
to occupy and become possessed by new person-images. Writing on 
Schönbein, Jusselle theorizes '...if every puppet can become body, the body 
itself is the first puppet' (57). One reviewer said of her, ‘She is not a puppeteer,
she is a live puppet’25 ("Chair" 2006), and she says, 'I try to adapt myself to 
the state of being of the thing that has no life...' (Gross ch. 11). She attaches 
elements moulded from her body parts and face to different parts of herself, 
moving, often in front of a mirror, until she finds hybrid forms where the 
viewer no longer knows where she ends and the puppet begins. She describes
23 I am reminded of my cat-skin possession, albeit a moment of discovery rather than mas-
tery on my part.
24 My trans. of 'Un dialogue en solo entre moi et l’enfant que je fus.' The piece is not, in fact
a solo; Schönbein is accompanied by Nathalie Pagnac and Bénédicte Holvoote.
25 My trans. of ’Elle n’est pas marionnettiste, elle est une marionnette vivante.'
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working with the mirror as easy because there is an external control; in front of
an audience she must find an internal technique to replace it ("ILKA" 
DailyMotion 00:08:15). She attempts to find out how to extract characters 
from her body (Gérard 123).
Like Fastoche, Chair is based on a contemporary novel. It is the story of 
a gypsy circus family on the run from the dictatorship in Romania, seen 
through the eyes of a young girl in its midst, Olinka. Gross claims the story in 
Chair is 'made to depend on these mysterious objects, always caught in 
transition between animate and inanimate, dead things that can become the 
vehicle of a spirit'26. He refers to the two-way impulses between the puppets 
and puppeteer, writing 'the desolation and uncertain life of the puppets was 
bound to the desolation and life of that body, which so strangely put itself at 
risk to animate those figures, to bring itself close to their condition of uncanny,
half-deathly life' (ch. 11). The hard lives of the characters emerge as hard 
visions in Schönbein's sculpting hands and sinewed movements. Her person-
image is transformed in this process and there is no functional separation 
between her and her puppets. She sees the process of animation as one where 
a piece of life is torn from death, which itself is sitting inside her, in the form of
her 'squelette sauvage' (Gérard 14). She embodies her skeleton as an inner 
puppet, an idea introduced in Chapter 5. There is a tension between the living 
and the non-living in her work and it is often hard to distinguish between them 
(105).
26 Gross writes, 'The puppets in Ilka Schönbein’s Chair de ma chair (My own flesh and 
blood) were less separate creatures, things with bodies and heads of their own, and more
parts of bodies, worn, stressed, starved, and exhausted remnants. Many were hollow 
masks of faces, broken or split. Others were supplemental limbs, perverse prostheses, an
arm and a shoulder, a partial torso, a leg with a cane as if thrust through it, or reaching 
arms attached to the spokes of a bicycle wheel. These puppets seemed as close to ruin 
as possible. Moving them with both delicacy and eerie devotion, the puppeteer held these
masks, limbs, and torsos by turns close and apart from her own body, using now her 
hand, now her own head, even her feet. She was always present onstage, a body 
stained, worn, almost starved. Her own face was often visible below the masks she wore
—the margin between face and mask was at times like a scar' (ch. 11).
252
That Schönbein is the centrifugal hub around which her puppets fly is 
demonstrated in her puppeteering (or her puppets'?) choices. In Chair, she is 
clothed as the mother-aerialist for her first appearance, with pale flesh-
coloured material covering her whole body except for one leg, which is in black,
and a red bra (Figs. 16 & 1727). The black leg is, if you will, the masked 
puppeteer; the rest of herself, Schönbein gives to the puppet. She covers the 
right half of her face with a mask attached to a skein of vivid red hair and holds
a papier-mâché leg, topped by a red-knickered pelvis and pierced by a walking 
stick ("Chair. Sallaumines" 00:01:11). (The walking stick will later be used as 
just that, leg still attached, when the mother has had the accident that was 
waiting to happen.) Standing on the black leg, she creates the illusion of flying 
by lifting her other leg and the papier-mâché leg, a trope she uses in other 
shows. It is the movement of her pelvis, with the puppet leg held closely 
against it, that drives the movement of the image. The pelvis and standing leg 
are the axis around which the rest moves. There is no sense of independent life
or animation; she is the source and control of the image, utterly involved in it 
to her core. Not wearing a mask but possessed by the puppet. Her own and the
puppet's presences and body-images are inextricably interwoven and 
interdependent. When she whips off the mask and drops the act, the 
leg/walking stick becomes an object again; the moment of possession is over 
(until the next one).
This relates to a point Schilder makes about the contradictions in human
beings:
We desire the integrity and the totality of our own body; we are afraid of
every change which may take away a part of this body (castration and 
dismembering motive); but we are still continually experimenting with
27 See also Gérard 29.
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 it. Our delight in imagining beings with an increased number of limbs is 
an example of this experimentation. I remember the strong impression 
made on me by a scene on the vaudeville stage when the body of a 
performer was so well concealed behind the body of another that only 
his arms and legs protruded and one saw an individual moving with four 
arms. This is the playful multiplication of limbs28. It is the same motive 
which comes out in the innumerable limbs of Indian Gods and 
Goddesses. Very similar motives are to be found in the drawings of 
children. (2000:205)
His linking of this phenomenon to childrens’ drawings is important in relation to
Schönbein; fairy tales are often her source, and the self-transformations and 
iterations in her work strongly relate to the exploding possibilities in the child’s 
imagination. It is no surprise she has made superb work for children29, and 
even her early street work was, by its democratic placing in the public sphere, 
for everyone rather than for adults alone.
Schönbein’s manner of making her puppets, incorporating the forms of 
her own limbs and face with objects, conjures a world in which things invade 
person-image and people meld with things, as with the walking stick-pierced 
leg. At another moment in Chair, she wields two lower legs (the child’s) with 
ice-skating blades emerging directly from the feet (fig. 19); object and 
anatomy are welded together as she is with her puppets. A child mask has a 
comb embedded in its scalp which she sometimes uses as the puppet’s control 
(fig. 20). The nonhuman comb is embedded in the human-seeming puppet and
acts as human-puppet go-between. And at another point, she merges the child 
with a bicycle wheel (fig. 21), creating a metaphorical prison; a sense of the 
28 Multiple legged, flying combinations of beings are a common occurrence in Schönbein's 
work, such as in La Vieille et la Bête (Gérard 19) and Voyage d'hiver (Gérard 26, 27).
29 Le Roi Grenouille (1998); I saw the 2006 version. Also her collaborations with Laure Can-
nac, Alexandra Lupidi, Kerstin Wiese and others.
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life on the road she cannot escape. In another show, Voyage d'Hiver (2003), 
pieces of torso and mask meld with a window frame (Gérard 99-102).
  
Figs. 19, 20, 21 Ilka Schönbein/the Child in Chair de ma Chair, 2006. Image © Frederick 
Guerri.
The relationship with the only man figured in Chair is entirely different 
to that with the child and mother puppets. Schönbein plays Olinka, and the 
man, a puppet, is her father; her knees are his backside, her feet are in his 
shins and she moves his arms, upper body and head with her arms through his
nightshirt sleeves (fig. 22). Her ankle joints are his knee joints, her knees his 
pelvis and her arms his neck. These non-habitual roles assigned to joints might
have delighted Feldenkrais. Schönbein maintains two characters throughout 
this uncomfortable, incestuous sex scene, hovering between agony and 
ecstasy. Sometimes there are overtones of a baby (the man) suckling at its 
mother’s breast. She is herself/Olinka from the pelvis up; the father a semi-
conjoined and unwelcome partner she conjures and plays with. That’s a lot of 
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plates spinning. Developing the ability to play with person-image and diffused 
focus would make a useful contribution towards training to do this.
Fig. 22 Ilka Schönbein as Olinka with the Man/her father in Chair de ma Chair, 2006. Image
© Frederick Guerri.
Schönbein varies her technique on occasion. In Winterreise (2003) she 
creates a figure with an elongated spine topped by a chamber pot head above 
her own, with a ribcage visible beneath a cotton smock which descends to the 
floor - her arms in its arms. She dances round and round and the spine’s 
flexible material responds; it is the continuity of her own expressive and 
flexible spine. The puppet spine magnifies and extends her movement. If her 
movements were rigid and she did not have access to all her vertebrae in her 
person-image, the puppet would not have this expressivity. The performer 
extends her person-image into the puppet. She creates interest and confusion 
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by her displacement of masks and body parts, feelings which arise perhaps 
from the fact that although we acquire a sense of our human bodies, a child-
like sense of potential lingers, if only in dream. She creates illusions, blurring 
the viewer’s perception of where she is or of who is present. This reminds me 
of Feldenkrais’s use of non-habitual movements to re-ignite curiosity in one’s 
actions. Schönbein gives external form to her play with non-habitual person-
image.
Person-image is malleable, incoherent, evolving; it is to be played with, 
as Schilder suggested. The development of person-image is a process of 
inhibition, where all possible images are progressively contained and shaped 
into something that fits into the society of other person-images, even as it 
continues gradually to evolve. Schönbein holds open a door to look back into 
that cauldron of potential. In a sense Feldenkrais’s 'five lines' are a fiction and 
a limitation. Why not three or a hundred or a thousand lines30? NASA scientist 
turned origami-artist, Robert Lang, makes hundreds or thousands of creases in
a single sheet of paper to produce a wide and wild variety of abstract and 
nature-based forms ("Crease Patterns"). Without diminishing the value of using
the five lines, which relate to a biomechanical norm, for helping to develop 
awareness of person-image, I think there is space to experiment beyond this 
too and consider unlimited or limited lines and directions into and from the 
person. This is the work of puppetry. Schönbein riffs on this.
Of the central relationship explored in Chair, Schönbein, quoting the 
novel on which the piece is based, says:
30 As alluded to in Chapter 4, some people actually have three lines (double leg or arm am-
putees, or conditions where one or more limbs is not present from birth), and some ex-
perience more or fewer lines than their physical body manifests (phantom limbs, para-
lysis).
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This mother loves her daughter to the point of eating her. ‘My daughter 
is my life. If my child abandons me, I’ll die.’ She has not understood 
that the truth of love is to give the child its freedoms so that its own 
personality can develop. And the child realizes, ‘My mother comes in and
out of me. I seem like a photo of my mother. I seem without my self.’31 
("Chair" 2006)
A mother's desire to consume her children is archetypal, and typical. I feel it. 
The question of space for the child is real; she needs the space to develop an 
independent person-image. This relates to what Feldenkrais refers to as 
maturity, which comes from self-determination. The focus on the mother-
daughter relationship in Chair implicates the mother in the person-image of the
child. She threatens like a phagocyte while the child attempts to establish her 
own person-image. Schönbein's body-mask technique is justified thematically; 
the figures of mother and child partake of the same body here. There is one 
person at the centre of it all, with an expansive, elastic person-image. 
Schönbein’s possession is not only by the puppets, but also by the text: ‘I 
didn’t adapt the text at a desk! It’s the puppets which each chose their parts’32 
("Chair" 2006). 
She incarnates the child in Chair on a less one-on-one basis than the 
mother, her face sometimes visible and commenting, or counterpointing, the 
child mask she holds in one hand in front of her, as well as sometimes playing 
and speaking as Olinka. At one point, she sits with one leg folded under her
31 My trans. of ‘Cette mère aime sa fille jusqu’au point de la manger. « Ma fille c’est ma vie.
Si mon enfant m’abandonne, je meurs. » Elle n’a jamais compris que la vérité de cet 
amour c’est de laisser la liberté à l’enfant pour que puisse évoluer sa propre personnalité.
Et la fille se rend compte « Ma mère entre et sort en moi, j’ai l’air d’être une photo de ma
mère, j’ai l’air sans moi »'.
32 My trans. of 'Je n’ai pas fait le choix du texte au bureau! Ceux sont les marionnettes qui 
ont choisi, chacun son propre passage'.
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and the other standing in front of her, wearing a papier-mâché forearm and 
hand holding a bowl on her foot. I see a child with an emaciated and elongated
upper arm and shoulder (Schönbein's real shin, calf and knee). Schönbein 
switches constantly between shadowing the child character, being the 
character, and projecting into and through the puppet33. Here is a multiplicity 
of separate person-images, selves with faces, in contrast to Le Roy’s fluid 
unfinished self (below), and Tual's trinity of separate entities.
Just as Schönbein plays with syncopated rhythms banging with the bowl
and spoon and the words she speaks (‘Mutter…Mutter…’; ‘Mother…Mother…’), 
she also syncopates attention and presence between herself, her limbs, and 
the elements of the puppet. She plays with layers of presence, at one point 
maintaining a fixed point with spoon in mouth in disbelief at her mother’s 
departure while the child mask continues to move, head searching forward. 
The dexterity of self here is something akin to a drummer maintaining multiple 
rhythms with hands and feet. This is not a puppetry of the hands; it is 
dexterous in Bernstein's sense, for whom 'dexterity is in finding a motor 
solution for any situation and in any condition' where 'demand for dexterity is 
not in the movements themselves but in the surrounding conditions' (Bernstein
Essay 1). Schönbein holds the child mask with her reddened hand over its 
mouth and eats out of its head as if from a bowl (Gérard 83). The soul of the 
starving, abandoned child is eating its own mind (Gross ch. 11). Or another 
interpretation. The mere presence of two gazes, hers and the puppet’s, 
demands a split focus of the performer, and of the audience. The dexterity of 
the performer asks for dexterity from the audience.
33 For a fragment of the scene, see "Chair. Sallaumines" 00:00:55, and the film of the 
whole piece, Schönbein and Nota.
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To look at the skill required for this dexterity, I want to take a detour 
into a specific ATM lesson from Alexander Yanai. In AY 359 “Tanden with 
bending the knees” (vol. 8a:2465-2472), Feldenkrais asks the students to pay 
attention to the area just below the navel (the tanden), and then to continue to
pay attention to this area whilst also paying attention to the length of the 
spine, the legs in the hip sockets, the arms and shoulder girdle, the spreading 
of the face as if it was going to smile, then to all these simultaneously, then all 
this while doing a simple movement of bringing the head and knee towards 
each other. Throughout the lesson he says attention to the tanden is the most 
important and all the rest is just there to challenge this. The puppeteer is 
always involved in split focus in some way, no matter how simple the 
puppetry; there is always at least the duo of practical questions, what am I 
doing? what is the puppet doing? Schönbein visibly attains multi-directional 
attention; her presence not only runs throughout herself, but into and through 
her puppets too. Roser told her the secret is to focus all one's attention on the 
object (Gérard 114). In my view however she moves beyond this to develop 
absolute concentration on the object whilst being utterly present (in) herself. 
Tual’s focus skips between himself and each of his puppets; he has more of a 
tendency to occult himself sometimes. This is partly dramaturgical choice, but 
clearly you need to have the capacity for diffuse attention to use it. 
I find the “Tanden” lesson useful towards puppetry because the constant
focus on the proximal, while also attempting to sense the more distal parts, 
helps diffuse awareness throughout myself while maintaining a clear centre. 
For puppetry this diffuse but centred awareness is key; I need to have a very 
clear sense of my centre in order to dose the movement of the puppets at the 
periphery, but also to sense and allow them to destabilize me in creative ways.
Schönbein's tanden + distal awareness is visible since both are in play; she is a
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good example to help understand why FM is particularly useful for puppeteers. 
With puppeteers who are not ‘manipulacting’, the proximal-distal relationship is
still important although it is not mise-en-scène, or mise-en-avant. Whether my
puppet is on my hand above my head, hanging on strings from my 
outstretched arm, supported on my shoulders, or whatever, mastery of the 
tanden (proximal) will help mastery of the puppet (distal), which may be one 
reason dancers often find the basics of puppetry easy to pick up (Buckmaster, 
The Great War Horse). It might be more accurate to refer to mastery of the 
exchange between the two, or the capacity to respond spontaneously in this 
exchange. Without a diffuse and accurate sense of tanden + periphery, 
movement in the puppet cannot be mastered (which is not the same as 
controlled; mastery allows for feedback from the puppet). A musician is 
constantly receiving feedback from her instrument through the way it feels and
the way it sounds which she actively responds to as she plays. With a puppet, 
movement is produced, so the input and the output are in the same mode 
(rather than movement and sound). Since my focus is movement, I am not 
taking into account the voice in puppetry, which adds another layer of 
complexity of which we caught a glimpse in Fastoche. The puppeteer who uses 
her voice will have to master this aspect of acting and placing her voice as well 
as the tanden-periphery awareness, although these are not unrelated.
It is perhaps no coincidence that Feldenkrais refers to actors and 
musicians in the “Tanden” lesson:
It is not important what a great actor does. When he is a great actor, 
whatever he does is okay. How does he become a good actor? There is 
something inside that he senses, organizes, understands, before he 
does it and everything that he does is okay. The same thing [applies] to 
someone who knows how to play an instrument. It is not after he plays 
note “A” that he goes “I played a note that was not in place” or “not on 
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time” or with “too much force”. It is already organized before this. He 
learns to pay attention to the melody despite disturbances that are in 
the movement, despite the difficulty in the speed of the movement of 
the hands, reading the notes, or seeing the note. We want to arrive at 
the same in movement. That means it is possible to hear the melody 
despite the disturbances in the movement. (AY 359, 2470)
He locates the absence of ability in the faulty self-image:
Get rid of the performance. You will see that when you get rid of the 
performance, it is possible to distinguish all these faults, this absence of 
an ability to do something. The absence of the ability is not in the back, 
not in the muscles, but in the place in the nervous system that is the 
image of the movement. (2469)
So the tanden-periphery relationship is deeply connected to having a full and 
organized person-image that can be relied on when the person wants to 
perform with a puppet. Feldenkrais’s understanding of the power of the tanden 
serves to underpin the work of the self-exploding puppeteer.
There is a difference however between producing movement in the 
centre that is expressed towards the periphery (what Schönbein often does), 
and keeping the centre as a dynamic anchor while producing lots of movement 
at the periphery, as in much string and hand puppetry for instance. Here the 
free but full tanden ensures freedom in the shoulders, elbows, wrists and 
fingers in a manner akin to playing a fingering based musical instrument. So, 
while what Haller calls ‘minimizing the complications between ourself and 
another’ (2010) by organizing gently from the centre and not from the extrinsic
musculature is key to hands-on in FI practice and some of the puppetry 
Schönbein is involved in, a slightly different version of this is needed the more 
distal the puppet. The centre still needs to be organized to free the distal from 
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excessive tone or tension not only to lift or move weight, but to be freely and 
creatively dexterous. I am not going to puppeteer your ribs like piano keys in 
FI, but for FI, puppeteering and piano-playing, I need the same freely available
movement in my fingers, wrists, shoulders, spine and pelvis, home of my 
tanden.
Speaking of her own preparation technique, Schönbein says:
It's difficult to tell you what I do. I don't exactly do yoga, but I try to be 
as open as possible to what I see and hear ... I also do concentration 
exercises in my own body. I try to heal things that aren't working … the 
most important is to be in the present moment34. ("Conversation" 11)
Her process sounds close to FM, involving self-scanning and attention to fine 
sensations in order to improve (processes Feldenkrais had no monopoly on), 
although she also invokes connecting to spirits and sprites in nature. A 
chacun(e) sa sauce (each to his/her own.) Interestingly, Schönbein says she 
invents a large part of her shows whilst on the road, driving ("ILKA" 
DailyMotion 00:12:30). This might be seen as another way of using split 
awareness, like the “Tanden” or a “Bell Hand” lesson; the driving becomes a 
kind of meditation which unleashes her imagination.
It would be too facile and essentializing to say Le Roy and Tual’s work is
more masculine and Schönbein’s more feminine since the stereotype of the 
masculine might be seen as more clean and conceptual while that of the 
feminine might seem messier and more expressive. I can think of plenty of 
messy, boundary-defying work made and performed by men (e.g. Par le Boudu
34 My trans. of 'C'est difficile de raconter ce que je fais. Je ne fais pas vraiment de yoga, 
mais j'essaie d'être ouverte à ce que je vois et entends... Je fais également des exercises
de concentration dans mon propre corps. J'essaie de guérir des chose qui ne vont pas ... 
L'important ... c'est d'être dans l'observation du moment présent'.
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(2001) by Bonaventure Gacon, or Faust 2360 Words (2005) by Akhe 
Engineering Theatre) and conceptual work made and performed by women 
(e.g. Vera Mantero and Claudia Trozzi). But Schönbein’s work does have a 
messy and overflowing aesthetic, even while it is also extremely physically, 
rhythmically and emotionally precise. She specifies her interest in women's 
cycles of being and she works for the most part with women, including all the 
projects she has directed in the last few years. There is a sense of ad hoc in 
the puppets and things she makes; they evolve as she makes and plays with 
them, as if she were a child at play. Birth is a recurrent theme (fig. 2335), and 
the sense of creatures emerging from her conjures the leaky, fluid outpourings 
of birth and babies; waters breaking, blood, meconium, placenta, milk, poo, 
wee, sick, tears, screams36. At the end of Chair, the audience is invited to eat 
oozing polenta and red sauce, in which the nearly aborted child, Olinka, has 
cooked in the story (Jusselle 2008:9). Her attachment and involvement with 
her creatures is passionate; she births and mothers them. The joy, sorrow and 
frustration are there. Although not seen as a politcal artist, she says her 
creativity engages at the point where politics creates suffering; she seeks 
provocation (9). For me, her work cuts to the core of motherhood; this is 
political.
35 See also Gérard 33-40 and 43-47.
36 Jusselle finds the puppet, in Schönbein's work, prolongs the feeling of loss, like feces and
(presumably the excretions of) breast and penis (2008:10).
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 Fig. 23 Ilka Schönbein/birth scene, Chair de ma Chair, 2006. Image © Frederick Guerri.
A pregnant woman has her person-image perturbed as she swells and 
grows another being which will eventually have its own person-image. Her 
sense of balance is affected, her centre of gravity changes, she swells a little 
over the whole of her body as her body produces about 50% more blood and 
bodily fluids; she literally takes up more space. Schönbein allows her puppets 
to occupy and challenge her person-image in a similar way; this is what I see 
in a memory from Métamorphoses, where she gives birth to a puppet baby37. 
Along with Neville Tranter, Philippe Genty and Moussoux-Bonté, Piris 
classes what Schönbein does as manipulacting, which he defines as disclosing 
37 A scene also filmed for the television ("Ilka"), and in a more intimate setting ("ILKA" 
YouTube).
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‘a human being and an object engaged in a relation of self to Other’, (2012:4). 
As discussed above, I dispute the usefulness of this definition, finding it richer 
to consider ‘manipulacting’ as an exercise in the flexibility of person-image, 
where the apparent boundary between self and so-called other is eroded and a 
person emerges as a knot in a meshwork, rather than in opposition to an 
‘other’. I also find the terms 'manipulation', 'acting', and their combination, 
reductive in relation to Schönbein's work where possession and sublimation 
seem more apt. Prost considers 'the puppet is not a simple extension of her 
body she brings to life through manipulation', but that 'it is the performer's 
body which is extended through her doubles' (161)38, suggesting that the 
puppets are indeed tools in the exploration of facets of person-image. Jusselle 
sees the half-flesh, half-material puppets as animating the body they have 
emerged from 'by an effect of reversibility' (2008:9).
Schönbein finds a specific relationship with the ground, with the surface 
she is on, as well as specific input from each piece and form of her material, 
and a way of being that is attentive to the meshwork, to concrete reality and 
the materiality within which, and as which, she becomes. Gérard considers that
she reminds us we are our bodies, unique and similar to each other, linked to 
others (109); finite but meshworked creatures. Schönbein creates an 
unbounded self and allows for an open reading of person-image that neither Le
Roy's mercurial but clean and bounded work, nor Tual's clarity do.
Schönbein allows us to consider the performative merger of person and 
not-person. She is radically invested in her performances. She inhabits her 
puppets; they inhabit her. Her puppets are her creations, her emanations, her 
children to a certain extent. Her performances can be seen as exploring Grosz's
38 Piris also cites Prost's argument (2012:51).
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previously mentioned ‘multilocational, plural, ambiguous, polymorphous’ 
female sexuality (1994:83) and, more generally, archetypal woman's 
experience. The impression of a hall of mirrors, or iterations of self is created 
partly by the deformed moulds of herself she often uses as the basis of her 
puppets (Prost). She is saying, look at these versions of me, these echoes, 
aspects, facets, these continuities of me. They are coming out of me. They are 
in me. There is a fluidity between the corporal and the plastic, the material, 
which is articulated to give rise to a vision of a fantastic world where psyche 
and a deep connection to myth, folk and fairy tale is revealed. She is 
puppeteering with her whole person very clearly. By comparison, Le Roy is 
more like a disinterested observer of himself in SU, and Tual’s exploration of 
self is more anecdotal, less far-reaching, less complex. More psychological.
To return to Schilder’s woman with a feather in her hat, it is perhaps not
so much that her person-image extends into the feather as that she allows the 
feather to draw something out of her in terms of a response. By learning to 
stand and move using the specific support from the surface I’m on, and the 
specific input of the things I touch, my work as a puppeteer is liberated. This is
facilitated by FM and it is a huge part of a puppeteer’s work. The ground is the 
first partner, the first thing, on which the relationship with all the other things 
relies. Puppetry is responding adequately in the first instance, and then 
creatively to things and forces outside oneself, with a creative understanding 
that inside and outside are not strictly opposed. If I try to control and focus on 
what my puppets, or hands do, I literally have nothing to stand on. Everything 
on stage is constructed from relations (meshworks), not from actors or acting. 
The puppet gives solid form to this, particularly in what Piris calls 
‘manipulacting’ and other instances when the puppeteers are clearly visible, 
even if not performing something other than as puppeteers.
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Person-image is a relational idea involving how the outside world 
contributes to the person. Schönbein highlights this; she is becoming through 
her puppets and the meshworks which are her constantly shifting shows. She 
does this with child-like glee and pleasure, drawing on fairy-tale dark and 
lightness; she is like an unhindered child constantly remaking herself through 
the stuff with which she plays with sensual pleasure. Even her use of the mirror
in her creative process is child-like; children play with the visual images of 
themselves as much as with other sensory and proprioceptive aspects. FM can 
learn even more child-like pleasure from puppetry, and liberate itself from a 
too human or anthropomorphic idea of self-image. Nothing is the limit.
6.4 Xavier Le Roy / Self Unfinished (1998)39
Put very simply: I become a different person depending on how I 
construct my body. (Le Roy in Cvejić 2014:158)40
The last work I discuss here comes, perhaps provocatively, not from 
puppetry but from contemporary dance41. Therefore, by way of justification, I 
will introduce it via a puppetry act. Not that these are or should be strict 
categories, but I have, after all, thus far placed my research in the context of 
puppetry.
39 My experience of this show is via video and Le Roy and others’ words about it. Since the 
discourse around live performance forms a large part of its presence in society given that
only relatively few people experience the live event, I think it is justifiable to include this 
work in my discussion due to its pertinence.
40 My trans. of ‘Pour le dire très simplement : je deviens une personne différente suivant la 
façon dont je construis mon corps.’
41 Athough its status as contemporary dance has also been questioned in spite of its inten-
tion, and it might also be called 'conceptual dance' (Burt, Cvejić 2015:5) or 'practical 
philosophy' (7).
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In a workshop on Russian articulated cabaret puppets in which I 
participated in 200342, a colleague made and performed the puppet pictured 
below (fig. 24). The performer is bent over, hands on the floor; she wears two 
puppets, one which uses her legs as legs, and the other her arms as legs43. 
Each wears a coat down to the ‘ankles’ and the puppet/coat arms cling to the 
‘legs’ of the other puppet as they wrestle, tumble, kick and fight. There are two
heads attached to the lower back of the performer. The effect is startling; I see
two beings wrestling, while the puppeteer is hidden, albeit unconventionally. 
Only at the end does the puppeteer suddenly stand up, fling the ‘arms puppet’ 
off, and reveal herself; the reveal is part of the number. I knew she was there 
all along but my imagination is delighted by the sudden revelation. I am 
reminded of a story a Japanese dancer told me of her first experience of 
theatre-inspired wonder; after a simple hand puppet show she saw as a child, 
the puppeteer threw his hands in the air and sent the puppets flying, revealing 
his bare hands. She found this marvelous. In relation to person-image, the 
performer says, ‘I created these beings possessed of person-image before you 
and now I contract them back down to myself, or my hands’. The delight arises
from the elastic play with person-image. There is one person present, but 
several person-images.
42 "Stages Marionnettes.”
43 Thanks to Sonia Masson for information on this act. For versions of this number by Alex-
ander Matus-Marchuk, see "The struggle" and "Kampf".
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Fig. 24 Sonia Masson in a recreation of a Russian cabaret puppet number, 2003. Puppet 
design by Galina Molotova and Vladimir Kantor, made by Sonia Masson. Image © Sonia 
Masson.
The duo of Russian puppets use the walls (to push the other up against) 
and the edge of the stage (to hang the other off) to great theatrical effect. 
They seem intent on battling each other, locked in their wrestling embrace, 
their focus towards each other. The image is fixed – there are two heads on 
two bodies to latch onto and believe in - and the figures are involved in a 
situation which has already developed into a fight. There is no question about 
form or content; the number works brilliantly as it explores the gags and 
possibilities within the constraint. Two person-images are constructed and 
inhabited by a single performer and then shed, or contracted back into the 
performer herself.
The related dance piece I want to consider, Xavier Le Roy’s Self 
Unfinished (SU), was made in response to Schilder’s concept of body-image. 
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Set next to the Russian cabaret number, I think it clearly has its place in this 
discussion. To an extent, it plays with person-image in a similar way to the 
puppet number, as can be seen in figs. 25 & 26.
Figs. 25 & 26 Le Roy in SU, 1998. Images © Katrin Schoof.
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Le Roy’s top pulled up over his head makes him into two beings in 
dialogue, male and female perhaps. The ‘woman’ advances on the ‘man’ and 
there is some conflictual play, as in the puppet number. But the fact that they 
are joined via Le Roy’s midriff such that they appear to merge creates another 
level of confusion. There are no helpful puppet heads or arms here to help the 
viewer rationalize what she sees into two beings. I see one and two and even 
three and four beings simultaneously. One and two and three and four person-
images. None complete. There are no heads. There are a skirted being, a 
trousered being, a four-legged, headless being and a man bent over playing 
these tricks on my mind. A hybrid, yet also separate beings. Cvejić sees these 
as Deleuzian 'captures'; new entities made in a choreographic composition that
partitions the body, clothing and movement (2015:74). The way Le Roy frames
this ambiguous multiplicity of selves contributes to how a viewer might read it. 
He does not start the piece in hybrid form as the wrestler puppeteer does. 
From the start he is working on what Cvejić identifies as the question, 'how will
he not decide what is to be seen?' (75). 
I will describe the action44. A tall, slim, white man, neither young nor 
old45 sits at a table and looks at the audience as they enter. He wears a grey 
shirt, black trousers and black, Converse-style shoes. He stops looking at the 
audience, makes some small robotic gestures and sounds and does a robotic 
walk46. He stops the robot business and moves backwards across the space as
44 Cvejić offers a detailed description and analyisis of the SU with a different emphasis from
mine (2015:73-83); my discussion of it is limited to how it pertains to puppetry and my 
argument, rather than a systematic approach to it as a whole.
45 SU was created in 1998 when Le Roy was 35 and was last performed in 2010 according 
to Le Roy’s website ("Self Unfinished").
46 There is perhaps a dance historical link to be made between SU and Bodenwieser's De-
mon Machine, mentioned in Chapter 3, on the theme of person-iamge and body-as-ma-
chine.
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he lifts his shirt over his head, bending forward, shedding it to reveal a black 
‘skirt’ underneath; the waist is around his lower ribcage and the skirt descends 
to his wrists, covering his head, shoulders and arms. His hands and wrists 
become the feet and ankles of a headless skirted figure, which meets and 
merges with the headless trousered figure of his legs. There is something 
about the unstable image which is deeply troubling. The lack of a head or 
heads, the thing that perhaps most gives a sense of another self, of another 
person, disturbs. As a puppeteer, I can transform most things into puppets 
simply by giving them a head, or, more specifically, giving them a direction47; a
sense that they are focusing on something beyond themselves. This hybrid of 
Le Roy’s might seem to have no outward focus, given the lack of head(s), yet it
does give a sense of exploring its simple world (unlike the Russian duo, whose 
focus is more internal and exclusive). It moves in space in a nonhuman way, 
like a different kind of organism, guided by other information from its sensitive 
extremities. The ambiguity of the relationship between Le Roy’s lower and 
upper halves means there is a strong sense that they are evolving in their 
given environment and in relation to each other.
He goes on to remove his clothing, leaving black shorts and a T-shirt, 
which he subsequently removes to play with his naked back and arms while 
resting on his shoulders with his back to the audience and his legs on the floor 
upstage (like the Plough position in yoga, only with arms outstretched to the 
sides). He makes his way under the table like this; it boxes him in, his body 
constantly seeming to morph into different forms. He is continuously 
constructing and reconstructing his person-image with the objects, including 
his clothing, on, around and inside him (his skeleton). Cvejić notes reviewers
47 According to Mottram in a workshop, puppets are pointing machines; the puppet with the
biggest nose would earn the most money in the marketplace, vying for attention.
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were uncertain how to name this body; one German article title began, "How to
become a chicken: Metamorphoses..." and another used the phrase 'headless 
crawling creature' (2015:234n.1)48. I also see a naked fetus; a self unfinished.
Le Roy doesn't do a curtain call. Diana Ross's Inside Out ("Diana Ross") 
is played as the audience exits; Le Roy awaits them in the foyer. The song's 
lyrics continue the theme of transformation:
Upside down
Boy, you turn me
Inside out
And round and round
And perhaps also make a comment on the performer-spectator relationship:
Instinctively you give to me
The love that I need
I cherish the moments with you (Edwards et al.)
The slow pace of the performance has demanded attention from the audience; 
they have operated the transformations. While Le Roy's solo might be seen as 
solipsistic (Lepecki), and literally navel-gazing at times (in the part seen by 
some reviewers as a headless chicken), he needs the spectators and cherishes 
his moments with them.
By entering this space of transformation, Le Roy approaches the 
territory of puppetry, but in the simplicity of his proposition, he also does 
something else. Where Tual explodes one person-image into a trinity, and 
Schönbein creates a multiplicity of separate person-images, fragments, and 
48 Le Roy concurs that naming is part of the regime of theatrical representation. Cvejić adds
that the need to identify the object bypasses the process of differentiation that happens 
in duration (2014:173). I have not addressed the issue of time and duration in this 
thesis; there is work to be done in this area with regard to person-image.
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world-person encrustations, Le Roy implodes many selves which merge within 
and perturb one human form and its environment. Using only regular items of 
simple clothing and retaining the visibility of his bare limbs, he makes no literal
attempt to hide the one human body present on stage. Le Roy says, however, 
that he tries to disappear, 'to become the space, to melt into the environment 
thanks to my posture and the quality of my presence', to become a horizontal 
or a vertical line at different moments, 'an object in space' (Cvejić 2014:176-
177):
In order to interpret the material, I am attentive to the things with 
which I am in contact ... I become the contact between the wall, the 
floor and my body ... I try to think of myself as an element participating 
in the composition created by the chair and the table, my legs being 
additional chair legs. I bring an extension to the objects.49 (177)
His manner of inhabiting his performance recalls Silk's call for the actor 'to 
study the concentrated life in a chair, a table, a commode - the unhurried life' 
(228). Le Roy allows his person-image to be subsumed by the environment; it 
is truly meshworked, at least from a visual point of view. He sees the elements
of the piece, including himself, as part of the same thing, rendered thus by his 
contact with them. Returning to the idea of puppetry as bringing awareness to 
handling things, Le Roy can be seen as taking a full-body puppetry approach. 
The performance situation here provides a limited context in which to observe 
meshworked person-image.
The piece functions a bit like the optical illusion below, where the viewer
sees a rabbit or a duck (fig. 27), except that Le Roy's creation is more complex
49 My trans. of ‘Afin d’interpréter le matériau, je suis attentif aux choses avec lesquelles 
j’entre en contact … je deviens ce contact entre le mur, le sol et mon corps … je tente de 
me penser comme élément participant  à la composition créée par la chaise et la table, 
mes jambes étant le pieds additionnels de la chaise. J’apporte une extension aux objets.’
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since it involves, at a certain point, two figures in movement that seem to be in
a relationship. Two truncated humans welded together. Headless conjoined 
twins. In the Russian duo some of this complexity is absent: I see two pairs of 
legs, two sets of arms and two heads, although they could also be conjoined 
twins. I know there is one person beneath it all, but this is far more like the 
duck/rabbit. I can see the two human figures, or I can see the human beneath 
it all, and I can jump between the two. In Le Roy’s unfinished self, there are no
two to go between, no heads to count; it is all and always transitioning. It is an
example of pushing at the boundaries of what a body is, what a body can do50, 
and how a body can appear; Manchev finds not only the self effaced, but also 
human and even animal morphology (Le Roy et al. 101), and Cvejić that the 
body is one with its movement (2014:159).
Fig. 27 Anonymous image first published in German magazine, Fliegende Blätter, 1892 
("Duck-Rabbit"). Wikimedia Commons.
50 Le Roy asks ‘what can the body do?’ after Spinoza, rather than the essentialist ‘what is 
the body? (Le Roy et al. 96, Burt).
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While Le Roy is not intending to do puppetry, by positioning his work 
alongside the Russian number, some shared ground is revealed and a 
discussion pertaining to puppetry opens up. In both, Piris’s Self and Other are 
co-present in the same place. In the Russian number, the puppeteer is hidden 
until the reveal at the end. Le Roy never hides his presence. The puppets are 
more like body masks perhaps, where it is also true that Self and Other are co-
present in the same place, or that other has possessed self. However, SU and 
the puppet number both play with co-presence beyond notions of Self and 
Other, and can be considered in terms of extensions and transformations of 
person-image. There is a fecund territory where Self in Other and Other in Self 
elide and exchange. To me this is more interesting thinking ground than the 
rather simplistic Self-Other binary. It matters because it points towards how 
Piris’s argument relates to and differs from mine.
In Le Roy’s SU, I see a man transform himself into a hybrid man-
woman-creature, a multiple and evolving thing that is not one or two, but a 
shifting form and number - literally a self unfinished, undecided, feeling around
in the world possibly for other elements to absorb or extend into. Le Roy’s 
origins as a research biologist are hinted at both in the title and form/content 
of the piece; in a human embryo, the potential beginnings of a new ‘self’ in 
terms of sex differentiation begins only in the sixth week of pregnancy. Prior to
this, cells multiply, and, while the sex of the child is determined by the sperm, 
the actual process of differentiation has not begun. In six week old embryos, 
‘the internal reproductive organ precursors are bipotential, meaning they have 
the potential to develop into both male and female sex organs given the proper
chemical instructions’ ("Sex Determination"). Le Roy presents us with the 
beyond biology vision that this bipotentiality is ongoing, if not on a (unaided) 
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physiological level, at least on an imaginative level, and he makes this 
imaginary real, concretizing it in such a way that it plays with my mind.
Le Roy says, ‘My body appears as being something else than a human 
being’ (Coccio 00:01:35). For him, the ‘self unfinished’ arises from the fact that
each time he watched back what he did on video as he created the piece, he 
saw something different although he thought he had done the same thing 
(Cvejić 2014:167). His subject is not the trick, as with the puppet number, but 
the slipperiness of the self, including a deft questioning of the fixity of gender 
via the co-present opposition of skirt and trousers; his title is precise and a 
super succinct summary of Schilder’s ideas - Self Unfinished. Self as process. 
He is exploring the possibilities within a constraint, as the puppet number is, 
but he has made the constraint much more ambiguous, less specific and 
presented it within a larger work offering a more complex frame in which to 
read it. He says:
I wasn’t interested in producing the question, ‘who is that?’, even 
though I knew the question was a plausible one. As far as possible, I 
wanted the question to be, ‘what is that?’, and so invite the audience to 
ponder the meaning of these things placed in front of it … the spectator 
could attribute different meanings to the same object (or same 
movement), and [that] each individual spectator would regularly remind
himself/herself that the body s/he was gazing at was both human and 
inhuman at the same time. As if s/he were to say to himself/herself 
‘that’s just a person there’ and then straight afterwards ‘but no, it’s not 
possible, it can’t be…’ (Cvejić 2011:191-2).
He aimed to keep the viewer’s imagination moving, to give her an uneasy 
experience. Ambiguity of gender is a common zone of play, even in the 
everyday, but not ambiguity of personhood. There is something monstrous in 
Le Roy’s human/not-human in the way it deviates from 'the natural or
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conventional order'; it is 'unnatural, extraordinary' ("monstrous"). It is for him,
however, more about simple transformations than internal struggle (Cvejić
2014:160).
This is Yvonne Rainer’s wonderful evocation of her experience of the 
piece:
The brightly lit performing area gives no clues to "how to read" and the 
mechanical-man beginning is offset with a return to ordinary task-like 
activity: walk, sit, turn off tape machine. By the time you're into the 
contortions with the dress, we're given this extraordinary hybrid 
creature which confronts us with a multiplicity of interpretations. For me
it alternated variously as insect, Martian, chicken, watering can, 
caterpillar into pupa, et al. What saved it from being a Pilobolus-like 
entertainment (a crowd - pleasing American group that combines bodies
to create biomorphic oddities) were the stillnesses and extended 
durations. We must sit with our attention riveted, waiting for the next 
stirring. Like watching a spider or snail. Your timing in this piece is 
exquisite: no pandering to short attention spans here. ("Self 
Unfinished.")
Her suggestion that timing is key to taking it beyond the trick51 is interesting in 
relation to FM where going slowly is more likely to yield change in the self-
image. The way Le Roy takes his time allows for the shifting perceptions of the 
viewer to emerge.
Cvejić refers to the "zones of undecidability" Le Roy identifies - where 
the body moves forwards and backwards, or left and right at the same time, 
where it can be simultaneously man and woman, human and nonhuman, 
animate and inanimate (2014:15). Barba's notions of ''luxury' balance' and 
51 Although a child at the performance in Zagreb asked its mother, 'Can you buy me this 
toy?'! (Cvejić 2014:173).
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'dynamic opposition' (53) pertain here in terms of technique, although Le Roy 
has his own approach to finding and embodying these qualities. Person-image 
is modulated in different ways to inhabit movement in performance. In 
puppetry, the inhabited movement can occur beyond the body of the 
performer. Le Roy inhabits the stillness of his environment, or allows it to 
inhabit him.
Deleuzian themes of repetition and difference are present in SU and its 
making. Le Roy's decision to work alone, with video feedback, for SU makes his
creative process similar in structure to an ATM, repeating movements and 
observing difference in the context of unfixing person-image. He moves from 
relying on visual feedback from the video to integrating 'kinaesthetic 
information' from questions like 'where is my weight?' and 'do I stretch my 
back or keep it compact?' (Cvejić 2014:168)52. We return to Latour's idea that 
reality expands in relation to one's capacity to notice differences (2004a:85). 
Deleuze notes that 'real repetition is of the imaganation' and 'difference 
inhabits repetition'53 (103). 
I claim above that it is the presence of a directed head which most gives
a sense of another self in puppetry, but there are perhaps ways of moving in 
the world which give the sense of another being, if not what might normally be 
considered as a conscious one. A thing that seems to have an intention - to 
find food, to escape trouble, to reach towards something - needn’t have a head
52 Spectators often comment they would be in pain in the positions he takes, as if they put 
themselves in his experience (Cvejić 2014:174); they imagine themselves in their cur-
rent person-images doing what he does, with his person-image, which does not produce 
pain for him. 
53 Spectators often comment they would be in pain in the positions he takes, as if they put 
themselves in his experience (Cvejić 2014:174); they imagine themselves in their cur-
rent person-images doing what he does, with his person-image, which does not produce 
pain for him. 
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to exhibit active interaction with its environment. All living things, including 
plants and fungi, are moving actively and reactively, but at different speeds 
and in different ways. So the distinction that is most interesting is perhaps 
between animate and inanimate, rather than between conscious and non-
conscious, which is a philosophical minefield. Even animate-inanimate however
is a tricky binary. It is not alive and dead exactly, although it is related to this. 
Rock is dead in a sense in that it is made from dead matter from eons ago. A 
clearer distinction might simply be between that which moves itself, and that 
which doesn’t. However, even here there are problems. Lava flows from a 
volcano. It moves. Rather than a flat category or binary, it makes more sense 
to see the Earth as an actively moving, animated thing, supporting lots of 
different gradations along a scale of animateness-inanimateness, or self-
moving to non self-moving. In a similar way, I have different kinds of tissue; 
relatively slow bone, fast blood, faster neurons, as well as hair and nails that 
can be cut off me to become inanimate objects. All things and qualities of 
movement in the world are available to influence my person-image; this is 
what Lecoq’s work is about. Feldenkrais's is about how I find support to move 
from the surface I am on in relation to my self-image. Le Roy's is about how 
person-image is evolving.
In both the puppet number and Le Roy’s piece, the performer is a 
soloist. The puppet costume attempts to make it seem there are two beings 
present. They might be able to step apart and exist separately. Le Roy never 
commits to a number of selves present at any given time and even the 
different selves or beings that emerge and retreat are partial; they are 
fragments which depend on each other, never potentially separate entities. In 
this too Le Roy is very Schilderian; body-image emerges from social and 
environmental interaction thus body-images are co-dependent on each other, 
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they form a community. He affirms a multiplicity of co-present body-images 
which themselves are subject to slippage and change, woven together in a 
complex meshwork, influencing each other and fed by the environment. 
Lepecki arrives at a similar Schilderian analysis of SU:
Le Roy’s self is unfinished not because it has not been completed yet, 
but because it can never be completed. This incompletion does not 
derive from some tragic interruption of a teleological process, but from 
Le Roy’s predication of ontology on radical incompleteness, on an 
ongoing process he calls “relation” ... Explaining his idea of relation, Le 
Roy invokes Paul Schilder’s notion of “body-image” (1964), and makes it
work along Deleuze and Guattari’s notions of becoming and of body 
without organs (43).
Lepecki goes on to quote a large chunk of Le Roy’s text for performance, "Self 
Interview" ("SI"), in which he asks (himself), ‘why should our bodies end at the
skin or include at best other beings, organisms or objects encapsulated by the 
skin?’. Le Roy goes beyond Schilder, seeing the body as 'fluid and dynamic', 
with 'osmotic' borders' capable of incorporating not only objects, but also 
discourses. These incorporations are short or long term; long term 
incorporations could be termed habits. It could be argued that FM is a 
discourse (amongst other possible discourses) that we propose the student 
incorporates; a new set of movement habits. But ones which support rather 
than threaten the growth of the person. For Le Roy, 'the body-image can 
shrink or expand; it can give parts to the outside world and can take other 
parts into itself' ("SI"). It can not only incorporate, but also extend to occupy 
something else, such as a puppet.
Le Roy claims he never wanted to represent 'becoming'; his interest lay 
in 'the oscillations between two eventual images' (Cvejić 2014:170). Person-
image conceived as such, rather than 'imaging', acknowledges the experience 
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of oneself as fixed; I might experience one thing then another but I am less 
likely to experience changing. Transformability as simple fluidity is criticized by 
Manchev as a potential 'apology for the fluidity of contemporary capitalism with
its unlimited 'permeability' and speed; on the contrary, the power of resistance
supposes an immanent resistability … : the weight of experience'54 (Le Roy et 
al. 100-101) (his italics). Le Roy notes that 'fixing' is impossible, but without it 
we can't understand or progress (101). We are skeletal beings, with access to 
an almost fixed solidity in ourselves. A deeper sense of the power of 
Feldenkrais's notion of self-image as a fixed but mutable thing connected to 
skeletal awareness becomes apparent. Le Roy's interest echoes this; the 
human feels, understands or sees something, or something else, but not both. 
The meshwork has fixed nodes, the human has monomotivated coalescences 
(person-images); they work against a flattening monist view of things.
Psychology, socio-historical context and anatomy do not offer a 
sufficient basis for Le Roy's notion of body-image; 'All kinds of non-human 
influences are woven into us,' he says. He proposes that, 'The body could be 
perceived as space and time for trade, traffic and exchange,' acknowledging 
Grosz in relation to this idea ("SI"). Feldenkrais might be seen as having 
remained attached to older ways of understanding self-image including the 
homunculus and an emphasis on anatomy via the skeleton. But in terms of 
what he did, he fully acknowledged the person as a space for exchange; his 
method is a dance of exchange, physical in FI and via words in ATM. Le Roy's 
expansion of the concept of what he calls body-image to allow for the inclusion 
of and extension into objects and discourses is an important conceptual 
progression from where Feldenkrais left self-image. Le Roy ultimately sees that
54 My trans. of 'l'apologie de la fluidité du capitalisme actuel, da sa "perméabilité" et de sa 
vitesse illimitées; au contraire, la puissance de résistance suppose une résistabilité im-
manente … : le poids de l'expérience'.
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'if each individual is perceived as an infinity of extensive parts, ‘individual’ 
would be a notion completely devoid of sense'; here he rejoins Schilder's 
community of body-images and Feldenkrais's notion that 'who' does an action 
becomes less important as person grows and improves, to be trumped by 
'what' and how and they do the action. 'Individual' loses its sense because it is 
a process of exchange and connection with other 'extensive parts'. (Le Roy's 
thinking stays very much in the material world, as does Schilder's and 
Feldenkrais's.)
Le Roy continues enigmatically, 
because I am composed by an ensemble of an infinity of infinite en-
sembles of extensive parts, I never stop to perceive exterior stuff. Per-
ceptions of myself in my relations to exterior stuff. Perceptions of exter-
ior stuff in relation to myself, and it’s all this which make the world of 
signs. THANK YOU TO DELEUZE, THANK YOU TO SPINOZA. ("SI")
I take this to mean that there is ultimately no interior or exterior, but only the 
capacity to sense, which amounts to saying I am my capacity to sense. This 
capacity gives me my person-image. In terms of puppetry, person-image then 
takes on a vital role as the communicative interface where me and not-me 
mingle.
Later in "SI", Le Roy refers to a proposal for a project involving 'Experi-
ments and investigations about human and non-human bodies as extensions 
one from another, using "movement-based art", their performances and rep-
resentations'. This could describe a starting point for a puppetry project and 
harks back to what I mentioned at the start of this chapter: there is scope for a
more radical enquiry into what distinguishes puppetry as an artform that, more
than any other, specifically investigates humans and nonhumans as 'extensions
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from one another'. This might not result in any output recognizable as pup-
petry, a show, or a concrete research outcome. Le Roy criticizes and wants to 
escape what he perceives as the capitalist constraints on scientific and artistic 
research which requires them to produce papers or shows ("Score"). A space is
needed for deep, non-goal oriented investigation. 
Towards the end of "SI", Le Roy makes two statements;
The utopic implies the presence of the imaginary because fiction is in-
herent to sensorial process itself. 
The utopic is not beyond reality but contaminates reality by the perman-
ent activity of our perception. (His italics.)
The fiction inherent to the sensorial process itself relates to person-image; use 
of the imaginary and the imagination are required elements simply for every-
day existence, not extra add-ons. The utopic person-image is unattainable but 
that is not the point; it opens the space for the imaginary and the imagination. 
The utopic person-image therefore ‘contaminates’ reality by challenging the 
activity of perception and imagination. Contaminates here could also be re-
placed interestingly by ‘liberates’.
Lepecki claims Le Roy’s (and, by default, Schilder’s) desire is to ‘replace 
the singular notion of the body as ‘stable unit bound by the surface of its skin, 
the body as spatially and temporally belonging only to the place-instant of its 
appearing, with the centrifugal notion of a body-image as unfolding multiplicity 
spreading in time and space’55 (129). The puppet however is not becoming, it is
being - it has no internally produced body-image, only one given to it by a 
puppeteer. The becoming of the puppet comes about only through its use.
55 Although, as noted above, Le Roy's is a nodal multiplicity, not a smooth one.
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Sometimes the desire is to make it seem as though it is alive, therefore be-
coming, unfolding, but sometimes the desire is for it to be what it is and not a  
stand-in for a becoming something. When it is not in use its uncanniness 
emerges since it is capable both of becoming and being in a way a human body
is not (Bell 2014, Freud, Jentsch). The puppet is connected in a signifying 
meshwork since it is a made and used object; it is part of a discourse even 
when it is not integrated into someone's person-image. 
In a later piece, Untitled (2005)56, Le Roy himself chose to use puppets. 
Spectators were given torches which they could use to discover bodies on 
stage, some human and some puppet. He wanted the puppets ‘because they 
involve human beings in a prosthetic relationship with and to an inanimate ob-
ject’ (Cvejić 2011:193), (to move a puppet, a human must move), and in order
to explore 'the interdependency of the environment and the body, whereby the
environment is regarded as an extension of the body and the body as an ex-
tension of the environment'. Le Roy observes what amounts to the influence of 
objects on person-image, or 'how a body in contact with an object makes an-
other body, or another entity with specific ways of moving and being'. The fo-
cus when observing person + object is on the qualities of the object rather 
than the transformation of the person(-image). Le Roy notes that typically an 
observer sees a bag that looks heavy, rather than the shift in tension in the 
person carrying the bag. In preparation for Untitled, he spent hours moving 
and being moved by objects with varying 'density, fluidity, elasticity, and rigid-
ity', to experience the effect on his body (Cvejić 2015:118). This led to the 
construction of a 'human-like object' from stuffed clothes, moved proximally 
body to body, with the hands, or distally with strings. Cvejić notes points 
56 My only experience of this piece is through its traces; critical writing and a paucity of 
photos.
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where 'action blurs the source of movement' so that 'the causal relationship-
between human agency and the inanimate material thing appears reversible' 
(119). A performer admits having to change the choreography depending on 
how the puppets react, saying that 'neither the performers nor the puppets are
completely independent, "free and his own. It's the connection"' (123). How-
ever, this slow performance in the dark mostly annoyed audiences (124), and 
seems to present a conceptual play with perceptions and categories regarding 
person-image as much as a dialogue with materials or an investigation into hu-
man-nonhuman interactions where the co-creation of person-image might be 
scrutinized. Le Roy moves from an undecided body in SU to a confusion of bod-
ies in Untitled57. Both have an affiliation with puppetry but make the spectator 
do different work. By applying a puppetry perspective as I have here, with a 
particular focus on person-image, the works open up in new ways which point 
to territories that puppetry practice might go on to investigate.
57 Cvejić finds that SU and Untitled both ask not 'Who is it?', but 'How is that a body? Is it a
body? ... Where does the movement come from if not from the body and if it doesn't ex-
tend in space?' (2014:14).
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
… the space shrunk between puppet & person & all became humanized &
wooden at once.
Rampolokeng (219)
My aim in this thesis was to clarify the concept of person-image in FM 
and examine it in relation to puppetry. To do this, I returned to Feldenkrais's 
source for self-image. Schilder provides an important exploration of ideas on 
person-image (his 'body-image'), rooted in clinical practice and an intuitive 
grasp of lived reality as meshworked. I discovered in Schilder an important, 
and hitherto untapped, resource for thinking about person-image in relation to 
puppetry and objects, and their integrations in us. Ingold's meshwork has 
provided me with a conceptual context which enables puppetry and person-
image to be considered as part of an ecological whole. I conclude that person-
image and puppets are nodes in the meshwork, and use the term 'nodal 
meshwork' to guard against a sense of a homogenous monist or holistic whole. 
There are nodes and holes in the whole! The meshwork is textured. Not all of 
Latour and Bennett's actants have the same weight or influence. Those that 
can move themselves with intention have a responsibility in the meshwork.
I have trawled Feldenkrais's work and my experience of it to elaborate 
person-world collaborations as producers of person-image and how this 
phenomenon can inform puppetry practice. I have analysed ideas around 
human-world relations presented by Kleist and Silk, and Lecoq in his pedagogy,
as a focus to hone my own suggestions towards a new practice that I call 
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Awareness Through Puppetry. Using the rich, porous, pliable concept of 
meshworked person-image that I have developed, I have analysed 
performances by Tual, Schönbein and Le Roy and shed light on the work that 
might yet be done by puppetry. I conclude that there is a new subversive and 
radical phase that puppetry can move into as a somatic technology.
A radical approach to puppetry and its possibilities as a human artform 
cannot ignore person-image and cannot revolve solely around the 'actant' 
capacities of things and materials, but must involve refined somatic sensing. 
Asked whether, as a FM practitioner giving an FI, one should be concerned with
oneself first or with one's student, trainer Karzen says without hesitation, 
always yourself first. In FI, Haller and Zones place a particular emphasis on 
self-organization in order to be available to sense what's going on in the other 
person. Being available to sense is also at the heart of puppetry. Puppetry 
could benefit from fundamental research on the intermingling of, and 
responses between, human and nonhuman bodies, on the co-creation of 
person-images between human and nonhumans.
According to Claudel, in relation to Bunraku, but also transferable as an 
idea to puppets more generally, 'You don't touch a puppet and it doesn't know 
how to touch you. All its life and its movement come from the heart'1 (Plassard 
80). The puppet is a part in a fragile meshwork of lines along which intuition 
and feeling, both part of skilled action, must run. It is unique in its quality as 
both inanimate and animated. A puppeteer has access to movement in both 
worlds and the puppeteer's skill grows as her awareness of animate-inanimate 
transactions increases.
1 My trans. of 'On ne la touche pas et elle ne sait pas toucher. Toute sa vie, tout son 
mouvement lui vient du cœur'.
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When I saw Bunraku in Osaka in 1999, I was struck by the combination 
of astonishing skill with a kind of naïve delight, both in the creation of the 
performance and in its reception by the audience. Waves were created for a 
scene of two horsemen going further and further out to sea, the puppets 
replaced by smaller ones to create the illusion. Barrault remarked on the fact 
that in spite of the concentrated and contemplative performance, the scene 
changes were noisy and informal; 'there is no attempt to hide the 'jeu"'2 
(2011:14). Claudel refers to the notion from Japanese literature of the ah-ness 
of things that make you go 'Ah!'. This scene of puppets at sea made me and 
others in the audience go 'Ah!'. An ATM or FI frequently makes me go 'Ah!'. 
This 'ah-ness' might also be called the 'elusive obvious'3 or the surprise of the 
expected. In relation to person-image in FM, the 'Ah!' might translate as 
feeling, 'Oh, I can be like this' or 'I feel more like me'. In watching and doing 
puppetry I argue that it comes from seeing or sensing the habitual boundaries 
of person image transgressed.
Playing with person-image, and creating new person-images, is the work
of both actors and puppeteers. Writing about Handspring's work, Marx states 
that 'the puppet and its visible puppeteer exist as a physical hybrid; the puppet
grafted onto the puppeteer’s life force, and the puppeteer grafted onto the 
puppet’s likeness and visual association' (245). Life-force here relates to 
person-image as discussed in this thesis and suggests the arguments can trot 
both ways; the concept of person-image is a tool both for new ways of 
analysing performance and for performance-making.
2 My trans. of 'On n'essaie pas de dissimuler le "jeu"'.
3 The title of one of Feldenkrais's last books is The Elusive Obvious. In it he tries to consol-
idate the thought and experiences of his life.
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FM can be a precursor to anything - it can potentially help to improve 
any activity or function. Puppetry and FM are both, in some way, arts of 
movement and manipulation (albeit a contentious term), both are 
conversations between materialities. In this thesis I show how attendance to 
oneself - somatic awareness - enhances material awareness and swells the 
appreciation of the vibrancy of matter, giving it more chance of a performative 
life. Human bodies are extremely varied but also made of the same material 
and all contain a similar structural constraint (the skeleton). Feldenkrais, with 
his ‘concise, abstract image’, is offering a way to work with human sameness, 
without denying difference and without claiming that the abstraction is real or 
true; it is, precisely, an image. Looked at in this way, person-image can be 
seen as a tool, a kind of thought experiment, for exploring shared human 
concerns on a very basic level; a tool which works on how to be actively 
engaged in the world and other people beyond mere adaptation to 
circumstances, on how to have a constructive critical presence in the world, not
just the capacity for critical thought.
I propose that puppetry and FM, and particularly a cross-fertilization 
weighted either towards Awareness Through Pupppetry, or Puppetry Through 
Awareness, offer practical means to deliver a shift in ways of living and 
inhabiting the world of the kind Ingold, Bennett and Sheets-Johnstone desire 
and theorize, as these practices centre on being more skilled in relation to the 
environment. Part of my contribution to knowledge consists in suggesting that 
knowledge cannot grow as long as it stays within the confines of theory. I could
not have written this thesis entirely at a desk. I offer some suggestions 
towards specific ways of approaching practice, which I claim must engage 
awareness. This, rather than the specific examples I write about, is paramount.
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FM, and arguably any art, centres around the capacity to sense 
differences. Latour observes that the more you learn the more there is to learn 
in the sense that developing the capacity to sense differences increases one's 
'reality'. He writes, ‘There is no end to articulation whereas there is an end to 
accuracy,’ (2004b:210), echoing Feldenkrais on many occasions emphasizing 
that his search is for improvement, not correct movement. Improvement 
comes through articulating more parts of oneself, which FM accomplishes 
through more articulate movement. In FM, you repeat a movement only for as 
long as you are interested in it, and can still discern differences each time. 
There is no ‘right’. Lefebvre suggests that rhythmicity involves not repetition 
but 'differences within repetition' (Ingold 2011:61), which relates to Latour's 
notion of articulation over accuracy and Feldenkrais's anti-perfectionist call to 
do things well but not too well because then you’ll be bad. 
A shift towards thinking in terms of improvement and ever greater 
articulation dovetails with an understanding of the emergent nature of action. 
Bernstein wrote that dexterity involves the 'tuning of the movements to an 
emergent task’4 (“What is Dexterity?”) (his italics). I need to develop my 
capacity to make distinctions between this and that in my own experience in 
order to enable this tuning. There is a footnote to AY 339, one of the lessons I 
refer to in Chapter 4, about the concept of 'Havdalah' in Jewish tradition, which
is said to mean distinction, and is used in relation to remembering the Sabbath
as distinct from the other days, thus reminding people of the distinction 
between sanctity and secularity. The sages apparently explain, ‘If there is no 
wisdom, how can one differentiate?’ (vol. 7b:2328). Feldenkrais’s notion of 
self-image is the wisdom he offers, against which each individual can come to 
sense her difference, and also the difference between her experience of herself 
4  Also qtd. in Ingold and Whitehouse (19).
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an hour ago and now. In performance training, making and enacting, person-
image is a focus for investigation, a generative tool, a theme and a route to 
understanding material theatres which push at the boundaries of the human. It
lights a path for puppetry towards a more radical questioning of itself as an 
artform.
FI is often exhilarating to watch as a person becomes more and more 
differentiated, her movement lighter and lighter, involving more and more of 
herself, as she accepts a more intimate collaboration with the world she is in 
and of. The practitioner appears to have almost magical powers; she does so 
little and the person responds so much. The practitioner reminds the person of 
her humanity, and is reminded of her own. The puppet-master injects 
humanity or vitality into the puppet, or channels this from the thing. In the 
puppet, the more articulation, the more expressive generally speaking. 
Likewise with the person. While there is a clear difference between working 
with inanimate matter and working with people – a puppet is a tool which can 
be physically altered or rebuilt - there are also many similarities in how to work
such that the movement is expressive and meaningful. But it is not an equal 
power relationship and the balance of reponsibility for one's actions is tipped 
towards the human. The puppet doesn't learn, although it can become looser, 
and can break. FM attempts to prevent people from breaking, needing knee 
replacements and so on.
On a simple level, watching humans engage within sensitive feedback 
meshworks with other humans and nonhumans is at the heart of all live 
performance. A somatic approach to puppetry and a puppetry approach to 
theatre-making focus on this. Tools or puppets help tune awareness because 
there is an outcome beyond oneself. Somatic education such as FM can benefit 
from using them.
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Thing interlude #3: Noodling
Another tiny tale of person-image between matter and movement.
Figs. 28, 29, 30 Photos of Pansy Fredricksson, aged 2, and her dinner, by Kristin
Fredricksson, August 2015. Image © Kristin Fredricksson. 
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Three photos of my two year old daughter’s dinner. I’m not sure how it all
started, whether the drawing was interrupted by the arrival of dinner, or
whether dinner was interrupted by the need to draw; I came in at the point the
first photo was taken, while the noodles were being circled with blue crayon.
Was Pansy drawing the noodles in her drawing on the right? Or did the noodles
arrive and seem to her to be a 3D orangey-yellow drawing in need of some
blue? Was she drawing her drawing, this time on the plate? Or continuing her
drawing from the paper to the plate? Did she draw the noodles or did the
noodles noodle her drawing? The event is a collaboration between Pansy, her
crayons and paper, the plate and the noodles. I think there is more here than
just being proud of my daughter’s artistic spontaneity and flair for colour!
There is something happening to do with how a child is negotiating person-
image and world, how the world permeates and traverses the person, and how
it, the world, the stuff in it, needs and finds expression through the person who
is its translator and interpreter. Crucially, the world also translates and
interprets the person. So the ecological question, what are we doing to the
world? is too simple and must be expanded to, what is it doing to us? Because
the first is unanswerable without the second. Puppetry is an activity at the
heart of questioning the relationships between person-image and world. Pansy
is eating the noodles by absorbing them into her person-image rather than
taking them into her oesophagus and gut!
*
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A visitor to Le Roy's Rétrospective exhibition, where parts of his 
choreographies from the previous twenty years were exposed, is reported as 
saying, 'I can't consume here? It's impossible'4 (Cvejić 2014:31). Faced with 
real dancers performing fragments of undance-like dances in and amongst the 
gallery visitors, this woman, conditioned by consumerist society, was uncertain
how to relate to her experience. The work presented was not objects; work is 
no longer about manufacturing objects but manufacturing ourselves as workers
(126). This involves person-image. Person-image is beyond the self; it is part 
of the meshwork and influences how we navigate and literally feel our way 
around it. If work is about manufacturing ourselves, efficiency needs to be 
reframed in terms of human movement, taking into account feelings of 
effortlessness and spontaneity, amounting to an aesthetic appreciation of 
oneself in movement. A meshworked notion of self and person-image is an 
ethical necessity if we are not to end up like Kleist's young man, gazing at an 
artificial image of ourselves at a distance, in an inanimate object; a cool, frigid 
mirror that views us from afar and from the outside only. Person-image must 
be understood as the collaboration of inside and outside, and a life process that
connects humans socially. Le Roy's approach to dance-making, performance 
and presentation has some lessons for puppetry. ATP and a puppetry approach 
to performance-making can be powerful tools in a meshworked critical theatre 
practice. Aesthetics can be extended to include felt sense in a move from 
'Ways of Seeing' to 'Ways of Living'; a shift from the dominance of the 
(consumable) visual image to the lived sense of (non-consumable) person-
image.
4 My trans. of 'Je ne peux pas consommer ici? C'est impossible.'
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Before Chair de ma Chair, a performer offers dolls to the audience, for 
them to hold during the show. This choice shows a desire on Schönbein's part 
to reconnect people to a simple, playful connection to the material world they 
live in and are enmeshed with ("Chair ... Sallaumines"). Schönbein identifies 
her first doll as her first puppet. Unsurprisingly, given her later work, she called
it Ilka. By some standards Schönbein is brutal with her puppets, but she is 
never less than passionately engaged with them and with her world.
Schumann, of Bread and Puppet, writes:
Objects have been performing under the whip of subjects too long and 
are now disobedient and can't be counted on any longer. They avoid 
meaningful relationships and divorce themselves from the intention of 
subjects. They used to be good and close to our hearts. They almost 
liked us and seemed to be grateful for our attention, but were deprived 
of their dignity by the throw-away philosophy, which resulted in the 
object's revenge: garbage. (49)
On an ecological front, the way we use and interact (with our person-images) 
with things affects how quickly they are used up or break. Increased sensitivity
and awareness from everyone would have a major impact. And, in caring for 
things, more reflection might go into what things are made and how; mature 
spontaneity might be achieved. The meshwork which includes the animate and 
the inanimate, the living and the dead, could be brought to awareness. This is 
the puppet's new subversive role; being senseless, it is the gauge of 
sensitivity, a somatic technology.
*
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